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Abstract 
The UK energy system has in the past been characterised by the ownership 
and control of large-scale supply technologies by corporate entities. It has 
become apparent however that such structures are ill suited to addressing 
contemporary energy challenges of decarbonisation, energy security and 
affordability. Moreover, their resistance to change means that the current 
system is fundamentally inconsistent with the need for energy system change. 
The advent of affordable renewable energy however, particularly at small-
scale, offers new prospects for addressing these energy challenges. In 
particular, they present an opportunity for greater societal engagement in the 
energy system, not least as owners and managers of energy assets, but also 
as stakeholders with interest and influence in the energy system more 
generally. Within the context of greater citizen engagement in energy, 
community energy has developed in the UK as an organised means for 
“collective action to purchase, manage and generate energy” (DECC, 2014b). 
Such collective action is complimented by progressively broad engagement 
by individuals in the energy system as investors and prosumers, rather than 
solely consumers. This thesis responds to a need to better understand the 
role and value of community energy, and wider societal engagement more 
generally, within the wider energy system. 
Taking a mixed-methods approach, this thesis contends that community 
energy has the potential to have significant impacts at both local and national 
scales. Social, economic and environmental impacts of a specific community 
energy project are evidenced to illustrate the breadth and scale of potential 
impacts at the local level. Broader analysis of the community energy 
movement, and of ‘small-scale energy’ more generally is suggestive of the 
potential for such approaches to be transformative in terms of overcoming 
system inertia. In particular, the energy system is undergoing a process of 
democratisation, whereby power, wealth and value is gradually distributed 
among society. A key role for policymakers then is to consider the strategic 
importance of democratisation.  
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1 The road now taken? 
“What scale is appropriate? It depends on what we are trying to do.” 
(E.M. Schumacher, 1973) 
Although brief, this quote from E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful captures 
the essence of this thesis. Schumacher’s publication contributed to emergent 
discussions around sustainable development, questioning in particular the 
meaning of ‘growth’ and the notion of societal ‘success’. Primarily though, the 
collection of essays challenged the assumption that for industries and firms 
(as well as nations), bigger is always better. Forty years on, these 
assumptions are still being questioned, not least in the world of energy, the 
principal domain of this thesis. It is here, in the questioning of the “universal 
idolatry of giantism”, (Ibid) that this work is situated. 
Following Edison and Insul’s ‘system building’ push for the widespread 
adoption of electrified networks (Hughes, 1983), the inexorable trajectory of 
the last 100 years have been towards larger, more centralised networks 
connecting more consumers, with associated economies of scale (Ibid). The 
drivers of this development were simple, and remained unchanged for 
decades: demand for greater and more reliable connectivity to the electricity 
network, and at least cost.  
For around the last 25 years however, both the rules of the game have 
changed, and the things ‘we are trying to do’ have evolved. Along with our 
continued demand for reliable, low cost electricity, contemporary awareness 
of the influence of our energy system on the environment means that we are 
also increasingly expectant that the production of our energy is clean, safe 
and secure, and its delivery unhindered. Furthermore, the ongoing 
development of new energy technologies means that the norms around who 
has the right to decide about, own, and draw value from energy infrastructure 
are being challenged. While energy has always been political, the heightened 
potential around societal involvement is arguably resulting in a deeper and 
more profound form of politicisation. It is around these overarching themes 
that the context of this thesis is set. 
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Shortly after the release of Schumacher’s book, another publication drew 
specific attention to the societal implications of the energy decisions of 
government. Amory Lovins’ essay ‘Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken’ 
was a critique of the continued expansion of large-scale centralised supply 
technologies (particularly nuclear) in the U.S. (Lovins, 1976, Lovins, 1977). 
For Lovins, following such a hard energy path represented an enormous 
missed opportunity in terms of avoiding both the unnecessary capital costs 
and waste associated with conventional forms of energy production and 
consumption. The alternative, a soft energy path, characterised by 
renewables and energy efficiency, would avoid these negative impacts and 
instead be far more aligned with societal values. The main thrust of Lovins’ 
work was twofold. First, although the familiar, well-trodden path would be 
“convincingly familiar” for policymakers (Lovins, 1976), a determined shift to a 
new path would be rewarded with social, environmental and economic 
benefits. And second, the existence of a divergent path represented a 
deliberate choice for policymakers, meaning that the hard energy path was far 
from inevitable.  
As it happens, the following decades of energy production and consumption in 
the U.S were far more aligned to Lovins’ 1976 soft energy path, albeit with 
less renewables and more nuclear than Lovins had considered desirable (EIA, 
2011). While this may be considered an achievement of progress, the social, 
environmental and economic context of the political and societal debates 
around energy are continually evolving. This means that debates around what 
is the ‘most suitable’ energy system, in terms of meeting not only cost but also 
other societal objectives such as equity and fairness, are continually being 
refocused. 
Specifically, the last few decades have brought emerging consensus around 
the science of climate change, even if the social, environmental and economic 
consequences are less certain (IPCC, 2014). A new assortment of 
technologies, including energy technologies (but also information and 
communication technologies) are enabling a shift in the relationships between 
people and energy (Mason, 2015); And the centralised energy infrastructures 
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with which we become reliant are reaching the end of their lifespan, meaning 
replacement capacity, in whatever form that may take, needs to be deployed. 
Such factors are focusing attention on the importance of a new set of societal 
values around ‘what we are trying to do’ in terms of our energy system.  
The convergence of these pressures means that today’s decision makers find 
themselves again at a crossroads, and the costs and benefits of a softer 
energy path, versus the status quo, is the subject of much debate within 
policy, academia and contemporary society. This time however, the stakes 
are higher, not only because the trajectory chosen will determine our ability to 
minimise the costs of global climate change, but also because it will shape our 
potential societal progress more generally, through for example the extent to 
which costs and benefits are shared between us, and between this generation 
and the next. 
Electricity infrastructure in the UK is dominated by large, centralised thermal 
generation, the value of which is retained by a small number of firms and 
whose dominance is perpetuated by an out-dated set of governance 
arrangements (HM Treasury and DECC, 2010, Mitchell, 2008, Mitchell, 2013). 
Moreover, society’s role in the energy system has traditionally been one of 
passive consumption (Watson, 2004, Devine-Wright, 2007), which does little 
to signal demand for change in the market-driven energy system, meaning 
that the entire energy system is characterised by inertia (Mitchell, 2014a, 
Marechal and Lazaric, 2010, Soutar, 2015). As such, changing to an 
alternative path represents a significant change in direction, not only for 
policymakers, but also for actors throughout the energy system. 
The emergence of community energy (CE), as “collective action to purchase, 
manage and generate energy” (DECC, 2014b) represent one such alternative 
path. Such approaches typically favour small-scale, locally sited technologies 
over conventional technologies. While not necessarily opposing fossil fuel-
based technologies (For example, community-based Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) may still employ gas as an energy source), this change in focus 
has been made possible in part by the emergence of affordable RE 
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technologies, and as such, provide a route for localised deployment and 
ownership of such technologies. They also provide opportunities for managing 
energy demand, an area that has proved challenging within the framework of 
the existing energy system.  
While DECC’s definition of CE (as outlined in the previous paragraph) seeks 
to capture both formal and informal collective action around energy, it is 
recognised that such groups cannot be isolated from the activities of 
individuals within wider communities or populations. CE groups usually 
comprise local members of the community, and the success of CE projects is 
often dependent on the ability of local populations to support, buy in to, and 
invest in CE groups such that projects can be enabled or constrained by wider 
communities. Moreover, CE represents but one strand of a wider movement 
of individuals, networks and businesses being more engaged with the energy 
system. As such, this thesis has a primary focus on the CE movement of 
collectives, but also considers the role of the wider energy ‘community’. Thus, 
from now on this thesis takes community energy to mean collective efforts 
and citizen-led energy to include CE as well as the aggregated activities of 
individuals.  
This thesis is concerned with furthering our understanding around the role of 
citizen-led energy as one alternative approach to established norms. As such, 
the research echoes that of Lovins and Schumacher in both interrogating the 
logic behind centralised energy systems and reappraising the opportunities of 
small-scale, localised systems.  
1.1 Understanding energy transitions 
The following research question forms the foundation for this thesis: What is 
the value of community energy in the UK? From that broad, overarching 
question come three more specific lines of inquiry: 
a) What impact can community and citizen-led energy have on local 
energy systems? 
b) How do social dimensions of community energy relate to its value? 
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c) In what ways does the community energy movement, and citizen-
oriented energy more widely impact upon the wider UK energy 
system? 
In addressing these research questions, this thesis brings together several 
themes pertinent to the understanding of energy system change. 
The first theme this thesis addresses, and one that carries through the entire 
thesis, is that of the interplay between incumbency and innovation in the 
energy system. The community energy movement describes the aggregated 
efforts of a growing set of grassroots actors seeking to manage, own, reduce 
energy locally, and by doing so counter the norms of the established energy 
system. As well as affecting local energy economies, the wider development 
and growth of the sector is of potential consequence to the broader energy 
system.  
Meanwhile, as already alluded to, the current energy system is characterised 
by an inflexible set of technological, economic and institutional structures and 
norms, which are both self-reinforcing and resistant to pressure from 
competing structures. Examining the role of community energy within the 
wider energy system therefore requires building an understanding of 
circumstances of, and relationship between, inertia in incumbency and the 
dynamism of subaltern interests. However, many analyses focus either on the 
development of niche innovations, or on lock-in to incumbent structures. By 
employing and building upon established theories around sociotechnical 
transitions, this thesis seeks to develop a more coherent and dynamic 
understanding of the interplay between established systems and emergent 
social and technological innovations. 
Secondly, this thesis is strongly underpinned by the recognition that climate 
and energy challenges are not simply technological or economic challenges, 
but are also social in nature. This is not to say that the technical and 
economic aspects of problems and solutions to challenges are not important: 
Technological developments and associated improvements in economics are 
clearly key drivers of energy transitions. However, this thesis seeks to 
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highlight the importance of the social, particularly in the context of the current 
energy transition at multiple levels. In terms of individuals and communities for 
example, this thesis provides evidence to support calls for a collective 
renegotiation around new sets of values and norms; acceptance, support and 
adoption of new technological innovations; and the aggregation and 
organisation of individuals within and among grassroots CE groups. In terms 
of policymaking, it calls for acknowledgement and deliberative action to 
overcome system inertia, political reflexivity towards societal values, and a 
realignment of regulations and institutions to better align with these values 
(Soutar, 2015, Mitchell et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the outcomes, as well as the processes of community energy are 
inherently social in nature. Technical and economic feasibility is clearly 
important for renewable energy developments to make sense, but the 
selection of a specific technology in CE projects is less often cited in terms of 
the scale of economic returns than it is to its ability to help address social 
objectives, such as the redistribution of energy supply revenues to local 
communities. In this sense, the importance of economics is heavily weighted 
towards distributional, rather than absolute benefits for profit maximisation. 
Also central to CE is the potential for other (non-monetary) value streams, 
such as the creation of more legitimate forms of governance. 
While an understanding of community energy hinges then on understanding 
social aspects of community energy, the current political and academic 
overemphasis on the technologies and economics of energy means that the 
importance of society in negotiating and shaping energy system change can 
be overlooked. This thesis seeks to play a part in readdressing that balance. 
This thesis is mindful that the role of community energy will depend to a large 
extent on how the attributes and opportunities it offers are understood, 
realised and valued, in different ways, by different sets of actors throughout 
the energy system. For example, the value of community energy practitioners 
as trusted intermediaries for householders must be considered alongside the 
ability of the sector to deliver local economic resilience, and within the context 
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of its wider contribution towards processes of energy system transformation. 
Different stakeholders can of course be expected to weight these factors 
differently, depending on individual interests, and it is on the richness of roles 
and expectations of CE that this thesis seeks to reflect. 
Finally, if we hope to steer ongoing transformative changes in the energy 
system to societal objective we must first understand the agents, dynamics 
and consequences of such a shift. While existing literatures exploring 
sociotechnical transition are well aligned with transformational pathways, 
these are often theoretical, abstracted and conceptual, and as such rarely link 
analysis of specific activities on-the-ground to transformational pathways. This 
thesis seeks to address this by considering the importance of community 
energy at the local level alongside how the drivers, diversity and dynamism of 
the wider community energy movement contribute to the realisation of broader 
societal objectives. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Including this introduction, this thesis is comprised of ten chapters, and is 
structured as follows. 
A comprehensive review of the literature in Chapter two provides the overall 
rationale for the thesis. The contemporary energy system is characterised by 
a new set of pressures relating to climate change, energy security and 
affordability. It is apparent that the energy system as it is currently set up is 
not just incapable, but fundamentally incompatible with being able to address 
these challenges. Indeed, overcoming the inertia characteristic of the system 
can be considered a challenge in itself, and suggests the need for 
fundamental and structural changes across the whole energy system.  
Involving a different set of technologies, scales, and actors however presents 
the potential for addressing these contemporary energy challenges, including 
overcoming inertia. In contrast to conventional centralised technologies, 
networks and modes of governance, distributed production of energy 
comprising renewable energy technologies in particular represents a small-
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scale approach to energy, which offers quite different prospects in terms of 
distribution of costs and benefits, shifts in governance, managing demand, 
public engagement, and broader evolutionary change within the energy 
system. While a nascent community energy sector in the UK is highlighting 
the potential of an alternative energy approach, there is a real and urgent 
need to build a better understanding of the merits of this approach. 
Chapter three examines two countries, Germany and Denmark, which are 
frequently cited as having strong citizen-oriented and community energy 
sectors, which is often attributed to sympathetic domestic policy frameworks. 
Renewable energy deployment in both countries is strong both in absolute 
terms and relative to domestic electricity consumption, while the ownership of 
such infrastructure is heavily weighted towards individual and communities. 
Cultural aspects relating to public attitudes to nuclear and renewables, and of 
existing traditions around community ownership and governance are 
considered to have been central to the development of community energy 
within supportive policy frameworks. 
Chapter four provides an overview of the methods used to address the 
research objectives, with two specific loci of interest, a) the impacts of a 
community energy initiative on a specific local energy system and b) the 
impact of broader sector-wide changes resulting from aggregation of 
community energy efforts. A two-tiered approach is favoured, whereby 
insights into the micro-scale dynamics of community group development and 
practice can be considered alongside macro-scale evolution of the broader 
community energy movement as a whole. A household survey thus 
compliments a desk based study and stakeholder interviews to give a 
rounded picture of the evolution of the movement. Reflection on subjective 
and objective notions of ‘success’ from the perspective of different community 
energy stakeholders supports the use of a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. 
Chapters five, six and seven present results from the research. In 
establishing a baseline for a local energy system, Chapter 5 highlights 
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several potential opportunities and barriers to community energy in the town 
of Wadebridge. The size of the study site relative to other community energy 
projects means variability in local housing stock, access to gas, 
socioeconomics and demographics present both challenges and opportunities 
for change. Local support for renewable technologies, particularly at small-
scales is matched by support for local ownership, particularly where local 
benefits can be realised. 
Chapter six seeks to analyse the impacts of WREN’s activities, which can be 
understood according to multidimensional, distributional and temporal aspects 
of community energy. Multidimensionality acknowledges the importance of a 
whole-systems approach, which simultaneously accounts for physical, social 
and economic dimensions of change. The distribution of impacts are 
considered key to understanding equity and justice as social elements central 
to community energy, while temporal variations in impact relate to the 
interplay between objective-based and system-based change. WREN has 
demonstrated considerable impact in directly and indirectly influencing local 
RE deployment (particularly small-scale PV and domestic heat), playing an 
important role in implementing national demand reduction programmes, and 
paving the way for more fundamental changes in terms of local supply. 
Chapter seven contains a deeper exploration of the relationship between the 
development of WREN and people-oriented capitals. Local human and social 
capitals have proved instrumental in the establishment and evolution of 
WREN, and indeed is considered central to CE more widely. Specifically, 
human capital in the form of knowledge, expertise, determination and vision 
has provided a nucleus around which collective action can coalesce. Such 
social networking around collective values and interests contributes to 
bonding capital, which strengthens as a result of working together. Bridging 
capital is employed with reference to the expansion of WREN’s activities 
beyond the core membership group, playing an important part in legitimising 
efforts. An extension of this is a discussion of WREN’s ability to deploy linking 
capital to establish useful relationships with influential individuals and 
organisations to further their goals, both locally and further afield. 
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Moving on from the individual case study perspective, Chapter eight 
refocuses the discussion on the evolution of community energy in the UK 
more broadly. It demonstrates how the aggregated impact of local 
expectations, networks and learning is contributing to sector-wide change, 
and how the formal community energy sector has influenced adoption of key 
principles and approaches by other regime actors. As well as describing 
energy system in transition however, the evolution of community energy can 
also be described as transformative in that it is affecting the fundamental 
structure of the energy system, including technologies, actors, and the 
relationship between them.  
Chapter nine progresses from a sociotechnical transition-perspective of 
community energy to considering the transformational potential of the 
movement. A new set of technologies and stakeholders are changing the 
rules of the energy system from one which relies on economies of scale to 
one in which network economies are more important. The energy system is 
thus undergoing a process of democratisation, whereby assets, wealth and 
thus value are shifting from a small number of private actors to a large, 
distributed and diverse network of actors. In contrast to large-scale energy 
systems, small-scale energy is demonstrating the ability to respond to societal 
needs, engaging new actors, and challenging institutional and cognitive 
norms, and as such are considered central to overcoming system inertia. As 
far as energy system transformation is needed, this suggests a key role for 
policy in engaging society in the energy system. 
Chapter ten concludes this thesis by summarising the research and relates 
the insights developed therein to the original research questions. The ability of 
community energy to positively impact upon local communities is 
complimented by creating the conditions for more fundamental transformative 
change. The key implications for policy are a) that while it is unlikely that 
transformational change can be managed, it can be nurtured and b) that since 
transformational change is a necessity, embracing the opportunities created 
by such change should be prioritised. This chapter is concluded by reflecting 
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on the contribution of the thesis to the research community and highlights 
further avenues for research. 
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2 The role of scale in overcoming contemporary energy challenges  
The global challenges of climate change and energy security, combined with 
the need to update domestic energy infrastructure, means that UK energy 
policy is at something of a crossroads. However, it is becoming bleakly 
apparent that the current energy system is ill-suited to addressing these 
challenges: it is clear that the established fossil-fuel based technologies that 
have contributed to climate change and energy security concerns cannot 
continue to play a large role in a future energy system. More fundamentally 
however, the current energy system is characterised by a structural resistance 
to change, and it is overcoming such inertia that represents the single 
greatest challenge of energy policy today. 
The emergence of small-scale and particularly low carbon sources of energy 
provide opportunities for meeting these contemporary energy challenges, as 
well as helping to overcome systemic inertia. The nature, scale, and 
geography of alternative technologies are well suited to addressing key 
energy policy objectives of ensuring clean, secure and affordable energy. On 
a more fundamental level, the advent and adoption of such technologies is 
fundamentally changing the structure of the energy system by facilitating 
stronger relationships with individuals and communities as both shareholders 
and stakeholders of the energy system. 
Perceived failings of the current energy system to deliver societal benefits, 
and emergent opportunities to counteract this with small-scale technologies 
has meant that citizens are becoming more and more engaged in the UK 
energy system. While community energy in particular represents a potentially 
valuable framework for driving, funding and implementing local energy system 
change, its contribution in the wider energy system is being constrained 
somewhat, particularly because it reflects a set of actors, approaches and 
values that are outside of the norms of the established energy system. 
Specifically, the value of business plans offered by many CE groups is less 
immediately obvious to a political system more familiar with delivering energy 
policy via more traditional market actors, at greater speed, and with less 
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apparent need for societal engagement. As such, political and societal 
support for community energy has so far been limited. 
Based on this narrative, this chapter presents a comprehensive review of the 
literature that provides context and rationale for this thesis.  
2.1 New objectives, new decisions 
The UK’s energy system is at something of a crossroads. Climate change and 
shifts in global energy consumption are presenting two key challenges to the 
country: reducing the carbon intensity of the energy system and increasing 
domestic energy security. The importance of addressing these long-term 
challenges, whilst maintaining affordability of energy supply for consumers, 
was first communicated in the government’s 2007 Energy White Paper 
(BERR, 2007). Addressing any one of those issues would be difficult in its 
own right, but addressing them all simultaneously represents an 
unprecedented challenge in the scale, depth and immediacy of the situation 
for policymakers as well as society at large.  
Moreover, a significant proportion of the UK’s current energy infrastructure is 
coming to the end of its functional lifetime, hastening the need to make 
decisions around the next round of infrastructure investments (DECC, 2011b, 
Ofgem, 2010). In very coarse terms, the first option might be to renew the 
existing fleet of energy producing and generating plant with similar 
technologies but updated technical standards and increased efficiencies. This 
might represent the employment of existing fuels, supply chains and supply 
networks, albeit with modern technical components, such as in a new 
generation of nuclear power or gas turbine plants. While the familiarity of such 
changes might be appealing to politicians (and perhaps part of society), such 
incremental change could only go so far in tackling the energy challenges, 
particularly those relating to climate change, and would perpetuate exposure 
to volatile fossil fuel prices with implications for energy costs. 
A second option is to fill the capacity gaps left by closing generation plants 
with alternative technologies more fundamentally suited to addressing 
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contemporary energy challenges. Importantly, this option would take 
advantage of renewable sources of energy, which, by their nature dramatically 
reduce the contribution of the energy production to carbon emissions. The 
scale and relative immaturity of some such technologies means that the 
upfront capital costs of this option can be relatively high in the short term, 
although their minimal operational costs (due to the use of free, renewable 
sources) mean they are relatively insulated from variations in global fossil fuel 
prices. Depending on the technology used, such a path would also employ 
both existing supply networks as well as require their updating. 
Clearly, these options represent two extreme ends of a continuum, and the 
path currently taken is a combination of the repurposing and renewal of 
existing technologies and networks with the introduction of new technologies 
and networks. However, each path along that continuum represents vastly 
different propositions in terms of our ability to address the energy challenges 
outlined above; the costs involved and value created, both for this, and for 
future generations; and consequently, for our ability to meet broader societal 
objectives. It is clear then that careful consideration needs to be continually 
taken with respect to the pathway we, as society, want to take, as well as to 
the steps we take to move towards and along that pathway.  
Financial assistance to increase the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies have been in place for around 25 years, but while significant 
progress has been made to this end, there remain doubts around whether the 
scale and speed of such progress is enough to meet EU targets (European 
Commission, 2015). Furthermore, the energy supply system is only part of the 
wider energy system, and the nature, scale and immediacy of the 
interconnected energy challenges requires a systems-wide approach; that is, 
meeting the challenge requires changes not only to supply, but also to 
consumption, and necessitates learning from and adaptation of technological, 
economic, societal and institutional systems (UKERC, 2009, Droege, 2009, 
HM Government, 2009a, Stern, 2006, Foxon et al., 2009, Jackson, 2009). 
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Further, it is becoming acknowledged that current governance arrangements 
and associated institutions are ill-suited to the energy challenges of today. 
Rather, the rules, incentives and institutions currently in place do not facilitate 
innovation needed to meet the various energy challenges, are disengaging of 
consumers, are ill-suited to the integration of modern technologies, and failing 
the interests of society by virtue of the lack of a legitimate, transparent and 
dynamic framework upon which change can occur (Lockwood, 2013, Mitchell, 
2014a, Mitchell et al., 2015). These arguments are at the heart of the need for 
a fundamental policy paradigm shift within energy (Mitchell, 2008, Kuzemko, 
2013, Kern et al., 2014). 
As the following section explores, the current energy system design is ill 
suited to meeting the key objectives of energy policy, and making only 
incremental changes to the fundamental structure of the system is unlikely to 
get us very far. Furthermore, for reasons that will be explored, the energy 
system can be considered ‘path dependent’: that is, any decisions made 
about future pathways are very much constrained by the current path, and it 
can be costly (in financial, political and psychological terms) for those with 
influence in the energy system to divert from what is held to be familiar. As 
such, inertia is a key characteristic of both the components of the energy 
system (business models, institutions, forms of governance, consumer norms 
etc.) as well as of the system as a whole. 
This has two key implications. Firstly, the decisions that take us down a given 
pathway cannot be taken lightly. They require careful consideration of the 
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of a huge range of 
decisions relevant to the functioning of the energy system. Secondly, system 
complexity and path dependency means that it is both difficult but vital to 
make decisions while focusing on the pathway society wants to take, rather 
than the one it appears to already be stumbling along. It is in this context of 
the need for deliberative decision making that the current research is placed.  
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2.2 Inadequacies of the current energy system 
The headline challenges for UK energy policy, to provide clean, secure and 
affordable energy are consequences of both external and internal factors. 
While exogenous factors (e.g. shifts in global energy consumption of 
developing countries impacting on global energy prices and emissions) of 
course provide part of the rationale for energy system change, endogenous 
factors cannot be overlooked. For example, the fossil fuel based energy 
system in the UK has been a major contributor to domestic emissions, and 
thus to climate change (HM Government, 2009a). Similarly, a reliance on 
fossil fuel-based infrastructure means that we have become increasingly 
reliant on fuel imports, often from fragile economies, which has affected our 
energy security (Wicks, 2009, Kuzemko and Bradshaw, 2013). Affordability is 
in part influenced by global factors (such as wholesale costs of gas, for 
example), but again, these external factors are of importance only because of 
the dependence on fossil fuels in this country (Ofgem, 2012, Wicks, 2009, 
Mitchell et al., 2013). Thus, while the big issues of climate change and energy 
security are often framed as external forces (Kuzemko, 2013), they are 
influenced in large part by the characteristics of the system in place today 
(Mitchell et al., 2013). 
For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that UK energy policy challenges can 
be addressed with the same technologies that played have created them. This 
section discusses the inadequacies of a centralised, fossil-fuel-based energy 
system in dealing with the contemporary energy policy challenges. 
2.2.1 Climate change 
There is now widespread scientific consensus that the climate warming is 
unequivocal and that it is “extremely likely” (> 95 per cent probability) that 
most of this warming is due to anthropogenic GHG emission increases (IPCC, 
2013). There is growing evidence of the impact of climate change on natural 
and human systems, with potentially profound implications for ecosystems 
and the human livelihoods they support (IPCC, 2014). As such evidence 
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mounts, climate change has been described by world leaders as the biggest 
threat to humanity (Ki-Moon, 2014, Obama, 2014). 
The potential economic implications of climate change impacts were 
highlighted in the Stern Review, commissioned by the Government in 2006. 
Stern described climate change as “the greatest and widest-ranging market 
failure ever seen (Stern, 2006), highlighting that impacts are likely to cost a 
significant proportion of GDP, that these would be distributed towards poorer 
nations, and are likely to accelerate as climate change progresses (Ibid; 
OECD, 2008, IPCC, 2014). Addressing climate change sooner rather than 
later thus carries benefits that outweigh the costs (Stern, 2006, Ackerman and 
Stanton, 2006). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was established in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to "stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC, 
1992). This led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which sets binding GHG 
emissions targets for developed countries. Under this, the UK as member of 
the European Union committed to reducing GHG emissions by 12.5 per cent 
in the first commitment period from 1990 to 2012, and 20 per cent by 2020 
(Defra, 2006). 
The vast majority of total GHG emissions in the UK are derived from the 
production and consumption of energy, with the energy sector (including 
transport) contributing to 84 per cent of all GHG emissions in 2010 (DECC, 
2012c). This means that for the UK at least, the climate change challenge of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is directly related to the manner in which 
we produce and consume energy. This of course implies that those factors 
contributing to the problem can form part of the solution (Scrase and 
MacKerron, 2009). 
The passing of the Climate Change Act in 2008 established an overarching 
commitment by the UK to reduce emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, relative 
to 1990 levels (HM Government, 2008). The Act established a framework for 
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setting an “economically credible” emissions reductions path, gave ministers 
powers to introduce mechanisms to achieve targets, and established the 
Committee on Climate Change to oversee carbon budgets and policies (Ibid).  
The role of the energy system in reducing emissions is profound. Electricity 
generation is the single largest contributor to UK emissions, making up 
around a third of total GHG emissions in 2006 (WWF, 2006). Decarbonisation 
of the economy is thus reliant on decarbonising the electricity sector. In 
addressing the energy challenges, a central policy strand has thus been to 
increase the proportion of energy coming from renewable energy (RE) 
resources, with the 2009 Renewables Directive (EC, 2009) committing the UK 
to a 15 per cent target by 2020 (HM Government, 2009b). To that end, the UK 
government is seeking to deploy RE technologies through a suite of policy 
instruments and at a range of scales. Moreover, although the primary 
rationale for RE policy measures is to help reduce GHG emissions to comply 
with EU and associated UK legislation, it has been acknowledged that such 
an approach is also aligned with other energy policy objectives, namely 
energy security and technological innovation (DECC, 2011, DECC, 2010), as 
well as industrial policy objective of industry and job creation (EC, 2009, 
DECC, 2011d, DECC, 2010a). 
In part resulting from RE policies, and in part due to reductions in 
consumption caused by the economic downturn and improved energy 
efficiency, the contribution of the power sector to total emissions dropped to 
around a quarter in 2014, allowing the first carbon budget (and EU Kyoto 
target) to be met comfortably (CCC, 2015). Deployment of renewables over 
the last decade has been promising, particularly when the low baseline 
relative to other EU countries is considered. However, there remains 
considerable uncertainty over the continuation of investment up to 2020 and 
beyond (CCC, 2014), a situation compounded by the stagnation of two key 
elements of decarbonisation programme: the development of Carbon Capture 
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and Storage (CCS)1, and the deployment of a new generation of nuclear 
power stations (CCC, 2015, CCC, 2014). At the time of writing, the realisation 
of these two strands appears more at threat than ever (Neslen, 2015, 
Financial Times, 2015), making the unsuitability of fossil fuel based 
infrastructure even more apparent. 
2.2.2 Energy security 
Energy security concerns in UK policy have risen up the political agenda in 
the last decade, influenced by depleting North Sea oil and gas production, 
blackouts in power systems around the world, rising global energy prices, 
geopolitical concerns, and fuel protests (Mitchell et al., 2013). The UK in 2013 
changed from a net exporter to a net importer of primary fuel types, the first 
time it had been since the 1970s prior to the exploitation of North Sea oil and 
gas developments. Though import dependency itself may not be an issue, its 
political salience is enhanced by ongoing concerns about the stability of 
importing countries (Wicks, 2009, Mitchell et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the need 
for the current ageing fleet of generation infrastructure to be replaced provides 
an additional dimension to the need to maintain accessibility of affordable 
supply (Ofgem, 2010, DECC, 2011b). 
This political salience of energy security has, and continues to be, centred on 
the economic (and thus political) imperatives of “keeping the lights on” in 
terms of maintaining a functioning economy. This could either be manifested 
in a physical shock to supply over a short term (such as interference in transit 
routes), or a more structural, long-term stress to supply (caused perhaps 
through gas price volatility affecting inflation and consumer prices (DECC, 
2012a). Either way, the political consequences of threats to national 
prosperity are likely to be damaging, making appealing the prospect of having 
more ‘home-grown’ energy in the mix (Wicks, 2009). 
                                            
 
1 There are also ongoing developments in Carbon Capture and Recycling (CCR) 
technologies which produce usable CO2 for industry (Gale, 2015) 
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The interconnectivities of the UK energy system, and of energy systems 
elsewhere ensure that energy security is a property of the energy system, 
rather than of a single component (i.e. electricity supply infrastructure) 
(Mitchell et al., 2013). While particular components of the system might be 
regarded as being less or more ‘secure’, the overall security of energy 
services for society is dependent on the interactions between all of the 
elements of the system (Ibid), meaning that addressing energy security 
necessitates action across the entire energy system, rather than just to 
discrete elements, such as more favourable foreign relations. 
The dominance of centralised fossil fuel-based infrastructure over alternative 
forms of energy production means that the system is particularly vulnerable to 
disruption to supply networks, which are increasingly outside of domestic 
control and subject to wider geopolitical forces, giving rise to the threat of both 
shocks and stresses relating to the vagaries of global politics and energy 
consumption trends (Kuzemko and Bradshaw, 2013). Furthermore, the scale 
of centralised energy supply networks in the UK means that disruptions to 
single components or particularly supply sources (such as freight driver 
strikes and blockades) or distribution nodes can potentially impact large 
sections of the UK energy system (Sovacool, 2010). 
Of more fundamental relevance is how the institutional properties of the 
energy system, including governance, have impacted upon system security. It 
is clear now that assumptions in the 1980s and 1990s that energy security 
would be a natural outcome of marketization, privatisation and liberalisation of 
energy were flawed (European Commission, 2011). This realisation can in 
part be attributed to variations in state control (and often ownership) over 
energy companies across different nations, and the incompatibility of energy 
governance approaches across nations (Kuzemko and Bradshaw, 2013). 
2.2.3 Affordability 
Conceptually, affordability of energy can be considered a form of energy 
security (Mitchell et al., 2013), with the actor taken as households or 
individuals rather than the state (or region). Threats to affordability can then 
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appear in the form of reduced spending power, or the increased costs of 
heating and lighting as key energy services.  
Although the importance of domestic energy efficiency had been recognised 
since the late 1970s, it wasn’t until the advent of the New Labour Government 
in 1997 that affordability featured as an explicit strand within energy policy 
rather than as assumed outcome of free markets (Boardman, 1991, Kern et 
al., 2014). The commitment to liberalisation in general continued during this 
period, although the focus, particularly in the first term of government, was 
making it work better to serve social objectives (Pearson and Watson, 2012), 
with Energy Minister John Battle emphasising the “commitment to competition 
and determination to ensure that the unbundling of costs does not hit hardest 
those least able to pay” (Battle, 1997). For example, in their first year, the 
government introduced winter fuel payments, a windfall tax for utilities, and 
reduced VAT on domestic fuel bills, and paved the way for the publication of 
the government’s first Fuel Poverty Strategy in 2001 (Pearson and Watson, 
2012). Unlike climate change and energy security policy, affordability policy 
under New Labour can thus be explicitly characterised with social objectives 
of human health and wellbeing (Liddell, 2008, Hills, 2012). 
Beyond the policy focus on affordability directly, climate change and security 
interventions are of course inextricably tied to affordability. Since such policies 
are passed onto consumers through bills, our ability to follow a given energy 
transition will be determined by the willingness and ability of society to pay for 
the requisite changes to the energy system (Pollitt, 2010), the distribution of 
which is unevenly distributed across society (Mitchell et al., 2012). Outside of 
‘affordability policy’, the assumption that liberalisation would maintain 
affordability (by driving competition) has in recent years been acknowledged 
as false (HM Treasury and DECC, 2010), calling into question the suitability of 
energy regulation as it is currently set up (Mitchell, 2014a). 
There is however some evidence that affordability has been repoliticised in 
recent years in terms of increasing discussion within civil society and the 
media around rising energy bills and potentially excessive profits of energy 
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utilities. This has culminated in a series of policy interventions in recent years, 
including Energy and Climate Change Select Committee inquiry on energy 
prices and vertical integration (ECCC, 2013), the development of the first fuel 
poverty strategy in over a decade (DECC, 2015a), and a referral (by the Gas 
and Electricity Markets Authority as Ofgem’s governing body) to the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) over possible distortions of 
competition within the UK energy market. 
2.3 Inertia as the fourth objective 
The three energy challenges outlined in the previous section are only part of 
the picture. This thesis contends that there is a fourth challenge; that of 
overcoming the inertia that perpetuates the current, failing system that locks 
out the emergence of alternative pathways. As this thesis contends, the 
underlying problem is that the technologies, markets, institutions, governance, 
and consumers are highly entrenched in their own right, as well as in relation 
to one another. Not only then is perpetuation of the current centralised, large 
scale energy system inappropriate for meeting the three energy challenges, it 
is structurally resistant to the introduction of an alternative system. In this 
sense, the challenge is not simply in addressing objectives, but in changing 
the fundamental structure of the system to make it more able to address such 
objectives.  
2.3.1 Timescales of incumbency and change 
The timescales that both characterise energy systems and that are required 
for overcoming contemporary challenges are of relevance here. The 
architecture of the energy system as we know it in the UK was set up in a 
different era, to meet a quite different set of objectives than those faced today: 
The majority of the UK’s current fossil-fuel-based generation infrastructure, for 
example was set up in the 1970s and 80s, during in a period of abundant and 
inexpensive fossil fuels supply. Energy infrastructures were typically large 
scale, reflecting the relative ease of scaling up from smaller thermal 
technologies without prohibitive capital costs and economies of scale were 
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possible with the availability of transportable, storable, and easy to handle 
fuels. The siting of coal-powered generation plants near areas already 
exploited for coal resources, prior to cultural understanding of climate change, 
meant that decisions relating to generation were rarely as politically 
contentious as they are nowadays. As Liebreich points out, in the past “there 
were no discussions about the relative aesthetics of open-cast coal mines and 
gas fields” (Liebreich, 2015). 
In addition, in the 1970s and 80s, the threat and implications of unchecked 
climate change was yet to be acknowledged, as was the impact of carbon 
emissions on climate change, and the global power balance was 
characterised by the relatively simple bipolar axis of the Cold War (Mitchell et 
al., 2013). All of these circumstances ensured that expanding fossil-fuel 
extraction and generation could meet rising demand for energy services. 
Without (knowledge of) the threats of climate change or energy security, and 
with low fuel prices, energy was treated as a simple commodity (Kuzemko, 
2013) rather than the means to deliver a public good. As a result, society has 
become accustomed and conditioned to having abundant, cheap, energy 
services with relatively unconstrained availability and consumption, and with 
no real drive to become engaged in energy beyond the consumption of 
energy as a commodity.  
While the interconnected systems of technology, delivery and consumption 
have thus become established over a number of decades, the advent of a 
new set of energy challenges requires change to occur over a comparatively 
short timescale (Fouquet and Pearson, 2012). It requires the rapid adoption of 
(often) immature technologies, acceleration in innovation, and relatively quick 
shifts in individual and collective behaviours and lifestyles. It seems clear then 
the inertia that characterises the current energy system is a fundamental 
issue that warrants specific attention. This section seeks to address this. 
2.3.2 Questioning the inevitability of a fossil-fuel based system 
The hypothesis that a large-scale energy system is not an inevitability is not 
new. With relevance to energy studies, E.F. Schumacher in the seminal Small 
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is Beautiful (1973) challenges the established orthodoxy of economies of 
scale, arguing that while large scale processes may be economically more 
efficient, it risks side-lining those objectives (e.g. justice, harmony, beauty and 
health) that are less valued, but arguably more important in terms of overall 
societal welfare.  
Around the same time Amory Lovins conceptualised appropriately-scaled and 
decentralised energy technologies as an alternative ‘soft energy path’, to the 
conventional ‘hard energy path’ of centralised thermal generation (Lovins, 
1977). Lovins’ writings came at a time of increasing dependence on 
centralised generation and the notions of paths emphasised that choice is 
explicit, that is, a centralised ‘hard’ path is not inevitability. Furthermore, while 
each option is likely to necessitate change, choosing a hard path would entail 
social change that “are apt to be less pleasant, less plausible, less compatible 
with social diversity and freedom of choice, and less consistent with traditional 
values” (Ibid). 
These core publications present the basic principles upon which small-scale 
energy in this thesis is conceptualised. Firstly, they challenge the neoclassical 
premise that cost minimisation should override other societal objectives: while 
striving for economies of scale can be desirable in many industrial processes, 
the relationship between the energy system and society (particularly in 
relation to pollution externalities) compel us to satisfy needs beyond cost 
minimisation.  
Secondly, there is the suggestion that there is no middle way, and ‘choosing’ 
(either actively or passively) a centralised route can inhibit the attainment of 
the alternative, “both by starving its components into garbled and incoherent 
fragments and by changing social structures and values in a way that makes 
the innovations of a soft path more painful to envisage and to achieve” 
(Lovins, 1976). Small-scale energy can thus be considered both an end (in 
terms of the wide range of benefits it can deliver) as well as a means (in terms 
of alternative technologies, politics and philosophies) through which to get 
there. 
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While these publications gained traction among proponents of a different 
pathway, it is only recently that the benefits of such a pathway have made 
their way into the mainstream. With hindsight, they appear prophetic, 
especially given the infancy and low rates of deployment of the alternative 
technologies they promote, but also because of the dominance of the 
conventional energy system at the time. Now that such technologies are 
forcing their way into the mainstream and pushing out incumbent 
technologies, there the pressure to step away from a large-scale energy path 
is increasing. 
It is in this vein that Michael Liebrich recalls the quote often (mis)attributed to 
Gandhi that “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, 
then you win” in relation to the clean energy pushback (Liebreich, 2011, Klein, 
1918).  
2.3.3 Conceptualising lock in 
Analyses of the processes of technological, institutional and cultural ‘lock-in’ 
are well established within the literature, particularly with respect to low 
carbon transitions (e.g. Unruh (2000)). These forces of inertia work together to 
present significant barriers to addressing the various energy challenges to 
such an extent that overcoming these barriers could be considered a 
challenge in its own right.  
The heavily interlinked system of technologies, organisations, society and 
governing institutions, termed the Techno-Institutional Complex (TIC), can 
thus be understood as a stable configuration of technological infrastructures 
and the organizations and institutions that create diffuse and employ them 
(Unruh, 2000). The energy system can thus be regarded as an example of 
such a system. 
The field of Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies hypothesises that 
technology co-exists and co-evolves with society, and that specific 
technologies become established because they are ‘socio-technical 
configurations that work’ (Rip and Kemp, 1998). Although focusing on 
technology, this concept rejects any form of technological determinism (the 
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linear notion that technology moves forward and society adapts), and instead 
posits that technologies influence and are influenced by the social, economic 
and cultural contexts in which they develop (Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
Technological innovation thus arises as a result of the interactions of a given 
technology within the context of existing markets, institutional and regulatory 
factors, and expectations of consumers, to that extent that its development is 
said to be ‘path dependent’ (David, 1985), with regard to the existing TIC. 
In particular, path dependency and the embedded nature of TICs within 
complex systems (such as the energy system) acts to favour incumbent 
technologies and supporting organisational, societal and governing structures 
over new technologies and new structures. To the extent that technologies, 
institutions and society becomes locked in to a specific TIC – in this case, the 
large scale centralised energy system (Arthur, 1988, Foxon, 2002). The 
mechanisms behind such forces are now briefly explored. 
2.3.4 Technological lock-in 
Stability within the dominant energy system TIC arises from a combination of 
forces that conspire to perpetuate fossil-fuel based infrastructures despite the 
presence of alternatives, a situation which has been described as ‘carbon 
lock-in’ (Unruh, 2000). Firstly, as already touched upon, path dependency 
relates to the selection of particular designs through a chance set of 
circumstances relating to timing, strategy and historic circumstances, rather 
than superiority (Arthur, 1988). The temporal dimension is central here: large, 
centralised fossil fuel-based technologies offered an appropriate solution for 
the needs of a historic energy system, but are ill-suited to today’s challenges. 
Several factors, including adaptive expectations, scale economies, learning 
economies and network economies contribute to increasing economic returns 
to scale reduces the cost of technologies as adoption increases, creating 
competitive advantages. Under conditions of path dependency (i.e. with the 
right timing/historic conditions), exploiting these increasing returns to scale 
through development and commercialisation can result in market domination 
and lock-in to specific technologies (Unruh, 2000). With particular relevance 
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for this thesis, network effects, as the embedded nature of interconnected 
technologies, explains the coevolution of large scale fossil-fuel based 
technologies with centralised, radial, inflexible transmission and distribution 
networks through the establishment of within-industry cooperation and 
standards (Mitchell et al., 2014, Mitchell, 2011), norms of financing (Reed, 
2013), and a specific set of institutions and skills that perpetuate knowledge, 
skills and resources needed to maintain a particular system (Unruh, 2000). 
2.3.5 Institutional lock-in 
The coevolution of TICs means that embedded technological are supported 
and reinforced by lock-in of an to the institutional structures that employ them. 
Piersen (2000) argues that collective action, the high density of institutions, 
asymmetries of power and the complexity and opacity of politics means that a 
potentially wide range of social outcomes can result from relatively small or 
contingent events within the development of political institutions (Foxon, 
2002). Acknowledging the developing relationship between technologies and 
the social, economic and cultural contexts in which they are situated is thus 
key to understanding both lock-in and the potential for overcoming lock-in 
(Foxon, 2002, Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
Institutional lock-in in this sense however can be extended beyond the 
traditional notions of firms or other organisations to encompass the “rules of 
the game”, particularly with respect to energy governance. Since privatisation, 
the current UK energy system has largely been facilitated by liberalised 
energy markets, within what can be described as a Regulatory State 
Paradigm, characterised by light-touch independent regulation of market-led 
solutions (Mitchell, 2008, Kuzemko, 2013). The rules and norms of governing 
have therefore been shaped by neoliberal assumptions around energy as a 
commodity and the role of a regulated private sector in helping address the 
energy policy objectives. Of course, these rules are enshrined in a set of 
institutions including Government departments and regulatory bodies (e.g. 
DECC, Ofgem). 
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2.3.6 Cultural lock-in 
While the sociotechnical change literature often focuses on relationships 
between technologies and institutions, the role of end users in sustaining lock 
in is an important dimension. As Unruh (2000) states, “the social co-evolution 
with technology can have pervasive and lasting influence on individual 
preferences. From this perspective, expectations and preferences co-evolve 
with, and become adapted to, the dominant technological system in an 
endogenous path-dependent manner”. Society both affects and is affected by 
coevolving technologies: Society ‘picks’ technologies to fit in with their needs, 
and in turn the emerging dominance of systems becomes integrated into 
society through the adaptation of preferences, expectations and routines 
(Unruh, 2000, Unruh, 2002, Perez, 1985, Hughes, 1983).  
Although these analyses often refer to macro-level societal actions, this broad 
view of societal preferences has been complimented in the literature by 
contributions from sociology and psychology. Here, the nuances of 
convenience, habit and responses to norms and contexts to the individual’s 
experience have been used to characterise “consumer lock in” in relation to 
consumption (Jackson and Michaelis, 2003, Shove, 2003, Shove and Warde, 
1997, Gronow and Warde., 2001). For example, energy end-use technologies 
(which have coevolved alongside supply and distribution technologies) have 
had profound impacts on activities in everyday life including cooking, leisure, 
transport etc. (Nye, 1990). 
This has several implications for policy: Although markets are often assumed 
to offer freedom of choice to consumers, consumer lock-in implies limits to the 
agency of individuals, which of course suggests a greater role for government 
in facilitating change (Jackson and Michaelis, 2003). This role must 
acknowledge that energy users are more than mere consumers, and have a 
more nuanced appreciation of the dynamic and shifting relationship between 
individuals and the ways in which they use energy (Devine-Wright, 2007).  
One example of the complexity of individuals as energy consumers, and a 
profound example of consumer lock-in, is that of sticky customers in the 
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electricity market. Since privatisation of the industry in 1990, almost 40 per 
cent of customers had not switched from the incumbent regional supplier, and 
most of those that have switched only do so rarely (Ofgem, 2014c). Low 
switching rates (and thus low competition) in turn affect energy system 
innovation, as new entrants find it difficult to access new customers, and 
incumbents are not encouraged to offer new or better services (Mitchell et al., 
2014). Such a situation calls for a greater appreciation of the factors in and 
opportunities for overcoming lock-in of this type. 
2.4 Alternative prospects of a different approach to energy 
In broad terms, an alternative pathway to the current centralised energy 
system based on large-scale fossil-fuel generation can be represented by a 
more decentralised non-fossil fuel system at the smaller end of the scale. By 
virtue of the nature, scale, and geography of an emerging set of technologies, 
such an alternative pathway offers a new set of prospects around how the 
energy system is able to deal with contemporary energy challenges, including 
that of overcoming inertia. The availability of an alternative pathway 
particularly as it becomes better understood calls into question the inevitability 
of the status quo, and can be seen to be challenging prevailing policy 
direction in the UK. 
What are the key aspects of an alternative pathway? Such a question has 
been at the heart of much debate, and is of consequence for the perception, 
analysis and treatment of such approaches within both academia and 
policymaking (Pepermans et al., 2005). At the coarsest level, an alternative 
energy pathway simply represents a set of technologies whose nature, scale 
and geography is the antithesis of the conventional energy system. However, 
such a conceptualisation is ignorant of the breadth and diversity of 
technologies and scales within, all of which have the potential to offer different 
value prospects to society. A remote 20MW wind farm, for example has the 
potential to offer very different prospects (positive and negative) than a single 
500kW turbine local to a population in terms of network integration 
implications, investment required, policy support, planning, and the potential 
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for different ownership models. While both projects thus might be considered 
cleaner, smaller-scale and decentralised compared to conventional energy 
technologies, there is clear merit in understanding how such approaches 
translate into value for different stakeholders. This section dissects the 
meaning of an alternative energy pathway and presents the relative benefits 
and disbenefits therein, with specific relevance to the contemporary energy 
challenges. 
2.4.1 Conceptualising an alternative pathway 
There has been some disagreement in the literature over what constitutes 
decentralised energy, with definitions differing between countries and 
contexts, and shifting over time (Woodman and Baker, 2008). Pepermans et 
al. (2005) documents various attempts to define distributed (electricity) 
generation (DG), which are based variously on voltage levels (CIRED, 1999, 
Dondi et al., 2002, Chambers, 2001, Lasseter, 1998), directness of supply to 
consumers, centrality of planning or dispatch or degree of independence from 
the distribution network itself (CIRED, 1999, Dondi et al., 2002). Other more 
flexible definitions are based around proximity to load or for specific consumer 
needs (Dondi et al., 2002, IEA and OECD, 2002). Ackermann (2001) aims to 
provide a more precise definition through analysis of the main issues of 
purpose, location, rating, area, technology, environmental impact, mode of 
operation, ownership and penetration, offering a definition of DG as 
‘distributed networks, or on the customer side of the network’ (Ackermann et 
al., 2001). Even within UK government, definitions of ‘distributed energy’ have 
variously excluded (Ofgem and BERR, 2008) or included heat (BERR, 2008), 
the latter emphasising the importance of proximity of supply. 
2.4.2 Emissions reduction 
In terms of reducing GHG emission, introducing RE technologies clearly 
offsets the need to supply the same energy from fossil fuel sources. Although 
renewable forms of power generation release some emissions during 
production and installation stages of developments, fossil fuel plants release 
emissions in throughout operational phases, giving them total emissions of up 
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to 100 times the magnitude of renewables, depending on technology (Evans 
et al., 2009). 
A key argument for the deployment of small-scale RE in particular is that it 
increases overall RE capacity, thus contributing to RE and emissions targets 
(Hain et al., 2005). The wide variety of scales over which RE can be deployed 
means that technologies can be sited in many more sites than large-scale 
centralised thermal plant, such as on domestic or commercial rooftops, or 
embedded in or around towns and communities, which in turn opens 
opportunities for a much larger and more diverse ownership base than is 
possible with remote, centralised infrastructures. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that deployment of renewables among populations can be self-
reinforcing, encouraging adoption through peer effects (Bale et al., McMichael 
and Shipworth, 2013). 
2.4.3 Energy security 
A key driver for RE deployment is that it reduced dependence on imported 
fossil fuels and provides insulation against both the vagaries of the global 
fossil fuel market and sudden supply disruptions (Grubb et al., 2006). 
Although the intermittency of RE sources means that they are potentially 
sources of insecurity individually, increased deployment of decentralised, 
diverse RE sources gives enhanced system security through both more 
diverse supply chains and enhances resilience against interruptions to any 
one source, particularly when considered in light of developments in demand 
reduction, load flattening, and increased flexibility in both the demand and the 
supply side (Grubb et al., 2006, Hoggett, 2013, Jansen, 2015, Mitchell, 2015b, 
Mitchell, 2015a). The benefits of distributed RE is discussed in further detail in 
relation to network management in Section 2.5.5. 
2.4.4 Affordability 
The cost and revenue structure of large-scale, centralised fossil fuel-based 
energy production varies massively from smaller scale, distributed, renewable 
and alternatives. The former are typically characterised by relatively low 
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capital costs and high, and variable fuel costs. Relatively low capital costs are 
possible when deployed at scale because of the scale inherent in thermal 
generation, although fuel costs, as discussed, are exposed to the vagaries of 
uncertain and fluctuating global commodity markets. With much of the UK’s 
thermal-based energy infrastructure coming to the end of its operational 
lifetime (Ofgem, 2010), RE is considered as a cost effective hedge against 
fuel volatility. 
The impact of RE adoption on energy costs, and thus affordability has been 
subject to much debate. In the UK, costs are supported by a range of 
incentives operating at different scales, funded by bill-payers. The impact of 
renewables support on energy bills has been relatively low: In the period 
2004-11, electricity prices increased by 79 per cent, six per cent of which is 
attributed to renewables support and a further nine per cent to carbon price 
support (CCC, 2011). Up to 2020, further net increases of around 29 per cent 
to overall energy bills are projected, ten per cent of which will be due to RE 
investments and carbon price (Figure 2.1). Cost projections past 2020 are 
however subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly around the actual 
mix of renewables on the system and the associated carbon price costs (Ibid). 
Beyond 2030, and assuming high overall RE capacity and continued RE cost 
reductions from learning in deployment, bills are expected to fall (Ibid). 
Nonetheless, for some, and depending on the form of ownership, support for 
RE adoption represents a regressive tax whose revenues only accrue to 
those with the resources to invest, and particularly harms the most vulnerable 
of billpayers (Monbiot, 2010, FPAG, 2009). For this reason, and because of 
rising household energy costs, the cost of RE deployment as a contributing 
factor has been the subject of much debate. It is thus while affordability is 
somewhat sidelined relative to other policy issues, its relationship to other 
objectives means that it is unavoidably salient (Kern et al., 2014). Apparently 
seeking to distance himself from any components of energy bills that might be 
avoidable, the Prime Minister in date was reported as stating that he wanted 
to “get rid of the green crap” (Platt, 2014). 
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Figure 2.1 Components of average domestic energy price 
Source: CCC (2011) 
However, in light of the updating required of energy infrastructure, and 
particularly of the need to decarbonise energy, some costs are inevitable. 
While it is of course unfortunate that changes need to be implemented 
urgently (particularly for the governments whose decision to do so may be 
unpopular among some of the electorate), this is an unavoidable 
consequence of both historic underinvestment in energy infrastructure, and 
the perpetuation of a governance framework that failed to encourage 
competition and innovation to the desired degree. 
2.5 Overcoming inertia: the role of small-scale 
While overcoming system inertia has apparently been of little interest to the 
UK government, there is evidence that the ongoing development of renewable 
energy within the energy system is itself challenging and disrupting the 
mainstream energy system as we know it. In contrast to the majority of 
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countries where energy was privatised in the 1990s, a limited few (Denmark, 
Germany, California) have introduced policies, which have collectively 
enabled a ‘disruptive’2 shift in the way their energy system operates (Mitchell 
et al., 2014). While the UK’s attitude to, and policy support for small-scale 
energy is lagging behind these frontrunners, there is still some evidence that 
some subtle structural shifts are taking place through the RE deployment that 
is happening. 
The dominance of the large-scale centralised energy system has been 
traditionally reinforced by the economies of scale afforded by affordable and 
secure supply fuels, and monolithic modes of governance enabled by 
disengaged publics. However, it is becoming apparent that the emergence 
and development of small-scale infrastructures are well suited to overcoming 
this inertia, by virtue of their cost structures, affordability, and overall 
democratising effect they have on society. With respect to the need to 
overcome inertia, this section shows that in the words of Lovins, these new 
technologies are proving themselves as ‘appropriate’ for the needs of society. 
2.5.1 Improved cost structures 
One key factor in the disruptive potential of RE is that it represents a different 
set of values to the system than fossil-fuel generation does. Within 
conventional electricity markets, energy is bought by suppliers in order of the 
marginal cost of generation, with the cheapest forms being utilised first and 
more expensive forms later (Ray et al., 2010). Since RE technologies have 
very low or zero marginal costs, energy from those sources is used 
preferentially, with higher marginal cost plants pushed progressively out of the 
market due to the ‘merit order effect’ (Ray et al., 2010, Mitchell, 2014b). As 
                                            
 
2 Mitchell et al (2014) define ‘disruption’ as a “rapid change in the characteristics of 
an electricity system, which has its own momentum…and which leads to different 
operating and management processes, which in turn enables different social, 
economic and technical outcomes”. 
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markets becoming more and more saturated with RE, fossil fuel plants are 
becoming less profitable, potentially threatening the business plans and 
strategies on which that type of plant is based (Buchan, 2012). Exceedingly 
high penetration of RE, and particularly solar, in Germany is a major factor in 
the ongoing collapse of utility business models in Germany (Schuppe, 2015a), 
raising the prospect of a similar situation occurring in the UK (Mitchell et al., 
2014).  
2.5.2 Technological learning and economies of scale 
While developing a base of renewable energy infrastructure comes at a cost 
(as discussed above), the relative infancy of many RE technologies 
(compared to more established forms) means that innovation through 
technological learning is expected to deliver significant reductions in energy 
production costs (Foxon et al., 2005). The argument here is that cost 
reductions and quality improvements can be brought forward through a 
process of “learning-by-doing”, whereby improvements in production 
processes, labour efficiencies and new processes drive down unit cost with 
both positive private and public and benefits (Arrow, 1962, BCG, 1972).  
For RE technologies, cost reduction rates have varied considerably across 
technology type and scale, reflecting varying rates of adoption, stages of 
maturity, capital intensity and market dilution (Müller et al., 2011). Global 
deployment of renewables in general has greatly enhanced the 
competitiveness, particularly in the case of solar, the cost of which in the UK 
has plummeted in recent years as a result of both global and local learning 
(Figure 2.2) (Department of Commerce, 2012, Kay, 2015).  
51 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Learning curve for all commercially available PV, 1980-2014 
Source: Fraunhofer ISE (2015)  
Deployment costs of RE vary as a function of scale. Larger commercial 
installations typically benefit from economies of scale at the plant level, since 
installing many wind turbines in one location, for example reduces cost per 
output through bulk-buying, and aggregating installation, planning and 
connection costs, reducing the total cost of installation per unit output (Wiser 
and Bolinger, 2011). At the other end of the scale, investment into a smaller 
development involving one or two turbines may be ostensibly more suitable 
for small-scale actors (individuals, community groups), although the lack of 
economies of scale such as those related to network connection costs, may 
prove prohibitive (Simonds and Hall, 2013). 
In contrast to large-scale fossil fuel or nuclear installations, the economies of 
scale achieved by RE at the production level are profound. Developing a 
single 500 MW gas power plant, for example, provides one opportunity for 
learning, whereas a comparable increase in onshore wind deployment would 
involve the production and installation of several hundred turbines (or several 
million solar PV panels), providing much greater opportunity for learning by 
doing, increased labour efficiencies, and process innovations. Consequently, 
the potential for cost reductions with smaller-scale technologies far exceeds 
that for large-scale technologies.  
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In addition to scale economy benefits, the small-scale and modular nature of 
solar PV means that the relative simplicity of supply chains is inherently 
flexible with respect to energy system disruptions. Being small-scale and 
highly modular means that it can be deployed rapidly in a range of 
applications and scales. The supply chains of solar PV installations 
(compared to nuclear power installation, for example) are relatively simple, 
particularly in the latter stages of the PV supply chain where modules are 
assembled and systems installed (Hoggett, 2014). The flexibility, adaptability 
and resilience of supply chains for small-scale technologies means that they 
are both inherently more secure and thus better suited to respond to ongoing 
changes within energy systems (Ibid), particularly when compared to large, 
inflexible technologies with complex supply chains and highly specialised 
components. 
The scale, flexibility and modularity of small-scale technologies help to explain 
both dramatic reductions in solar PV unit prices in recent years (Fraunhofer 
ISE, 2015) and indeed, rates of UK adoption far exceeded government 
expectations (DECC, 2014d). Deploying renewables thus has a positive 
feedback effect on helping to drive down costs, increasing the affordability of 
such technologies over time.  
2.5.3 More diverse ownership 
Because renewables can be deployed at a completely different scale to 
conventional plants, lower costs and the relative ease of installation means 
that energy production technologies are suddenly affordable to many more 
actors, thus paving the way for farmers, businesses and individuals, either 
directly or through forms of collective ownership to become shareholders of 
energy assets. Although social and environmental rationales are likely to be 
important factors in deciding about investing in microgeneration (Walker, 
2008b, Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008, CES, 2009, Houghton, 2009, 
Houghton, 2010, Roberts, 2009), the importance of economic motivations 
have been well documented (Hain et al., 2005, TLT, 2007, Walker, 2008b, 
CES, 2009, Warren and McFadyen, 2010). 
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Ownership of microgeneration, i.e. rooftop PV can take a number of forms: 
they can be owned outright by the occupier (or landlord if it is a rented 
property); developer or utility-owned, or community-group-owned. Each model 
offers reduced electricity costs for the householder, but offers different 
prospects in terms of whether FiT payments accrue directly to householders, 
to communities, or to commercial enterprises, and thus redistributes value in 
different ways depending on the model employed. 
With larger-scale RE technologies, emergent forms of collective ownership 
are further opening up opportunities for individuals and communities to invest 
in RE installations, at different scales. DECC (DECC, 2015c) sets out four 
main models of ownership relevant under the FiT scheme: 
• 100 % community ownership by a legally-constituted community 
organisation, aided with funding through a variety of financial models, 
including equity investments by business angels, venture capital, bank 
debt, share offers and/or crowd funding; 
• Joint ventures between community groups and non-community 
operators, such as a development company or local authority. 
Ownership and management of the project is split between partners, 
with developers providing experience and competency as well as 
carrying risk at the project’s early stages, in return for the community 
group providing value in terms of community buy-in and collaboration; 
• Shared revenue, in which the community group secures the rights to a 
virtual revenue stream, calculated on the basis of a specified proportion 
of the installation’s output, less agreed operating costs and generally 
less virtual debt service.  
• Split ownership, in which the community group owns a proportion of a 
development’s physical assets, for example, one or two turbines from a 
larger development. 
The suitability of each form of ownership depends on a number of factors, 
including the existence, nature and timing of the relationship between 
community groups and developers, and the availability of capital from different 
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sources. The degree of community ownership clearly has implications for both 
the risk carried by the community group, and the potential for revenues and 
associated social benefits.  
The degree of community ownership clearly has profound implications for 
both the feasibility and attractiveness of projects. While partnering with a 
developer may be seen (by some community groups) to be against the ethos 
of the group, developers are clearly valued in the financial and management 
benefits they can bring to projects. Capital costs can be prohibitive for 
community groups, and development of rural areas is often challenged by 
difficulties and costs involved in grid connections, which have been found to 
vary considerably among community energy projects (Simonds and Hall, 
2013). 
Although broadening the diversity of shareholders owning energy assets 
(outright or in shares) beyond corporate interests is beneficial for a number of 
reasons, the complexity and cost of RE projects has proved to be prohibitive 
for such actors, particularly at the scale of community energy. This is 
particularly the case at the start of RE projects, where upfront costs can be 
considerable (Walker, 2008b). Pre-development costs alone reflect legal and 
regulatory obligations associated with siting large pieces of infrastructure, 
including site surveys, engineering assessments, environmental impact 
assessments, legal fees and public consultation (Hoggett, 2010, Hain et al., 
2005, Woodman and Baker, 2008). The uncertainty around getting projects 
through this initial stage, the costs of doing so, and the lack of cash flow at 
this stage means that finance is considered ‘at risk’ and as such is both 
difficult to obtain and represents a key barrier to community energy schemes 
(Hoggett, 2010). 
Fundamentally though, local ownership (even in part) of renewable assets 
means that the benefits, as well as costs are held locally, rather than in 
wholly-developer led projects where financial benefits accrue only to 
developers and creditors. Opening RE investment up to a greater diversity of 
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shareholders greatly increases the availability of capital for deployment, and 
shares both risk and value over a wider range of actors. 
The distributed nature of RE technologies, particularly at smaller scales has 
introduced a far more diverse range of ownership, and thus greater 
competition in the generation market than possible with conventional energy 
production. Figure 2.3 illustrates that when all generation capacity is taken 
into account, smaller generators only own around 22 per cent of total 
generating capacity (a), whereas they own almost half of all RE generating 
capacity (b)3. 
 
 (a)      (b) 
Figure 2.3 (a) Share of total UK electricity generation and (b) share of 
renewable generation, 2014 
Source: DECC (2015b) 
A combination of the introduction of the small-scale (<5MW) feed-in-tariff (FiT) 
and concurrent reductions in the unit costs of small-scale RE technologies 
has resulted in significant growth at the small end of the scale. For example, 
the small-scale PV sector in particular experienced significant growth in the 
early 2010s, with around half of total PV capacity and 98 per cent of PV plant 
                                            
 
3 Only those companies owning the ten largest portfolios are shown here for clarity. 
Smaller generators are those not deemed to be one of the UK’s 38 ‘Major Power 
Producers’ under DECC’s definition. 
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sites contributed by small-scale generators (householders, businesses and 
communities) (DECC, 2014c). The affordability of small-scale RE units and 
the means through which to connect and generate revenue from them has 
opened up the possibilities of previously disengaged actors to play a role in 
the energy system in ways that simply were not possible before.  
Additionally, since the public can play multiple roles and engagements (an 
individual can be a micro-generator while supporting community projects), 
small-scale RE deployment has the potential to foster what has been termed 
’energy citizenship’ to describe the heightened information, literacy and 
empowerment, together stimulating an active rather than passive relationship 
with energy (Dobbyn and Thomas, 2005, Devine-Wright, 2007, Morris, 2001, 
Bergman and Eyre, 2011). Through empowering individuals and communities 
to understand, own and manage local energy systems, the expansion of 
small-scale energy technologies can thus be seen to have a democratising 
effect on energy supply, where the needs and desires of society are more 
closely knitted to the design and operation of the energy system in which they 
are embedded. 
2.5.4 Managing demand 
Although the dominance of large utilities as the principal agents through which 
consumers relate to energy policy has meant that up until recently, 
government policies for reducing energy demand have been delivered by 
energy supply companies through ‘Supplier Obligations’ (SOs), the 
development of alternative, appropriately scaled technologies however is 
offering different, and more effective means through which demand reduction 
can be addressed. 
Without much of an alternative against which to compare, some have 
suggested that SO-led approaches have been successful in increasing 
domestic efficiency (Rosenow, 2012). There does however remain doubt as to 
whether they can be as effective as an approach facilitated by small-scale 
technologies, and the new forms of relationships they afford with society. 
Fundamentally, the use of large-scale suppliers as intermediaries introduces a 
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potential market failure by way of the ‘principal-agent’ problem: the inevitable 
conflict of interests between the principal (the Government, who wants to 
reduce demand) and agents (utilities, whose raison d’etre is to derive profits 
from increased demand). Aside from introducing a market distortion, such 
policies also potentially confuse messages, leaving energy consumers without 
psychological, social or economic motivation to reduce their demand (Parag 
and Darby, 2009). 
Several studies have explored the potential benefits to demand reduction 
afforded by a new, decentralised renewable system. With respect to 
microgeneration adoption, studies of the impact on absolute demand are 
rather inconclusive, with some authors reporting reductions in consumption 
(Keirstead, 2007), no change (Erge et al., 2001) and some even finding 
increases, especially among both high-consumption households (Haas et al., 
1999) and ‘passive adopters’ (Dobbyn and Thomas, 2005).  
However, installation of domestic RE has in some cases been found to 
stimulate simultaneous deployment of efficiency measures (Haas et al., 1999, 
MTP, 2005), which further increases the potential for reduced demand. 
Additionally, several studies have linked PV installation to heightened 
awareness with regard to changing consumption patterns to times of peak 
generation, aided by simultaneous installation of monitoring devices 
(Keirstead, 2007, Schweizer-Reis et al., 2000, Jenny et al., 2006, Bahaj and 
James, 2007). In other words, while the installation of renewables alone may 
or may not have effects on absolute consumption, increased integration of 
renewables into the system, and aligned with consumer lifestyles is likely to 
have a profound effect on managing demand peaks. Demand management 
has the same intended effect of reducing overall demand in that it increases 
system efficiency, removing the need for redundancy in generation systems, 
and reducing additional system costs associated with balancing supply with 
demand (Strbac, 2008). 
In terms of the behavioural change aspects of demand reduction, few studies 
have analysed the role of community-based interventions on domestic energy 
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use (Hargreaves et al., 2008, CSE and CDX, 2007), and Büchs et al. (2012) 
note that the case-study nature of most studies makes it difficult to generalise 
these influences. In a rather more robust analysis by Bardsley et al. (2013), 
where interventions were controlled for, community intervention (attending a 
single event for householders) was found to modestly reduce electricity 
consumption in participants versus control households. These studies all 
suggest that the degree of direct contact with individuals is a key factor in 
encouraging behavioural change. Such contact is of course more likely to 
occur in community-led initiatives than through SO-led programmes. 
2.5.5 Network and market integrated generation 
Increasing penetration of RE provides several challenges and opportunities 
for system operators relating to integration, decentralisation, and remoteness 
(Gross et al., 2003). Networks in the UK has been designed with centralised 
fossil fuels in mind, and as such are both radial and passive, posing 
challenges to the integration of intermittent, distributed generation plants 
(Bayod-Rújula, 2009). While small amounts of RE can be deployed without 
considerable impact to grid stability (Gross et al., 2003), PIU (2001), (PB 
Power, 1999, Lopes et al., 2007, Pepermans et al., 2005, Hain et al., 2005), 
increasing amounts can affect the power flow, voltage profile and fault level of 
a specific network, and necessitate grid reinforcement (Simonds and Hall, 
2013, Hain et al., 2005, Lopes et al., 2007).   
Furthermore, the capacity of the network to cope with intermittency can 
indeed be increased by larger geographical dispersion of intermittent inputs, 
more variation between inputs, and better matching of local demand with local 
supply (Grubb, 1991, Hain et al., 2005, Lopes et al., 2007). Such 
characteristics are more likely to be obtained with a large number of dispersed 
small generators than a small number of larger generators. 
Aside from integration issues, near-site generation reduces the amount of 
power required from centralised plant, and thus reduces power losses and 
associated costs incurred through transmission and distribution over 
distances (IEA, 2008, Borges and Falcão, 2006). Further, there is some 
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evidence that DE generation can be used strategically to provide peaking 
power at times of high demand, maintaining overall power quality and 
reducing peak power costs (Bluestein, 2000, Pepermans et al., 2005). 
Whereas RE thus previously represented a threat to the stability to existing 
networks, steadily increasing penetration of RE has meant that focus has 
shifted towards the need for new forms of energy networks, which deal with 
the realities of the changing system. For example, in situations with high and 
diverse RE generation, the need for significant baseload to deal with 
intermittency is now being questioned (Jansen, 2015).  
Supportive of this shift is the coevolution alongside RE of an ecosystem of 
both consumer-side innovations (such as smart-meters, smart-appliances and 
increased domestic efficiency) and system optimisation strategies (such as 
storage (at domestic, community and utility levels), demand response, flexible 
generation, and cross-technology options (combining storage and 
renewables, say) (SETIS, 2014). These developments, themselves 
necessitated by increasing RE penetration, are challenging the traditional 
approach of designing supply arrangements to meet demand, instead offering 
the potential to reduce, flatten and flex demand to match a desirable supply 
portfolio (Mitchell, 2015b, Mitchell, 2015a). 
2.5.6 Shifts in governance 
One key benefit of small-scale energy generation is that it permits the 
engagement of a far greater number of stakeholders than is likely under the 
large-scale centralised convention. Governance, as “the myriad processes 
through which a group of people set and enforce the rules needed to enable 
that group to achieve desired outcomes” (Florini and Sovacool, 2009) occurs 
only in part within Government. Energy governance thus refers to a wide 
range of actors, including Government (as policymakers) and Ofgem (as 
energy market regulators), but also the suppliers and consumers within wider 
society who help to shape and enable energy policy objectives. 
Despite the role of a diverse set of actors on the energy system, influence is 
overwhelmingly weighted toward a very small number of privately owned 
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actors. At the start of this thesis, the incumbent’s (the so-called Big Six) share 
of domestic energy supply market was around 99 per cent (Ofgem, 2008)4. 
There is widespread consensus that such market concentration, unbundling 
and private ownership have been barriers to overcoming system inertia, 
particularly because of a focus on short term profitability over longer term 
innovation through for example R&D (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008, Lockwood, 
2013, Defeuilley and Furtado, 2000). Government failure has also been the 
focus of blame, in terms of reduced Government R&D spending (which 
stimulates private spending) as well as the inability to put in place effective, fit 
for purpose regulation (HM Treasury and DECC, 2010, Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2008). 
Secondly, there are suspicions that rather than competing, there has in fact 
been tacit collusion among the supply arms of the Big Six to protect customer 
bases and profits (Ofgem, 2014a). This collusion is also suspected to extend 
to within utilities, with vertical integration hindering competition, a situation that 
is reinforced by utilities’ resistance to unbundling (Pollitt, 2008). The 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, 2015), however, have recently 
rejected such assertions. 
Lastly and most directly of relevance to the issue of governance is that energy 
suppliers are the chief delivery agents for the majority of energy policy 
mechanisms. RE development (through the Renewables Obligation (RO) and 
now Contracts for Differences (CfD)) and demand reduction policy alike 
(through the Green Deal and smart meter deployment, for example) are 
delivered by those same utilities that are resistant to change. The principal-
agent problem (outlined above in relation to demand reduction) might be 
extendable to any diversification of business plans (including compelling 
                                            
 
4 Over the course of this research the market share of non-incumbents increased 
from 1 per cent to around 7.5 per cent (Cornwall Energy 2014) 
61 
 
 
deployment of renewables) beyond extracting profit from conventional power 
generation. 
The impact of the emergence of small-scale energy on energy governance is 
the subject of a growing body of literature, the assumption being that 
increasing amounts of small-scale energy implies a greater number of actors 
than under large-scale centralised systems, which itself changes the structure 
of governing actors. In 2013 this provided the impetus for the Government 
stating that the Big Six should be replaced by the “Big 60,000” – a reference 
to the potential for a large increase in stakeholders made up of companies, 
communities, public and third sector organisations (Barker, 2013). The 
emergence of policy rhetoric around community energy, and the publication of 
the Government’s first Community Energy Strategy is evidence in itself of a 
change in governance through the involvement of a hitherto absent sector of 
interested individuals and organisations as stakeholders. The degree to which 
the emergence of those new actors will hold influence in the overall energy 
policy landscape remains to be seen. 
2.5.7 Scale within energy policy 
Centralisation was a likely consequence of the historic abundance of fossil 
fuels, and energy policy in the UK developed in this context. Prior to the 
Second World War, coal dominated as the primary source of energy, used for 
domestic heating, as a key fuel for electricity, and for manufacturing ‘town 
gas’ for street, factory and eventually domestic lighting, with supply 
undertaken by privately or municipally owned coalmines, electricity plants and 
gas providers. 
The post-war Atlee Government was brought in under promises of social 
justice following the hardships of war, and a desire to consolidate planning 
(and ensure security, safety and standards) under conditions of austerity 
drove the nationalisation of major industries and utilities, including the coal, 
gas and electricity industries in 1947, 1948 and 1957 respectively. The 
creation of the Atomic Energy Authority in 1957, to develop civil nuclear power 
alongside a military capability, completed the nationalisation of the UK’s 
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energy industries. For the energy system of this era, the technologies involved 
necessitated economies of scale, centralisation and safety that could be 
managed under a nationalised system (Ibid). 
The 1980s however saw the attempted depoliticisation of energy under the 
market ideaology of Thatcherism through the gradual privatisation of the 
energy industries: gas in 1986, electricity in 1990, coal in 1994 and nuclear in 
1996. While theoretically opening ownership up, this simply marked a transfer 
of power from the state to a few large companies (Mitchell, 2013). Bolstered 
by a programme of domestic exploration and development in the 1970s, oil 
and gas began to dominate as principal fuel sources for the electricity sector, 
while the inefficiencies of the coal industry seeded its demise under Thatcher. 
The development of oil and gas regulation during liberalisation can thus be 
seen in the context of the political need to protect the interests of customers – 
and thus the structures and technologies it was designed to ‘fit’ (Mitchell, 
2013). 
2.5.8 Scale within renewable energy policy 
While government policy for RE indicates increasing attention being paid to 
the merits of alternative and decentralised technologies, it is only recently that 
the merits of small-scale technologies have been acknowledged. Before 
privatisation of the electricity industry in 1990, renewable development was 
centred on research and development (R&D). This, Mitchell (1995) states, 
focused primarily on large (>3MW) demonstration projects “capable of bulk 
energy generation” (NAO (1994) in Mitchell (1995)). Following privatisation, 
the 1990 Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) was the first instance of directed 
support for RE, although the overriding driver for the policy was to provide 
support to the State-owned nuclear industry (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). That 
said, in terms of renewables, the NFFO ostensibly favoured smaller-scale 
generators, with early rounds (‘Orders’) of the mechanism (NFFO1 and 
NFFO2) providing support for 300-750kW wind projects. Mitchell (1995) 
however states that it in effect was penalising of both small-scale and 
independently owned projects: the former were typically more expensive while 
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the latter found it hard to obtain finance (Mitchell, 1994, Mitchell, 1995). From 
the third and subsequent Orders (NFFO3-NFFO5) differential support was 
introduced for a sub-band of wind to reflect these cost differences, and there 
is evidence that these rounds helped to galvanise the growth of small-scale 
(<1MW capacity) in the mid to late 1990s (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). 
The mechanism that followed the NFFO was the Renewables Obligation 
(RO). Beginning in 2002, the mechanism was initially seen as more aligned 
with market ideals, though its complexity and preferential support for cheapest 
technologies was considered a barrier to both small technologies and new 
entrants (Gross and Heptonstall, 2010, Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The RO 
was characterised by a strategic emphasis of competition with a belief that the 
government should not be ‘picking winners’ between the technologies 
available. Such a position was criticised as being a barrier to technological 
diversity (Ibid), inherently risky (Margolis and Kammen, 1999) as well as 
lacking in political transparency (Watson, 2008).  
In response to these criticisms, the government in 2009 introduced banded 
support to encourage less mature technologies with higher associated 
development costs and risk (DECC, 2010b). While there was some implicit 
differentiation of scale (i.e. through differentiating between onshore and 
offshore wind, which differ by scale by their nature), there was no attention 
paid to different scales within technology bands (Woodman and Mitchell, 
2011). 
The introduction of a FiT in 2010 represented a breakthrough in terms of 
support for small-scale energy electricity generation, and paved the way for a 
dramatic increase in small-scale deployment. This was intended to remove 
existing barriers for technologies under 5MW, including high transaction costs 
and investment risks under the RO (Woodman and Mitchell, 2011, BERR, 
2008). A campaign to introduce a FiT began in 2007 and soon found traction 
with several organisations including Friends of the Earth, the Renewable 
Energy Association, Greenpeace. The Labour MP Alan Simpson worked to 
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push through legislative provision for a FiT within the newly created 2008 
Energy Act, soon after the formation of DECC (Aldridge, 2013). 
These policies (and the FiT specifically) have enabled considerable growth in 
the deployment of small-scale RE technologies in recent years (Aldridge, 
2013). This has further facilitated a great leap in terms of engaging new 
actors, including individuals, businesses, local authorities and communities 
(Nolden, 2013, Seyfang et al., 2013). In the solar sector, where deployment 
has been limited by financial barriers, (rather than planning, for example), the 
FiT has been hugely successful in driving innovation within the sector 
(Aldridge, 2013). 
However, while the success of some policies in addressing components of the 
energy trilemma are celebrated by government, little if any attention has been 
given to the transformational potential of small-scale energy within policy 
circles. Indeed, as Liebreich (2011) points out, energy incumbents are no 
longer ‘ignoring’ nor ‘laughing’ at the efforts of small-scale: they are fighting 
them. For other situations overseas, the opportunities presented by the 
growth of small-scale has begun to be grasped by incumbents, such as in 
New York, where action is underway to embrace and take advantage of the 
benefits of integrated small-scale technologies and help reforge a more 
harmonic relationship between society and the energy system that serves it 
(Mitchell, 2014c). As the next section demonstrates, such progress is yet to 
be experienced in the UK. 
2.6 UK community energy: emergence and constraint 
One facet of small-scale energy, community energy, has developed relatively 
swiftly over the last few years. Although the concept is somewhat disputed 
(Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2013, Databuild and Energy Saving 
Trust, 2014), in general it refers to “collective action to purchase, manage and 
generate energy” (DECC, 2014b). Such approaches have evolved alongside 
technological and policy developments, and while the sector appears to be 
growing strongly, there remains a need to better understand and 
communicate its value and potential. 
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2.6.1 The evolution of community-based energy in the UK 
Although the emergence of CE in the UK can be traced back to the 1970s, 
activity was limited to a few pioneering organisations outside of the 
mainstream energy supply system (Walker et al., 2007, Hargreaves et al., 
2013). Walker (2007) documents the evolution of a succession of Government 
initiatives to support from the early 2000s which provided information, advice, 
training, project development and capital grants for CE projects. These 
programmes followed emerging rhetoric emphasising both the benefits of 
more localised energy generation and the involvement of local people in the 
energy system (Ibid) throughout the 1990 and early 2000s. Of particular note 
was the attention paid to local energy within the 2003 White Paper “Our 
Energy Future”, which, for the first time officially advocated moving forward 
with more local models of energy generation (DTI, 2003, Walker et al., 2007).  
Recent years have seen the expansion of CE initiatives in the UK. 
Practitioners cite a range of economic, social and environmental motives. 
Economic rationale include income generation, reducing energy costs, 
tackling fuel poverty, and contributing to local skills and employment (Walker 
and Devine-Wright, 2008, Hain et al., 2005, Warren and McFadyen, 2010, 
TLT, 2007, Adams and Berry, 2008, Evans, 2006, Seyfang et al., 2013). 
Social rationale cited by groups include increasing social cohesion, inclusion 
and improving education (Walker, 2008b, Wüstenhagen et al., 2007, Walker 
et al., 2010, Seyfang et al., 2013), and increasing support for both existing 
and future projects (Adams and Berry, 2008, Houghton, 2010, Evans, 2006).  
Additional social impacts relate to enhancing the political processes around 
energy, including community power and control over local energy systems, 
and influencing wider energy policy (Seyfang et al., 2013, Walker and Devine-
Wright, 2008, Walker, 2008a, Walker, 2008b). These rationales are often 
underpinned by environmental agendas associated with addressing global 
and local issues of climate change through emissions reduction(Houghton, 
2010, Warren and McFadyen, 2010, Roberts, 2009, Seyfang et al., 2013). 
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Of course, since community energy initiatives are in general associated with 
renewable forms of generation, at either the domestic or distribution scale, the 
benefits (and challenges) of community energy can be directly related to 
those issues discussed in the previous section, including implementation 
costs, prospects for managing demand, and, obviously, opportunities for 
collective ownership. 
Despite the variety of drivers cited by individuals, the uptake of CE in recent 
years does however appear to take advantage of the financial opportunities 
afforded by government support, such as the small-scale FiT. While this 
would appear to provide evidence of a successful government policy, several 
authors report the evolution of the FiT (as summarised in Section 2.3.3) as 
primarily driven from pressure from grassroots practitioners and advocates 
(Aldridge, 2013). 
Several studies have sought to quantify the current scale and scope of CE. 
Recent evidence gathered as preparation for the DECC’s Community Energy 
Strategy estimated that at least 5000 community groups have “considered, 
commenced, or completed energy projects in the UK since 2008, of which at 
least 3475 were found to be active in 2013 in terms of having active projects in 
delivery or in the pipeline (Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2014). It is 
noted however that since no comprehensive database of activity exists, the 
true scale may well be larger (Seyfang et al., 2013, Databuild and Energy 
Saving Trust, 2014). This, and other studies, highlight that the sector is 
characterised by a diverse set of actors, structures, objectives, activities and 
contexts, which make it difficult to generalise about specific features 
(Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2014, Seyfang et al., 2013, Hielscher, 
2011, Hielscher et al., 2011). 
                                            
 
5 Databuild (2014) note that this number is likely to be much higher given limitations 
in data collection 
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More broadly, over 785,000 small (<50kW) solar PV installations had been 
installed on homes and businesses as of October 2015, making up 97 per 
cent of all installations, including larger commercial developments (DECC, 
2015d), representing significant engagement with the energy system by 
individuals and businesses and contributing significantly to total RE 
deployment (DECC, 2015b). 
2.6.2 Relating community energy to wider societal change 
As the community energy movement exists as a formalised network of 
collectives within civil society, the wider role of citizens in enabling, 
constraining and negotiating change must also be considered. Drawing 
linkages between the aggregated outcomes of the actions of individuals, and 
the collective actions of communities is of consequence to both academic and 
policy understandings of the value of small-scale energy approaches. 
The importance of social agency for energy transitions is in general 
underrepresented, both within academia and within policymaking, with far 
greater attention being given to the role of technology and economics 
(Sovacool, 2014, Cooper, 2013). One consequence of this is until recently, 
social agency in energy transitions was assumed to be of relevance only in 
terms of the individual, rational responses and preferences as ‘consumers’ in 
the idealised setting of an energy market (Seyfang et al., 2010). However, the 
emergence of grassroots movements such as Transition Towns or community 
energy more broadly has emphasised the potential for social movements to 
enable significant systems change. As Hargreaves et al state, “behaviour 
change will likely occur in the context of changing values, lifestyles, and 
cultural norms modulated through social contexts, including social 
movements” (Seyfang et al., 2010, Heiskanen et al., 2010, Middlemiss and 
Parrish, 2010). 
While this modulation of societal values, lifestyles and norms from civil society 
forms the main subject for analysis in this thesis, the roles of civil society 
within energy transitions extends beyond community energy or even 
‘grassroots innovations’ more broadly (Smith, 2012a). As well as providing the 
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resources for the formation of innovative ideas and practices (expressed 
through the creation of CE groups, for example), the way in which broader 
civil society relates to the values and actions of these groups shapes their 
legitimacy. Additionally, Seyfang (2010) highlight two more roles for civil 
society in a) unsettling incumbent regimes through lobbying and protests and 
b) as representing and constituting cultural broad trends through which 
societal values are expressed.  
So, while the emergence of a formalised community energy movement 
establishes a conceptually discrete subject for study (and policy intervention), 
this thesis contends that the broader context of societal values, lifestyle and 
norms is inseparable from such a movement. For example, an individual’s 
decision to invest in domestic renewables may be manifested as a private 
investment on one’s home, or as an aggregative component within a 
collective investment within the local community. Both situations are of 
consequence for both the development of small-scale energy and the 
implications for the wider energy system, and in such situations, the 
separation of collective, from individual endeavour thus makes little sense. 
2.6.3 Building a case for CE development 
At this relatively early stage in the development of CE, there has emerged a 
need for evidence of its value to support continued development. This is 
relevant for CE practitioners themselves, who need to be able to demonstrate 
local benefits to potential beneficiaries in host communities, as well as 
demonstrate their potential contribution to the wider energy system 
(Hargreaves, 2012, DECC, 2011a). This latter point resonates with assertions 
from commentators that the government could, and should be doing more to 
support the sector (Roberts, 2011) 
Several pieces of work have reviewed the existing evidence base for 
community energy (Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2013, DECC, 2013b) 
as well as the methodologies employed within these analyses (CISE, 2011, 
Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2013). Several barriers to the 
development of robust evidence bases can be discussed in this context. 
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Firstly, a lack of evidence is perhaps unavoidable given the infancy of CE as a 
collective movement. What constitutes the term ‘community energy’ itself has 
been subject to discussion (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008, Seyfang et al., 
2013, Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005), making it difficult to ascertain what 
the CE sector is, led alone what its impact is.  
Secondly, since CE initiatives are often concerned with social (e.g. cohesion, 
inclusion, learning) as well as economic and resource benefits, understanding 
the benefits therein requires qualitative as well as quantitative assessments. 
The infancy of the sector again means that there is a lack of standardised 
methodologies for carrying out such analyses, and as such many are ad-hoc, 
based on assumptions and rely on anecdotal evidence. Even for quantitative 
evidence-building, the difficulty in accessing key pieces of data such as utility 
bills hindered progress (CISE, 2011).  
Thirdly, the difficulties in carrying out robust analyses is further compounded 
by the fact that the community energy groups tend to be characterised by 
resource scarcity, both in terms of financial and human capital. Robust 
assessments can necessitate employing a wide range of methodologies and 
community groups often have neither the time nor capacity to spare, and to do 
so would removing their focus from core project management activities (CISE, 
2011, Haggett et al., 2013) and thus be counterproductive in the short term. 
Fourth, and related to this, is the fact that the multiple benefits arising from 
community energy groups’ activities is often assumed, and understood 
anecdotally throughout the sector. This is perhaps in part related to the flow of 
social benefits one gets simply from being involved in a project. Even before 
tangible outcomes emerge, intangible outcomes (such as involvement and 
community cohesion) are more likely to be readily felt by practitioners. These 
however are more difficult to measure and communicate as readily.  
Lastly, as well as relying on subjectivity inherent in qualitative assessments, 
CISE (2011) found that most assessments were either carried out by groups 
themselves or by interest groups, further increasing the potential for research 
bias, whereby analysts tend to affect results to portray CE in a more positive 
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light than would perhaps be the case under more objective analysis 
(Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2013). While this is perhaps expected to 
a degree (CE initiatives are undoubtedly under pressure to demonstrate value 
to funding bodies, policymakers and society), it risks undermining robust 
analysis of the sector as a whole. Nevertheless, academic analyses, while 
ideally under more restraint to avoid bias, can still be expected to exhibit 
some bias given the normative nature of energy policy.  
These factors combined mean that evidence building around the impact of CE 
has until now been ad-hoc. Further, the variability among both projects and 
methods means that observations of single cases exist as standalone 
analyses, with little supplementary thought about what they mean for the 
sector as a whole. In addition, those studies that do consider sector-wide 
impacts tend to focus on a specific set of impacts (e.g. immediate impacts to 
host communities) rather than a broader set of impacts encompassing, for 
example, the wider energy system.  
2.7 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the inadequacies of the current energy system for 
addressing contemporary energy and climate change challenges, and 
outlined how an emergent alternative system is better suited to these ends. 
Climate change, energy security and affordability were identified as key policy 
rationale for energy system change, although it is contended that in order to 
address these, it is the fourth issue of inertia that provides the most 
challenging obstacle in today’s energy system. Technological, institutional and 
cultural lock in to the current energy system is explained as consequences of 
drives for economies of scale made possible by the use of fossil fuels as a 
dominant fuel source.  
However, the establishment of alternative energy sources in the energy 
system is challenging the inevitability of a system based on large-scale 
centralised fossil-fuel-based plants. Such technologies, whose nature, scale 
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and geography are fundamentally more suited to addressing our 
contemporary energy challenges, including overcoming inertia. 
In terms of overcoming inertia, the cost structure of renewables as compared 
to fossil fuels is pricing the latter out of energy markets; technologies can be 
scaled such that they can be installed, owned and managed by individuals 
and collectives; their evolution alongside an ecosystem of smart infrastructure 
provides opportunities for system efficiencies; these factors are in turn 
facilitating more pluralistic governance in terms of increasing roles for 
individuals and communities as shareholders and stakeholders in the new 
energy system. In summary, if we want to take an alternative energy path to 
one reliant on fossil fuels, then it appears that it should contain a significant 
proportion of small-scale technologies, since it is those that help to overcome 
system inertia. 
The emergence of a community energy movement in the UK is introduced as 
one response to both the inadequacies of the current energy system, and the 
opportunities presented by a new system better aligned with societal values. 
The values, norms and activities within CE are embedded in and grow out of 
civil society, and while the movement is typically regarded as conceptually 
and physically distinct from broader values activities throughout civil society, 
they are very closely linked and should be analysed as such.  
However, energy policy in this country has so far been slow to fully 
acknowledge either the inadequacies of large-scale, or the opportunities of 
small-scale energy. This has in part been blamed on the lack of evidence 
around the value of the latter. It is around the supposed lack of evidence of 
the value of small-scale, and particularly community-led energy that this thesis 
is situated. 
This chapter has focused entirely on the energy challenges and proposed 
solutions of the UK. However, looking to other countries highlights that while 
many of the same challenges are common, the solutions taken can be widely 
different. The next chapter outlines the experiences of two other countries, 
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Denmark and Germany, in adopting high degrees of community energy within 
their respective energy systems. 
 
3 Overseas community energy exemplars 
There exist many comparisons of the UK experience of community energy 
(and inclusive energy more broadly) with other countries whose sectors are 
perceived to have been more successful. Two such countries are Denmark 
and Germany, and both have been cited extensively in attempts to 
demonstrate the potential for CE to become more mainstream in the UK. This 
argument is based on the assumption that the UK could emulate Germany 
and Denmark in creating the right policy environment that doing so would 
bring similar benefits, and that energy policy in the UK could learn from these 
international experiences. This chapter picks apart how the current energy 
system in these two examples came about, with particular emphasis on those 
changes affecting community energy. 
In order to understand how the community energy sectors in these countries 
developed, it is important to reflect on the wider energy system and policy 
contexts within which these sectors have coevolved. Community energy does 
not develop in a vacuum. Rather, the managing, purchasing and generation of 
energy by individuals and communities is enabled or constrained by a wide 
range of factors including the maturity of the wider RE sector (which affects 
the availability and cost of generation technologies), the presence or absence 
of markets for communities and individuals to become shareholders (including 
the availability of capital), planning regimes (which may or may not reflect a 
desire to decentralise both energy and energy governance), the legality of 
cooperative ownership of assets (and associated levels of bureaucracy) and 
cultural dimensions embodying sprits of entrepreneurship and cooperative 
action. Clearly, many of these factors are embodied in the development of 
policies within each country, but might also be reflected in more fundamental 
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ideologies behind energy policy more generally in these countries, including 
the dominant political paradigm. 
This chapter stops short of offering a robust analysis of whether such case 
studies mean that similar progress could be made in the UK. Such a 
discussion would necessitate an in-depth analysis of the various roles of 
historic, political, economic and cultural contexts that have enabled or 
constrained both RE development as well as more inclusive energy systems. 
As such, robust analysis of this kind is beyond the scope of this thesis. While 
these descriptive accounts are necessarily ignorant of a more complete set of 
circumstances and decisions (that might give a truer account), highlighting 
key factors offers a pragmatic alternative. 
The chapter proceeds by considering community energy in both Denmark and 
Germany. A timeline of key elements in the development of CE in each 
country is presented in turn.  
3.1 RE penetration and ownership in UK, Denmark and Germany 
Community energy covers a multitude of community-led activities around 
energy making it difficult to compare like with like across different countries. 
Focusing on a specific sector can therefore be useful in highlighting 
differences in progress. To this end, Figure 3.1 illustrates cumulative wind 
capacity and the contribution of wind to electricity demand, and Figure 3.2 
details the ownership of wind by each country. Focusing on wind in particular 
is useful as it encompasses a range of scales (and costs) relevant to 
individuals and communities. These figures provide some context for the 
discussion in this section.  
74 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Cumulative wind capacity in Germany, Denmark and the UK 
Source: DECC (2015b), Spliid (2014), Keiler and Häuser (2014) 
 
Figure 3.2 Ownership of wind turbines by country  
Sources: (Energinet.dk, 2009, Brophy Haney and Pollitt, 2010) 
In absolute terms, Germany is third only to China and the United States in 
terms of installed wind capacity. Growth of wind in the UK has been relatively 
slow over the same period, but has hastened over the last 10 years, with 
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offshore installations contributing around a third to total capacity. In relative 
terms, wind penetration in Denmark 2014 was around 40 per cent of total 
electricity demand, a higher proportion than anywhere else in the world. While 
wind capacity in both Germany and the UK reached around 10 per cent of 
demand in 2014, a point that Denmark had reached 15 years previously. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the different mixes of wind installation ownership in 
Germany, Denmark and the UK. Almost half of wind turbines in Germany in 
2005 was owned by either cooperative ‘bürgerwindparks’ or private individuals 
(typically farmers) (Toke et al., 2008). Coops in this sense refer to local, 
participative schemes run as social rather than profit-maximising purposes. 
The remainder (corporate in Figure 3.1) are made up of a mix of hybrid forms 
of ownership, typically consisting of a private limited partnership 
(Kommanditgesellschaft / KG) for each development with a limited liability 
company (GmbH) serving as full partner for multiple projects (Bolinger, 2001), 
reducing startup costs. This form may also entail local ownership through 
public share offers, though since minimum investment levels are typically 
high, this usually comprises only 20 - 30 per cent of all partners (Ibid).  
Bollinger notes however that the current blend of wind ownership in Germany 
has shifted dramatically since 1990, when the majority were owned by sole 
proprietors in the shape of individual farmers, reflecting both the 
commercialisation of wind and the increase in project size. (Ibid). 
Compared to Germany, a far greater proportion (around 88 per cent in 2012 
of wind in Denmark is citizen-led, owned by either private individuals (typically 
farmers) or cooperatives. That said, Bollinger points out that the latter are not 
technically cooperatives, but are contractual partnerships between consumers 
who pool capital (Ibid). While ownership restrictions originally encouraged 
local ownership (to within 3km in the early 1980s), these rules have been 
progressively relaxed to permit others, including outside of the country, to 
invest (Ibid).  
By contrast to Germany and Denmark, commercial enterprises dominate 
ownership of (mostly large-scale) wind turbines in the UK (Brophy Haney and 
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Pollitt, 2010). Even including solar and small-scale hydro schemes, total 
individual and community ownership of renewables in 2013 was still estimated 
to be less than half a per cent (Harnmeijer et al., 2012). 
3.2 Community energy in Denmark 
3.2.1 Danish industrial policy 
With limited domestic energy sources, and over 90 per cent of energy based 
on imported oil in 1973, the oil crises of the 1970s had a profound effect on 
Danish energy policy (IRENA, 2012). The first two Danish energy plans 
(Dansk Energipolitik and Energieplan81) in 1976 and 1981 thus focused on 
security of supply by using domestic sources of coal and renewables. The role 
of nuclear in the Danish energy system had at the time been the subject of 
prolonged political and public debate, and while the potential benefits in terms 
of energy security were appealing, a coalition of “green, left, and rural 
communities” argued for an alternative vision of more decentralised model of 
energy based on RE (Cumbers, 2013). This came to a head in 1985, when 
the Danish parliament agreed on a moratorium on nuclear from energy 
planning (IRENA, 2012).  
Domestic experimentation with early wind turbines in the 1970s was largely 
focused around private individuals adopting technologies locally without 
government support (Bolinger, 2001). Such pioneers can perhaps be 
considered manifestations of a broad base of supportive actors in the 1970s, 
including anti-nuclear activists, and organisations and networks supporting the 
efforts of wind turbine manufacturers and entrepreneurs (Toke et al., 2008, 
Jørgensen and Karnøe, 1995). 
Without nuclear or oil as options, energy plans focused on developing the 
country’s burgeoning wind sector alongside energy efficiency programmes 
and decentralised CHP plants (Toke et al., 2008). While Denmark had been 
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experimenting with wind turbines for many decades6, the 1973 oil crisis 
provided an opportunity for further experimentation with, and mass 
manufacturing of turbines for the domestic market. Initially modestly in scale 
(15-30kW), hub height, rotor diameter and subsequent power production grew 
steadily from then on (Sørensen, 1995).  Government-funded R&D in the 
1970s was considered instrumental to this phase (IRENA, 2012). 
Development of turbine manufacturing sector, and concurrent growth in global 
markets in the early 1980s, particularly in California, provided an opportunity 
for Denmark to establish itself as an exporter, making a significant 
contribution to technological learning (Krohn, 2000). These early experiences 
proved instrumental in developing the ‘Danish Concept’7 as an increasingly 
established and eventually dominant turbine design (Maegaard et al., 2013).   
3.2.2 Renewables policy 
By 1985, however, exports to California were waning, although momentum in 
Danish turbine manufacturing sector was maintained by the 1985 “100MW 
Agreement” target by 1990, a doubling of capacity at the time (Lauber, 2005), 
supported by capital grants. Given that the Government had at the same time 
ruled to prohibit nuclear, this provided both a specific objective and a means 
through which to achieve it. Independent investors partnering with 
communities were offered priority access to the grid, which was itself 
reinforced to cope with additional wind deployment, policies that at once de-
risked investments, created grassroots support, and enabled sector growth to 
build a reputation for reliable performance (Smith, 2012b). Momentum around 
wind deployment strengthened in 1990, when another agreement with utilities 
was put in place to deliver another 100 MW by 1995, alongside the 
                                            
 
6 Indeed, experimentation in early wind technology meant that wind was competitive 
with coal-based power for the first few decades of the 1900s (Sørensen, 1995).  
7 The ‘Danish Concept’ is characterized by a three-bladed upwind horizontal axis 
turbine, with fixed speed operation and direct grid connection rules. 
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announcements of the intention to deploy 1500 MW by 2005, covering 10 per 
cent of electricity production8 (Danish Energy Authority, 1990).  
After a period in the early 2000s, during which Danish energy policy was 
considered particularly unambitious, confidence in the wind market was 
bolstered by the publication of the government’s Energy Strategy 2050. 
Among other things, this proposed RE targets of 30 per cent by 2020 (with 50 
per cent of electricity coming from wind), towards a target of being 100 per 
cent reliant on RE for electricity and heat by 2035, and all sectors by 2050 
(DEA, 2012). Alongside this is a strategy to ensure such aspirations can be 
integrated into an ‘intelligent energy system’ comprising smart grids, flexible 
demand and storage (Danish Ministry of Climate, 2013). 
3.2.3 Planning and ownership 
The strong grassroots foundations of wind energy in Denmark form the basis 
of the early policy focus on local projects. Lucas (1985) suggests that Danish 
traditions around cooperative and decentralised governance were central in 
the development of the country’s energy system. Such traditions resulted in 
the country’s electrification being driven by capital from municipalities and 
farming cooperatives, rather than private enterprises, and as such, rather than 
being considered as providing a private good, electrification was primarily 
considered a social good for supporting individuals, cooperatives and 
municipal enterprises (Lucas, 1985, Hadjilambrinos, 2000). Since then, many 
Danish public utilities have remained under the control of regional counties, 
municipalities and rural regions (kommunes), localising asset values within 
the communities that depend on them. 
Subsequently, until the late 1980s, the overwhelming majority of wind turbines 
were owned by private individuals, either as individuals or through 
cooperatives (Bolinger, 2001). This momentum was carried through when 
                                            
 
8 In actual fact, this target as exceeded by a factor of two by 2003, or 19 per cent of 
production (Meyer, 2007) 
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Government support was introduced, which encouraged local private 
ownership through selective subsidies and ownership restrictions (Olesen et 
al., 2004, Andersen, 1998). For some, maximizing ownership by locals 
amounts to ensuring that local communities are compensated for the positive 
externalities of wind turbines, which accrue at national rather than local levels 
(Ibid).  
From 1994, Danish municipalities were obliged to allocate areas for wind 
power development, an arrangement aided by an obligation to involve 
counties, local NGOs and utilities throughout the planning process (Toke et 
al., 2008). This last point is considered by Toke to be central in achieving buy-
in and building consensus around plans from an early stage. 
Several benefits stem from the fact that the Danish wind industry was at first 
focused on the development of small-scale turbines. The majority of early 
turbines deployed into the 1980s were rarely larger than 30kW, meaning they 
could be installed in small plots of land without unduly affecting many other 
landowners, and could be financed by individuals or small groups of people. 
These combined factors had the effect of facilitated high rates of learning, 
reducing unit costs, and minimized public opposition to create broad 
acceptance of the industry (Smith, 2012b, Toke et al., 2008).  
3.2.4 Danish policymaking and regulation 
The strength and direction of Danish government policy towards progressive 
energy system is explained by Lockwood (2015) in relation to the policy-
making processed and regulatory framework in place, at least since 2000. 
Structurally, Denmark is similar in some ways to the UK, for example in terms 
of having independent economic regulation, a combined energy and climate 
ministry, with policies negotiated between government and opposition parties 
(Ibid). However, several key differences separate their abilities to make 
progressive energy decisions: in contrast to the UK, pragmatism, compromise 
and consensus underpin Denmark’s decision-making processes, principles 
upheld by the coalition politics and proportional representation characteristic 
of Denmark, and detailed analysis of policy and technology options are 
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carried within the energy agency, rather than the regulatory body, which has 
limited need to interpret policies or power to make trade-offs (Lockwood, 
2015, Lijphart, 1984, Campbell and Hall, 2006). Together, such processes still 
contribute to inertia, but is wholly more credible and consensus led than the 
processes in place in the UK (Lockwood, 2015).  
3.2.5 Summary 
Denmark’s success with developing community energy can be traced to a few 
key points. Firstly, Denmark’s tradition in turbine manufacturing, subsequently 
supported by considerable R&D support made it an early leader in developing 
and manufacturing the technology for both domestic and international 
markets, with profound implications for technological learning as well as 
building local supply chains and associated economic impact. This, amid both 
the populist anti-nuclear movement and burgeoning alternative technology 
support network provided the political legitimacy to decisively prohibit nuclear, 
providing continued focus and direction for renewables (especially wind) 
industries. Third, market support for the growth of the sector was consistent 
over perhaps 20 years, providing market security to would-be investors. 
3.3 Community energy in Germany 
3.3.1 Early German renewable energy policy  
Germany’s energy system in the 1970s and 80s was centred on coal and 
nuclear. However, building on the momentum of a strong environmental 
movement arising from the recent acid rain controversy, the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986 had the effect of galvanising strong and lasting public opinion 
against nuclear (IRENA, 2012, Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea, 1991, Jahn, 
1992). This built on the existing momentum for environmental issues arising 
from acid rain controversy in the early 1980s. 
In turn, this directed political consensus towards the need for more 
renewables, which was manifested in a cross-party Parliamentary Resolution 
in 1988 calling for increased R&D (Scheer in Jacobsson and Bergek (2004)). 
These events provided the foundations for the 1991 Electricity Feed-In Act 
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(EFL), which guaranteed grid connection and established a FiT for 
independent (less than 25 per cent owned publicly or by utilities) RE 
generators (Sijm, 2002).  
The EFL, combined with a favourable planning framework, and low interest 
rates for turbine investments, enabled a doubling of installed wind capacity 
annually between 1990-95 (Bruns et al., 2010, Sijm, 2002, Runci, 2005). The 
EFL was not without its critics, with German utilities arguing that tariff 
spending resulted in competitive distortions brought about by apparently 
undue subsidies incompatible with EU state aid rules (Sijm, 2002). An 
emphasis on wind in terms of relatively high and stable tariffs was meanwhile 
considered as detriment to the growth of other RE sources such as solar and 
hydro (Ibid). 
For these, and other reasons, the EFL was revised into the Renewable 
Energies Law (REL) in 2000. The Renewable Energy Sources Act (Das 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz or EEG) linked FiT to generation costs rather 
than to average retail prices, provided support to a more diverse range of RE 
sources (included utility-owned generators) and shared costs between all 
utilities irrespective of the distribution of FiTs between them (Sijm, 2002). 
Linking FiTs to generation costs removed price risks for generators, which 
disadvantages smaller, more risk-averse generators (Mitchell et al., 2006). 
Largely in response to grid constraints faced by burgeoning offshore wind 
sector, further amendments to the EEG in 2009 required operators to both 
expand the grid and optimise its management (IRENA, 2012).  
3.3.2 Planning 
Strong growth of wind developments throughout the 1990s compelled 
planning authorities to make amendments to regional planning law to better 
manage the local impacts of sector expansion. Increasing local conflicts 
around noise, visual and disturbance impacts drove down public acceptance 
of wind and subsequent restrictive interpretations of nature conservation in 
consenting procedures (Bruns and Ohlhorst, 2011). The wind lobby 
successfully argued that strategic intervention was needed to maintain sector 
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growth (Bruns et al., 2010), and influenced an amendment to the German 
Federal Building Code (BauGB 1996/97). This granted licensing privileges to 
turbines and other renewable developments, meaning that although 
municipalities could define “planning reservations” (spatially concentrated 
wind zones separate from residential zones) for wind within local development 
plans, there was a default presumption – at the Federal level - in favour of 
turbines (Bruns et al., 2010).  
In part these amendments sought to strengthen the decentralised planning 
regime through which rural populations, services and economies could be 
maintained more directly. Schmidt and Buhller suggest that such a local 
regime was largely a response to political, social and economic pressures 
brought about by German reunification and economic restructuring (Schmidt 
and Buehler, 2011).  
3.3.3 The Energiewende 
The rapid growth of renewable capacities and their contribution to emissions 
targets throughout the 2000s was galvanised by a reinforcement of RE 
deployment targets in the publication of the Energiewende (“Energy Concept”) 
by the German government in 2010. While it was the speed rather than the 
prospect of nuclear phase out that had been debated for around a decade, 
the 2011 Fukushima disaster provided an incentive for phase-out by 2022. 
This provided the foundation for continued RE expansion, increased efficiency 
measures and pushing ahead with the development of new coal and gas-fired 
plants to replace declining nuclear baseload (Agora Energiewende, 2015). 
The momentum of the German energy policy can be explained in part by 
coherence with other policy areas and a supportive constituency, and while 
the relative expense of the Energiewende policies has been criticised, it is still 
considered politically sustainable (Lockwood, 2014, Agora Energiewende, 
2015). Early wind sector development throughout the 1980s was supported 
strongly by government-funded RD&D (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). This 
provided an impetus for continued strengthening of green industrial policy 
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focusing on developing PV and wind turbine supply chains, particularly in 
poorer eastern and northern areas (Ibid). 
3.3.4 Funding 
Another vital element in Germany’s RE growth has been the availability of 
affordable capital, the majority of which is sourced from the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) bank. The institution, created as part of the 1948 
European Recovery Program (ERP) 9  for the reconstruction of German 
infrastructure after the Second World War has been an instrumental factor in 
supporting German energy policy (Schröder et al., 2011). Although the ERP 
ended in 1953, it was agreed that ERP was to be retained by the German 
Republic, but maintained as Special Assets from which a developmental 
revolving fund was established (Ibid). As Schröder et al. (2011) discuss, the 
fact that the funds were originally administered by the Ministry of the Marshall 
Plan, and was thus separate from the German national budget, meant that 
their use was not subject to the usual political debate. Furthermore, the nature 
of the bank meant that it was able to provide long term loans for industries 
deemed vital for the German recovery, for which conventional banks of the 
time would not. 
Energy supply in the form of both coal and electricity production, along with 
housing was a primary focus of KfW’s business throughout the 1950s (Ibid). 
The 1973 oil crisis played a large part in reshifting the focus in housing from 
living space to a reduction in energy demand, with the 1976 Energy 
Conservation Act (EnEG), which formed the foundation for today’s efficiency 
laws. From the inception of the EFL the KfW, with its emphasis on social and 
environmental investments, became the primary lender for renewables 
development, doing so at below-market rates. Small-scale RE deployment in 
Germany is tied to energy efficiency: German policy requires efficiency 
                                            
 
9 Popularly termed the ‘Marshall Plan’ after U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall 
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investments to take place before FiTs can be accessed (Ibid), a situation 
perhaps encouraged by KfW’s experience in financing the latter. 
3.3.5 Ownership 
However, the supportive constituency behind German renewables is perhaps 
best explained by the significant role that individuals and communities have in 
owning energy infrastructures (Figure 3.2). From its outset, the FiT was 
designed to be low-risk and accessible by small actors, and indeed sought to 
limit ownership by utilities or public bodies. The focus was expressly on 
diversification of ownership by permitting householders, farmers, coops, and 
municipalities to have stakes in the energy system. The driver, then, was on 
inclusion of a large and varied set of stakeholders, rather than on simply 
delivering on RE capacity targets. 
Pre-privatisation, the Stadtwerke (multi-utility city works) model of utility 
(energy as well as water supply, sewage and waste management) provision 
was commonplace, operating under the territoriality (Örtlichkeit) principle 
under which only local areas were served (Julian 2014). In terms of energy, 
the role of the Stadtwerke was in the management of local distribution 
networks and supply to customers. In contrast to the UK, where privatisation 
centralised the governance of the old regional energy boards into a small 
number of DNOs, Germany maintained the Stadtwerke model (although 
removed the territoriality principle) (Ibid). This formed the foundation for a 
highly decentralised modes of both distribution governance (888 Distribution 
System Operators) and local supply arrangements (1100 electricity supply 
companies) (Ibid). 
While the Stadtwerke legacy has maintained the disaggregation of suppliers 
in Germany, several municipalities and communities have sought to relocalise 
control over both grid infrastructure and supply. Julian (2014) reports that 190 
communities had retaken control over local grids, nine of which are 
cooperatives. Several of the latter (e.g. the communities of Feldheim and 
Schonau), who already had generation capacity, have also set themselves up 
as suppliers. Aside from supporting local economies, setting up as a supplier 
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means that such coops are able to discriminate towards local generation of 
specific forms, as well as address parallel issues such as energy efficiency 
and demand reduction (Ibid). KPMG stated in 2011 that one third of German 
cities, municipalities and communities are similarly seeking remunicipalisation 
of energy supply (KPMG, 2011). 
Figure 3.3 shows that as of 2010, almost 40 per cent of renewables in 
Germany was owned by private individuals, primarily via cooperatives, with 
farmers owning an additional 11 per cent (Buchan, 2012). This can in part be 
explained by the inclusive FiT. However, this itself was perhaps encouraged 
by the long traditions in Germany of collective civil action (Ibid) and 
agricultural cooperatives (DGRV, 2014, Bijman et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 3.3 Ownership of Renewables in Germany 
Source: Buchan, 2012 
The strong constituency created by dispersed investors, Lockwood (2014) 
writes, creates positive ‘policy feedback’ for continued support, which 
counteracts potential negative feedback associated with cost and landscape 
concerns. 
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3.3.6 Summary  
The trajectory of Germany’s community energy sector has much in common 
with Denmarks, with some key exceptions. German RE policy in general has 
benefitted from continuity of energy policy framework (Fell, 2009, Ragwitz et 
al., 2007), and recent moratorium on nuclear has provided the decisive policy 
focus to bolster momentum behind the renewables sector by way of the 
Energiewende. Like Denmark, support has largely (at least initially) favoured 
small-scale generation by non-incumbents, though in Germany the focus was 
on small-scale utilities rather than private individuals. Also with parallels with 
Denmark is Germany’s interweaving of energy policy with industrial, 
technology and agricultural policies.  
Deep traditions around agricultural cooperatives and maintenance of 
municipal utilities form the backbone of a strong cooperative energy sector, 
which contributes to the positive policy feedback encouraged by a diverse, but 
supportive constituency (Lockwood, 2014). 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the circumstances around the development of 
community-owned renewable energy as a key element of the German and 
Danish energy systems. The high penetration of RE paired with high degrees 
of individual and community ownership makes them especially interesting 
from the UK’s perspective, both in terms of the potential for energy system 
change, and the implications of following alternative energy pathways. 
Several factors appear to have contributed to both strong renewables sectors 
and high degree of ownership by communities and individual. Deep 
agricultural traditions were particularly important in shaping preferences for 
wind technology (particularly in Denmark), paving the way for contemporary 
strengths in wind power manufacturing and supply chains. Strong traditions 
around cooperative agriculture and industry, supported by local governance 
also provided the drive and capital for early renewable investments, and were 
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instrumental in directing government support towards such actors, rather than 
corporate utilities.  
Analysis of these community energy exemplars offers several insights related 
to the potential, practicalities and implications of the UK following a similarly 
alternative energy pathway. Firstly, while both countries have benefitted from 
histories and traditions that appear to be sympathetic to small-scale energy 
(such as norms around cooperatives, established wind turbine supply chains), 
they have also demonstrated the political will to make long-term strategic 
decisions facilitative of such pathways, such as nuclear moratoria. Both 
countries have thus challenged the assumptions that a large-scale energy 
system is somehow inevitable. 
Most importantly however, Denmark and Germany have both challenged 
assumptions around the potential negative consequences of supporting an 
alternative energy pathway. German support for the RE industry has been 
instrumental in driving innovation, both contributing to reductions in RE 
installation costs and developing an export market for green technologies 
(Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2015). The strong supportive constituency created by 
diverse ownership means that relatively high retail prices in Germany are 
politically acceptable (Lockwood, 2014). Furthermore, high levels of RE 
penetration are behind dramatic reductions in electricity wholesale prices, 
which combined with diverse ownership is challenging the stability of 
conventional utilities with business models focused on conventional 
generation (Schuppe, 2015a). Because of the low coal prices relative to gas, 
one unintended consequence of low electricity wholesales prices has been 
increased use of coal-fuelled generation, subsequently increasing emissions 
(Schuppe, 2013), although measures are being taken to counteract this 
(Schuppe, 2015b). In summary however, both Germany and Denmark are 
proving that it is possible for small-scale energy can play an important role in 
meeting conventional energy system goals as well as building a system 
capable of overcoming inertia. 
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4 Methods 
This section outlines the methods employed in addressing the research 
objectives. That value of community energy is both multi-dimensional and 
multi-scalar necessitates a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of a specific community energy case study alongside wider reflections of the 
evolution of community energy more broadly. Such a multi-tiered approach 
permits insights into the micro-scale dynamics of community group 
development and practice to be considered alongside macro-scale evolution 
of the broader community energy movement as a whole. 
The chapter commences by giving a brief overview of the context within which 
this research is set. This sets the scene for the methodological rationale and 
conceptual framework adopted herein. The use of integrated mixed methods 
comprising a case study approach alongside broader observations of 
community energy (in its widest sense) is then discussed. The boundaries of 
the research is then given with reference to resources, timeframe, and the 
unfolding policy context within which the research took place. The later 
sections describe in detail discrete phases of research, a community-wide 
household survey, a desk based study around energy impact analysis, and 
semi-structured interviews. 
4.1 Research context 
The research undertaken here ran from October 2011 through to August 
2015. The commencement of the research coincided with the launch of 
Wadebridge Renewable Energy Network (WREN) a few months previously as 
a community-led social enterprise in the north of Cornwall. This provided an 
excellent opportunity to observe the development of the group almost from its 
point of inception over the next few years.  
The period of research was also closely aligned with ongoing developments 
relevant to the wider evolution of community energy as a movement in the 
UK. April 2010 saw the commencement of the small-scale FiT, providing the 
impetus for many individuals, businesses and community groups to participate 
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in generation. The early 2010s were subject to several other developments 
relating directly to CE, such as reviews to policy mechanisms and levels of 
support, changes to renewables deployment costs, and wider changes to 
government rhetoric around the role of small-scale generation in energy 
system more generally. The early 2010s thus marked a watershed in terms of 
the momentum of both community energy practice and policy, and the current 
research is set in this context. Outside of energy policy, ongoing shifts within 
macroeconomic and political landscape, such as deepening of post-2008 
public austerity measures and associated restructuring of public services 
provided a more general, but still relevant backdrop during the period of 
research. 
While the research project was originally conceived as focusing solely on the 
value of WREN, it quickly became clear that this would need to be considered 
within the context of a broader understanding of community energy, as valued 
by a range of stakeholders. While it is the local value of CE that may be of 
most importance for practitioners, its wider value to society, business 
communities, and policymakers will influence the evolution of the movement 
as a whole. It was thus decided that the research should encompass both 
local and broader notions of value. 
Moreover, throughout the research the closeness of CE groups and wider 
society became increasingly apparent. In part, this relates to the 
interdependencies of CE organisations and the populations within which they 
operate, for example the mutual dependence on resources between groups 
and civil society. Furthermore, individuals clearly participate in the energy 
system beyond their role as consumers or their direct interactions with CE 
groups. Their roles as consumers, prosumers, activists, investors and voters 
shape the development of ‘small-scale energy’ more generally (Figure 4.1). 
For these reasons, this research does not hold community energy as a 
discrete entity, but rather includes the relevance of citizen-oriented energy 
activities as expressions of the values and practices of civil society. 
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Figure 4.1 The relationship between community energy and civil society 
Source: Author’s own 
4.2 Rationales for research approach 
4.2.1 Conceptual framework 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this research considers two loci of 
interest: the processes of change within a particular community energy 
initiative, and the broader development of UK community energy within which 
the former is nested. The research approach must therefore be capable of 
considering both scales of analysis. 
Local contexts influence the development of community energy (Raven et al., 
2008) by way of determination and expression of local motivations, 
expectations and visions for individual projects (Seyfang et al., 2013, Raven 
et al., 2008, Raven and Geels, 2010). Local motivations, expectations and 
visions are also inextricably linked to the availability of concomitant resources 
(such as natural, financial, or social capital) either available locally or sourced 
from elsewhere (Raven et al., 2008).  
The ways such factors shape notions of success within projects influences 
practices, in terms of the way groups approach objectives through specific 
projects. Furthermore, these factors shape outcomes, in terms of internal 
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perceptions around progress towards preconceived notions of success. 
WREN’s objectives - Increasing the proportion of locally produced renewable 
energy, focusing revenues locally, and doing so in a way that engages the 
whole population - span technical, social and economic dimensions (WREN, 
2011, WREN, 2012). As such, understanding WREN necessarily involves 
understanding the interaction between the initiative and each of these 
dimensions. Additionally, these dimensions are themselves linked: the ways in 
which RE technologies are deployed affect local financial flows and their 
distribution among local people. Established positivist methods of accounting 
and economic impact analyses are useful here. 
In a rather narrow sense then, that local success can be quantitatively 
measured against well-defined (locally-set) goals suggests that a realist, 
objective approach might be most relevant here. However, WREN’s third 
objective: that of ‘engaging’ the local population, is a more subjective issue 
and the appropriate methodological approach is thus dependent on how 
‘engagement’ for example is interpreted. For example, if ‘engagement’ simply 
is taken to mean even and equitable local diffusion of technologies and 
associated costs and benefits, then such an outcome can be readily defined 
and systematically measured.  
If ‘engagement’ however encompasses subjective and contended notions 
such as participation, trust, local deliberation and wider local democratic 
process (as WREN’s business plans (WREN, 2011, WREN, 2012) suggest), 
social constructivism might have more to offer than realism. At a broader 
level, different actors will perceive and experience the impacts of community 
energy in different ways, suggesting that there is value in an 
interpretive/constructivist ontology rather than one which assumes 
homogeneity in experience.  
Combining a case-study perspective with broader sectoral change also 
supports the use of an interpretivist construction of understanding, particularly 
as it involves the interrogation of the positions of additional system actors, 
with an increased diversity of perceptions and experiences of community 
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energy. Moreover, to understand how the CE movement has developed over 
time requires reflecting on how social values associated with CE (and the 
wider energy system) have evolved over time, which again is supportive of the 
interpretivist stance taken in this thesis.  
Given the subject studies, and methodologies employed here, it is important 
to reflect briefly on how the values held by the author influenced the research. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that understandings of energy policy (or indeed any 
field of public policy) can be sought in terms of both positivist and normative 
dimensions. Indeed, the range of possible approaches to addressing energy 
policy issues is vast, as it draws upon the complexities and uncertainties 
inherent in physical science, political science, and economics (Robert and 
Zeckhauser, 2011). Moreover, as Robert et al 2011 point out, climate policy 
(with obvious parallels with energy policy) is overtly political and rife with 
disagreement, but offers significant returns to providing clarity on those 
disagreements. As such, scholarly work within energy policy is necessarily 
situated somewhere along a hypothetical positive-normative continuum, the 
position on which determining everything, from the framing of the research 
question and the selection of methodologies, to the analysis and presentation 
of data and findings.  
If the archetype at end of Robert’s continuum is the dispassionate analyst, 
driven predominantly by facts and models rather than values, the advocate 
analyst places more emphasis on value-driven policies (Ibid). While some 
discussions in this thesis (i.e those critiquing the suitability of large-scale 
centralised infrastructures) are certainly in the voice of the dispassionate 
analyst, the primary thrust is that of advocacy towards a particular policy 
direction. This is driven not by insensitivity to facts, but first by the recognition 
that the energy system can impact upon society, citizens, and households in a 
number of ways both positively or negatively, and second to the belief that a 
‘good’ energy policy is one that best addresses the interests and values of 
society, rather than just the interests of incumbents and their shareholders.  
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Values of any persuasion unavoidably impact upon research. For this 
research in particular, the adoption (or acknowledgement) of a normative 
position on what constitutes a ‘progressive’, ‘sustainable’ energy policy was 
integral to the development of underlying themes of the thesis. A focus on the 
field of community energy itself arose from an interest in the role of individuals 
and communities in the energy system, in part because it of the greater 
potential for justice and equity in decision-making processes, but also 
because it is directly antithetic to the centralised principles of the ‘old’ energy 
system. It is in analysing the meanings behind normative assumptions that the 
research proceeds. 
However, it is important to note that these values evolved as the research 
progressed. For example, as insights emerged from the data, preconceptions 
around what is ‘sustainable energy’ were challenged and became more 
nuanced, and this helped to develop nuance around key findings, such as 
those around the democratisation of energy. Further, the development of such 
values had additional impact on the research in that they helped to shape 
concluding discussions the role of policy versus society in shaping the energy 
system. While the acknowledgement and reflection on personal values have 
been important processes in terms of demonstrating validity, it can be argued 
that they are also vital processes in developing a voice within academic and 
political discussions. Indeed, in the overtly contested and political realm of 
energy policy, it might be argued that normative discussions around ‘what 
ought to be’ are at least important as positive questions of ‘what is’. In this 
sense, idealism and advocacy can be considered at least as valuable as more 
objective, dispassionate analysis.  
4.2.2 Integration of research methods 
The exploratory nature of this research calls for an approach which is 
inductive rather than deductive, employing qualitative as well as quantitative 
data. Robson uses the term ‘flexible research designs’ to descibe a non-
prescriptive process of evolving objectives and methods (Robson, 2002). With 
its focus on establishing “patterns, consistencies and meanings” (Gray, 2004), 
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an inductive approach is well-suited to developing an understanding of 
transitions, where multiple actors perceive and have bearings upon processes 
in different ways and to different ends. This approach was deemed most 
appropriate in addressing the research questions, particularly as they are 
formulated around potentially contended notions such as ‘value’, and ‘impact’. 
Indeed, such contention between energy system stakeholders (i.e. between 
community energy practitioners, civil society, and energy policymakers) is at 
the heart of the current thesis.  
The meaning of ‘value’ and ‘impact’ is also of consequence to the use of 
mixed methods, as opposed to a purely qualitative or purely quantitative 
approach. For example, the value of community energy to an investor may 
centre around the ability to gain a favourable rate of return, while the value of 
the movement to a developer may extend beyond profits, towards for example 
enhancing the reputation of the solar PV sector. Indeed, different community 
energy practitioners may be interested in extracting different forms of value 
from their involvement, which might span financial and social motives, as well 
as focusing variously on the ‘individual’ and the ‘collective’. All research 
questions are thus addressed by drawing on a blend of qualitative and 
quantitative methods as appropriate. 
4.2.3 Rationale of a case study approach 
Case studies are defined by Yin (1994) as “empirical enquiries that investigate 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and contexts are not clearly evident”. As 
such, a case study analysis of a specific community energy initiative can be 
useful in drawing insights about more phenomena of community energy, or 
more generally, grassroots societal innovations. Since community energy 
exists as a complex system contextualised by the interplay of economics, 
culture, politics over specific timeframes, experimental approaches are 
unfeasible here (Gray, 2004). Also of relevance to the current study is the 
flexibility of case studies in the employment of both qualitative alongside 
quantitative data. 
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While an argument could be made for simultaneously examining multiple 
initiatives (to give a broader, more representative perspective perhaps), 
Flyvbjerg (2006) refutes the assumptions that for such approaches, more 
case-studies are always better than one. With reference to Flyvbjerg’s (Ibid) 
discussion of the theory, reliability and validity regarding case study 
approaches, the following arguments can be made in favour of a singe in-
depth case study of the form employed here. 
Firstly, despite some assertions to the contrary (e.g. Dogan et al, 1990), a 
context-dependent understanding of a subject can be more valuable than 
general, theoretical knowledge. This is especially so within social science, 
where the complexities of human behaviour render the attainment of 
predictive theory elusive (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The realm of community energy is 
inherently social, encompassing knowledge and practice of actors both within 
and around community energy practice. But, the (social) movement is also 
part interrelated complex systems comprising technology, economy, 
institutions and culture, which also coevolve over time. It is as unlikely then 
that community energy can ever be explained by a simple rule or theory as it 
could be by analysing a group in isolation. For these reasons, this thesis 
incorporates a case-based approach alongside observations from the wider 
sector to ensure that both deep and broad insights can be drawn. 
The second point concerns the practicality and desirability of generalising 
from a single case-study. For Giddens (1984), generalisations can only be 
drawn from case-studies in numbers in order that judgements can be made 
around typicality. The extent to which this is true, of course, depends on the 
typicality of the case-study subject in question. Community energy comprises 
a diversity of formal and informal groups, varying in context, drivers, values, 
resources and approaches, meaning that 1) there is no ‘typical’ community 
energy intitiative, and 2) surveying enough instances to build a ‘true’ picture of 
the sector and its evolution would be prohibitively difficult.  
In any case, Flyvbjerg notes that atypicality can often yield more information 
in terms of revealing a greater diversity of actors and mechanisms at play. 
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Certainly the scale and context of the selected case study is such that it does 
offer diversity, which is valuable in terms of the initiative potentially presenting 
more opportunities and challenges than other community energy groups. For 
example, WREN states explicitly the desire to engage with the whole 
community (WREN, 2011), i.e. a whole town, with diversity in terms of 
demography, incomes and rurality, at least in comparison to smaller, village-
located groups. 
Furthermore, in terms of the desirability of generalisation, the value of 
knowledge is not limited to the identification of instances that represent the 
wider whole (Flyvbjerg, 2006), insofar as a rich, in-depth understanding of a 
single CE group can be as valuable (or more so) than a portrayal of the whole 
movement. Indeed, the use of insights from atypical case-studies for the 
falsification of propositions is a valuable part of critical reflexivity. As will be 
explored in later chapters, in depth a case-study of the type employed here 
can indeed help expound some of the common myths around community 
energy. 
Another possible concern about case studies is that the depth of knowledge 
they can reveal can make it difficult or impossible to summarise findings into 
general propositions (Flyvbjerg, 2006, Benhabib, 1990, Roth, 1989, White, 
2009). However, and in relation to the points already covered, the reality of 
community energy is unavoidably complex, and a ‘thick’ narrative of a specific 
case can be more valuable than general propositions. The latter seeks to 
distill complex reality, whilst the former acknowledges that nuance and 
ambiguity are needed to tell the story. Summarising a community energy 
project would involve making rash decisions over what elements are 
important, for example relating to the ‘success’ of the project, a concept which 
(as will be seen) is subjective. Also, focusing on headlines risks overlooking 
minutiae, which in retrospect might turn out to provide the most compelling 
findings. This is especially relevant if one is interested in the dynamics rather 
than simply the success of projects. For example, explaining the 
circumstances around failures provides more insight than summarising 
successes (Diamond, 1997). 
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In addition to these rationale, a final reason for selecting it as a case study is 
one of methodological convenience. Richard Fenno in the Observation, 
Context and Sequence in the Study of Politics describes how the “immediate 
proximity to data…produces sensitivities and perspectives which…give 
observation some ‘value added’” (Fenno Jr, 1986). Here, the author was 
describing methods of political analysis, but it can be argued that proximate 
‘soaking and poking’, as Fenno puts it, is as relevant in the equally political 
world of community energy. That the research took place in close 
geographical proximity to WREN meant that these relationships are more 
accessible than would be the case if studying from afar. 
4.2.4 Broader observations of the evolution of community energy 
This thesis is centred at the interplay between two subjects of inquiry: that of a 
single CE group by way of a case study, and that of the broader CE 
movement. While the former will provide an in-depth account of real world 
day-to-day CE experiences, the latter is concerned with drawing more 
transferrable insights from the sector as a whole as well as from wider societal 
experiences of a more engaged, citizen-oriented energy system. As such, the 
thesis seeks to capture the aggregative and synergistic impacts of citizen-led 
energy, including community energy on the energy system. 
The intention is not to generalise about CE, not least because a key strength 
of the movement rests on diversity in values and approaches rather than its 
standardisation (Seyfang et al., 2014). Rather, the maintaining two distinct, 
but linked focal points seeks to go some way in capturing the interplay 
between the individuals and experiences of practitioners at one end of the 
scale, and the general momentum of the movement at the other.  
4.2.5 The multi-level perspective 
In order to understand the interplay between community energy and the 
existing energy system, this thesis draws on the expanding body of work 
focusing on sociotechnical transition theory, which pulls together insights from 
science and technology studies (STS) and evolutionary economics, as well as 
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sociology and institutional theory. This emphasises the role of hierarchical 
social structural factors in both maintaining system inertia and the selective 
permission of new sociotechnical assemblages to develop (Geels, 2002, 
Geels, 2005, Kemp et al., 1998, Raven et al., 2008, Bijker, 1995).  
In particular, the ‘multi-level perspective’ (MLP) developed by Geels (2002) 
describes how niches might be conceptualised alongside regimes within a 
nested hierarchy (Figure 4.2). Niche innovations, at the micro-level, are novel 
changes to sociotechnical arrangements carried and developed by a small 
number of actors in an ‘incubation room’ outside market selection. 
Sociotechnical regimes characterise existing technological developments and 
govern innovation trajectories. The sociotechnical landscape at the macro-
level describes the exogenous environment (macro-economics, sociocultural 
patterns, macro-politics) beyond the reach of individual actors. 
 
Figure 4.2 Niches, regimes and landscape within a nested hierarchy 
Source: Geels (2002) 
A key element of the MLP is that new technologies undergo a process of 
selection (or otherwise) as a result of internal processes within the niche as 
well as developments at the regime and landscape levels (Geels and Schot, 
2007). The dynamic relationship between niches, regime and landscape 
levels is illustrated in Figure 4.3. At the regime level, incremental changes are 
possible through ongoing negotiations between technology, policy, industry, 
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markets, science and culture. Tensions between these dimensions (resulting 
from landscape pressure, for example) weakens the existing regime, and 
provides opportunities for novelties to break through. Continued development 
of successful niche innovations through market growth and widespread 
adoption will eventually result in the niche becoming embedded within the 
regime level. 
	  
Figure 4.3 A multi-level perspective on transitions 
Source: Geels and Schot (2007) 
The MLP heuristic thus offers a framework upon which analysis of the 
coevolution between community energy and the wider energy system can be 
understood. In operationalizing the MLP however, it is acknowledged that the 
boundaries placed around this, as with any empirical study have great bearing 
on how the constituent elements of the MLP (niche, regime etc) interact. As 
such, this research, like others employing the MLP, is necessarily “partial, 
situated and temporary” (Scoones et al., 2007, Smith et al., 2010). 
 
F.W. Geels, J. Schot / Research Policy 36 (2007) 399–417 401
Fig. 1. Multi-level perspective on transitions (adapted from Geels, 2002, p. 1263).
sions: (a) availability of resources (factor endowments,
capabilities, knowledge) and (2) degree of coordination
of resource deployment. Assuming that selection pres-
sures are always present, Berkhout et al. (2004) combine
the two adaptation dimensions to construct a typology of
four transitions (Fig. 2).
‘Endogenous renewal’ results from regime actors
making conscious and planned efforts in response to
perceived pressures, using regime-internal resources.
‘Reorientation of trajectories’ results from a shock,
either inside or outside the incumbent regime, fol-
lowed by a respons from egime actors, using internal
resources. ‘Emergent transformation’ arises from unco-
ordinated pressures, outside the regime, often driven by
small and new firms. ‘Purposive transitions’ are intended
and coordinated change processes that emerge from out-
Fig. 2. Typology of transformation processes (Berkhout et al., 2004,
p. 67).
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4.3 Research boundaries 
4.3.1 Definitional issues 
The principle research question, What is the value of community energy in the 
UK? of course invites clarification around definitions. Specifically, it is useful to 
remove the ambiguity around the meaning of ‘community energy’. While these 
points of clarification may be clarified by selecting terms of reference 
arbitrarily, appreciation of the subjectivities around these terms is a key step 
in understanding the potential for scaling up community energy.  
‘Community energy’ is a disputed term, meaning different things to different 
actors. Definitions vary according to understandings of what should qualify as 
community energy, with particular distinctions drawn between community 
groups who own (wholly or in part) energy infrastructures and broader 
initiatives who engage with the energy system in other ways. In a review of 
evidence exercise for DECC, Databuild Solutions define community energy 
more succinctly as, “any UK energy project…that [is] led by a community 
group for the benefit of their community” (Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 
2014, Databuild and Energy Saving Trust, 2013), with terms additionally 
defined as listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Definitions used in DECC Community Energy Strategy Review 
Term Definition 
Energy project Any project involving collective action 
to buy, manage, save or generate 
energy 
Community 
group 
Any citizen group or third sector body 
with a representative voice. The 
community group must be 
responsible and/or accountable for 
the delivery of an energy project in 
the UK. 
Community Energy projects included in the 
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benefit review must generate a benefit for the 
community in the form of income or 
profits alongside other economic or 
social benefits. 
While this kind of definition is relatively broad, the main themes of action, 
agency, and benefits are central, and the extent to which community energy 
responds to each of these themes thus form key points of inquiry for this 
thesis. 
However, as highlighted in Section 2.6, although community energy exists as 
a movement of collective efforts, there is value in considering the interactions 
of such entities alongside the more nebulous activities across civil society. 
Community energy can be considered as both a response by, and responsive 
to civil society in the ways that the former draws on values, resources and 
legitimacy from the latter. Subsequently, while separating community energy 
from the aggregated values and activities of individuals is important from a 
policy perspective, it is somewhat ignorant of the importance of non-CE actors 
in influencing, accepting and adopting small-scale energy approaches, and 
thus of participating in energy transitions more widely. For these reasons, this 
thesis seeks to consider the role of individuals/citizens alongside, and 
embedded with the more formalised community energy movement. 
4.3.2 Primary study area 
The primary study area is that of the town of Wadebridge and the surrounding 
parish communities of St Breock and Egloshayle (Figure 3.1). Although 
WREN states that the surrounding area (including numerous parishes and the 
towns of Rock and Padstow) will be involved through ‘collaboration’ (WREN, 
2011), the primary focus for intended ‘intense activity and evaluation’ is the 
former, smaller area. 
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Figure 4.4 Geographical units of the study site 
Notes: See: 10 
The areas of interest are delineated by the boundaries of several ‘Lower 
Layer Super Output Zones’ (LLSOAs)11, within the ‘North Cornwall’ Local 
Authority ‘LAU1’ area. Super Output Areas (SOAs) were selected as an 
appropriate sampling unit for a number of reasons. First, government 
datasets, including census statistics as well as DECC and Ofgem data on 
energy consumption and FiT installations are readily available at SOA scales. 
Second, LLSOAs are broadly comparable in terms of population size meaning 
data can be compared with that from other areas throughout England and 
                                            
 
10 Four North Cornwall 009 LLSOA areas (blue) contain Wadebridge town while the 
‘North Cornwall 007A’ LLSOA surrounds the town. 
11 Following the 2001 census, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) developed a 
set of stable hierarchical geographical building blocks to facilitate the collection and 
publication of Neighbourhood Statistics. At the midpoint of the scales are the Middle 
Layer Super Output Areas and Lower Layer Super Output Areas (MLSOAs and 
LLSOAs) formed by an average population of 7200 and 1500 respectively (ODPM 
2005). There are 7193 MLSOAs (plus the Isles of Scilly) in England and Wales, 
comprising a minimum of 5000 people or 2000 households, and 1235 IGZs in 
Scotland made up of between 2500 and 6000 people. Within the English MLSOAs 
are 32,482 LLSOAs containing a minimum of 1000 people. 
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Wales. Also, blocks are expected to be stable over time, meaning that future 
surveys could use the same sampling blocks to build up a longitudinal picture 
of change. 
The ‘North Cornwall 009A-D’ LLSOAs comprises Wadebridge town and the 
villages of Egloshayle to the South East and Bodieve to the north, while the 
‘North Cornwall 007A’ LLSOA encompasses the area immediately 
surrounding Wadebridge on all sides, and includes the villages of St Breock, 
Whitecross, Trevanson, Burlaw, and Sladesbridge (Blue and red areas on 
Figure 4.4 respectively).  
4.3.3 Wider area of interest 
Placing a boundary for analysis (i.e. the primary study area as defined in 
Figure 4.4) is useful for focusing the research on a specific population, and 
reflects the fact that most of WREN’s work focuses on the population of 
Wadebridge and the surrounding area. However, to ignore all areas beyond 
these boundaries would be to negate the importance of wider impacts, i.e. 
those outside of the immediate study area12. This is especially important given 
the rural nature of the area, where populations, and thus stakeholder and 
impacts to stakeholders are dispersed. Furthermore, some impacts, e.g. local 
economic impacts may be felt both locally and further afield once multiplier 
effects are considered. Indeed, from regional and national policy perspectives, 
local, regional and national economic impacts are potentially of value. A 
pragmatic approach is therefore taken, with focus on the primary study area 
complemented by a more general discussion of impacts further afield. 
4.3.4 Proxies of energy system change 
The use of indicators for analysing system change in general is well 
established throughout the sustainable development literature e.g. (Ledoux et 
                                            
 
12 Indeed, WREN considers all impacts, rather than only those within a specific 
boundary of study 
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al., 2005), and its usefulness in that field informs the adoption of the method 
here. Indicators are “thriftily selected data assumed to have a causal 
relationship with a theoretical concept” (Vos et al., 1985). As such, providing 
that the indicators selected to be representative of local energy system 
change, they can be valuable as proxies of change. While local energy 
system change may not be distillable to one or two variables, the purpose is 
to build an understanding of how individual and meaningful elements of a 
system change and interact, and what this means for the system as an 
aggregate of these attributes. 
Patlitzianas et al. (2008) notes that much of the existing work on establishing 
sets of energy indicators has been carried out by international organisations 
(e.g. EC, UN, OECD, IAEA), and as such focus either on global or economy 
(i.e. continental or country) -wide scales e.g. (Streimikiene et al., 2007, 
Streimikiene, 2005, Aslanyan et al., 2005, Taylor et al., 2005) (Vera and 
Langlois (2007)).  
In addition to this, the UK has for several decades employed energy (and 
climate change)-specific indicators alongside wider sustainability indicators 
(Defra, 2010, Defra, 2011, HM Government, 2005, DCLG, 2006, HM 
Government, 2007, DCLG, 2011). By establishing a set of indicators, the 
Government can prioritise those areas that are deemed most important for 
meeting policy objectives, and help assess and manage delivery of policies to 
these ends, either centrally or by local authorities. While these efforts are 
important from broad sustainable development perspectives, the energy 
indicators used typically comprise only a small proportion of wider measures 
4.3.5 Identification of attributes of community energy 
In seeking to understand a local energy system and its evolution though, what 
attributes should be considered? What can be left out? Fundamentally, 
indicators must be able to communicate to stakeholders the speed and 
direction of travel in relation to their objectives. For example, selection of 
indicators for government objectives depends on which policies are to be 
monitored (Patlitzianas et al., 2008). Since community energy (and its 
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development) is potentially of interest to a wider set of stakeholders than just 
policymakers (including but not limited to practitioners and the academic 
community), it makes sense to consider objectives from that wider set. 
Building on the literature then (see especially Liverman et al. (1988) and 
Patlitzianas et al. (2008)), criteria were established in order to guide indicator 
selection: 
• Significance: the indicator should measure something of importance (to 
the stakeholders involved) 
• Availability of data: data should either be readily accessible or 
obtainable with reasonable time and costs 
• Replicable: similar data should be able to be collected both from repeat 
surveying as well as from comparators 
• Unbiased: data collection should be robust and objective 
Following these criteria ensures that the data collected here is both robust 
and of use across a variety of applications, for example, in mapping 
longitudinal shifts and comparisons between different local energy systems  
In light of these considerations, indicators were drawn from a number of 
sources, including the WREN business plan (WREN, 2011). The indicators 
have been selected to cover a range of qualitative and quantitative aspects 
covering resource, economic, and social factors. While these indicators have 
been identified specifically with consideration to the WREN context, for the 
purpose of evaluating the progress of WREN against internal and external 
goals and objectives, they are not site-specific and should be transferable to 
other similar projects and indeed to energy development projects more 
generally.   
4.3.6 Establishing a baseline 
Establishing a baseline is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, existence 
of a baseline provides a starting point from which change can be monitored 
and analysed. Longitudinal data analysis, for example, clarifies direction and 
magnitude of change among and between indicators, and can provide a more 
complete approach to empirical research than is afforded by cross-sectional 
106 
 
 
observations (Ruspini, 2000). With relevance to the value of this research, 
Menard (1991) refers to the value of longitudinal data which “allows the 
analysis of duration; permits the measurement of differences or change in a 
variable from one period to another…and can be used to locate the causes of 
social phenomena”, the phenomenon in this case being that of energy 
transitions. Establishing a baseline of Wadebridge’s energy economy is thus a 
vital part in determining the nature and scale of change.  
While time constraints of this research do not permit collection of multiple 
waves of data, establishing a baseline at this stage offers the potential for 
future analysis of the study area and may provide insights that are otherwise 
unreachable with cross-sectional analysis. 
Secondly, although this research is about understanding change, it is also 
concerned with understanding how to measure change. It this sense then, 
establishing a baseline is important in that it will help to develop a 
methodology for repeating the process, either on the same community to build 
up longitudinal dataset, or on different communities to understand how energy 
systems differ across different communities. 
4.4 Analysis of the impacts of a community energy group 
This section sets out the key methods employed in assessing the impact of 
WREN on the local energy system. It should be noted that because the 
research boundaries adopted here are different from WREN’s internal 
research on impact, inconsistencies between WREN’s assessment of impact, 
and this assessment, are to be expected. Two significant factors here are the 
use of a geographical boundary around Wadebridge and the temporal aspect. 
With respect to geography, as Section 4.3 points out this study focuses on the 
town of Wadebridge itself, and specifically taking four nationally–derived 
geographical boundaries to define the primary study area. Analysis of the 
impacts reported herein are thus analysed within this boundary. While it is 
accepted that WREN’s influence extends beyond this arbitrary boundary, such 
an approach provides a foundation for objective comparison of CE efforts in 
other population centres. In terms of timeframes, the data collection period of 
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this thesis necessarily had an end, although WREN continues to keep up-to-
date records of impact from the organisation’s perspective. Here again then 
arises the potential for disparities between this, and WREN’s datasets. 
4.4.1 Contextual data 
A wide range of contextual factors define the current energy system in 
Wadebridge. Furthermore, these factors may play a role in determining the 
speed and shape of local energy system change. In order to measure 
‘success’, understanding the context in which WREN seeks to enact change 
is thus important. 
Several contextual factors are important when considering energy systems 
and system change. The literature demonstrates domestic energy 
requirements are influenced by dwelling type (Druckman and Jackson, 2008, 
Baker, 2011, Yao and Steemers, 2005), household size (Yohanis et al., 2008, 
Druckman and Jackson, 2008, McLoughlin et al., 2012, Boardman et al., 
2005, Leahy and Lyons, 2009), occupant age (Roberts, 2008, Meier and 
Rehdanz, 2010, Healy and Clinch, 2002, McLoughlin et al., 2012, Yohanis et 
al., 2008), income levels/socioeconomic status (e.g. Druckman and Jackson, 
2008, Meier and Rehdanz, 2010, Yohanis et al., 2008, Leahy and Lyons, 
2009), tenure (Druckman and Jackson, 2008, O’Doherty et al., 2008) and 
rurality (Druckman and Jackson, 2008). Propensity to adopt both domestic 
energy efficiency measures have been related to tenure (Druckman and 
Jackson, 2008, Cunningham and Joseph, 1978), whilst microgeneration 
adoption has been related to age (Sardianou and Genoudi, 2013, Scarpa and 
Willis, 2010, Balcombe et al., 2013), tenure (Richter, 2013, Gooding et al., 
2013) and income/ socioeconomic status (Caird et al., 2008, Roy et al., 2008, 
Caird and Roy, 2007, Sardianou and Genoudi, 2013). Engagement with 
issues of sustainability more generally have also been correlated with 
socioeconomic status (Carter, 2001) and age (Roberts, 2008, Olli et al., 
2001), among other variables. 
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Data contributing to household size, dwelling type, demographics, income, 
socioeconomic status, tenure and rurality) are taken from 2011 census 
records for the relevant LLSOAs.  
4.4.2 Energy consumption 
The scale and form of local energy consumption both sets the baseline for 
energy system change and influences the opportunities for demand reduction. 
DECC publishes gas and electricity consumption at the LLSOA scale at 
annual intervals. Although this includes commercial as well as domestic data, 
this research focuses on domestic demand. To supplement LLSOA-scale 
data, finer-grained data at the individual household-level was collected as part 
of the household energy survey (Section 4.5). 
4.4.3 Energy generation 
As increasing the adoption of local renewables is a key objective of WREN, it 
is important to accurately and objectively measure progress against this 
target. Data is available from two sources. WREN maintains records of 
renewable installations that have been directly enabled (through installer-
referrals, for example) by the group. While self-reporting of non-direct impacts 
can potentially be open to over-reporting bias, the potential for peer effects is 
well established (Bale et al., McMichael and Shipworth, 2013, Michelsen and 
Madlener, 2013), and it is indeed possible that such effects can also be 
underestimated.  
Additionally, through Ofgem’s quarterly Feed-in Tariff report ((Ofgem, 2015a), 
installations by technology can be quantified according to the LLSOA 
geographical units. A small number (around 6 per cent) of FiT installations 
have locations registered in terms of Ordnance Survey grid reference rather 
than postcode, meaning they do not fall within any LLSOA (Long, 2013). 
While data from sources such as this may be more robust than self-reported 
data, it is ignorant of influence in ways that the latter is not. For example, 
WREN hold data on facilitated and influenced installations regardless of 
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location. This thesis therefore considers both WREN and Ofgem data in 
assessing local RE uptake. 
4.4.4 Economic impact 
The annual distributional impact of WREN-related microgeneration installation 
was estimated using self-reported installation data, unit costs and associated 
savings from onsite use. Average unit costs on a fixed date (Aug 2014) were 
used (Energy Saving Trust, 2014), to reflect the variability of costs over time. 
FiT and RHI generation and export revenues were based on tariffs at the time 
of writing. Energy bill savings were based on average consumption and 
electricity prices for the study area, assuming 50 per cent of generated 
electricity is deemed for export, and 25 per cent is used on site (Energy 
Saving Trust, 2016). The disparity between the two values reflects the 
mismatch between onsite supply and demand. 
Indicative estimations of WREN’s direct economic income and expenditure 
was carried out using financial data made available by WREN (Alexander, 
2013). Indirect economic impacts arising from commercial partnerships are 
not estimated, but self-reported figures from WREN (Hiles, 2014) is used 
alongside interviews with installers and indicative average industry costs 
(Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2012) to derive estimations of locally-accruing indirect 
expenditure.  
4.5 Household energy survey 
Desk-based data was supplemented by qualitative and quantitative data 
collected by conducting a postal survey carried out on householders within the 
study site. The aim here was twofold: a) to understand in finer detail the 
energy consumption characteristics of the population and b) to investigate 
local attitudes and perceptions towards energy system change in general, and 
the use of individual technologies more specifically. 
Gillham (2000) outlines several advantages of such an approach: they are 
relatively low-cost compared to interviews; they are convenient for 
respondents; they can be quick to analyse (depending on question structure); 
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and interview bias can be minimised. On the other hand, they can be 
expensive, and can be open to error design, collection, processing and 
analysis of data (Biemer, 2010), although these potential pitfalls are 
characteristic of qualitative methods in general, to a degree. 
4.5.1 Questionnaire design 
Survey questions were aligned with the research objectives and thus explored 
both the current energy system in Wadebridge as well as the social barriers 
and opportunities for local energy system change. The wording of questions 
focusing on perceptions were in part influenced by surveys previously 
undertaken by others (e.g. Spence et al. (2010), Demski et al. (2013)). 
The questionnaire sought to maximise breadth of data collected whilst 
minimising the time taken to complete. As such, care was taken to ensure 
questions and wording was clear, relevant, and brief. Efforts were taken to 
minimise bias through the use of neutral words, equal weighting of options, 
and avoiding built-in assumptions, loaded questions, technical jargon or 
unnecessary complexity. Careful layout and formatting minimised clutter and 
ensured questions were as easy as possible to follow. Comments and 
suggestions were sought from WREN on the content and layout of 
questionnaires. 
Careful wording within questions (e.g. “Wind farms” as separate from 
“individual turbines” sought to control potential variances in respondents’ 
constructs of simply “wind” (Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Related to this, options 
sought to respond to contextualist perspectives whereby constructs and 
attitudes are governed by context-specific facts as well as (abstracted) 
knowledge (Sturgis and Allum, 2004, Jasanoff, 2000). This was however less 
possible in some instances, as it was also deemed important to encourage 
trade-offs to be made between potentially competing technologies. For 
instance, constructs of local wind farms were likely to be more contextually 
informed than those of nuclear power in the region, simply because the latter 
does not exist.  
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The survey was piloted on a random selection comprising around ten per cent 
(n=297) of proposed recipients from across the study site to test logistics, 
return rates, and reveal other deficiencies in survey design. Questionnaires 
were subsequently modified slightly to remove or reword potentially 
ambiguous or superfluous questions, or else add additional questions. The 
return rate from the pilot was 11 per cent (n=34), exceeding the expected 
lower limit of 10 per cent. 
Questionnaires comprised 5 pages including a cover page, which introduced 
WREN and gave an outline of the research and how data would be used. 
Assurances were made regarding confidentiality and respondents were 
assured that opinions were sought (and there were no right or wrong 
answers). Respondents had the option of returning the survey via a stamped, 
addressed envelope, handing into the WREN shop, or by filling out an online 
version. Both then University of Exeter and WREN logos were prominent. 
Seven sections followed, including: 
1. Household circumstances, including number of occupants, tenure, 
and years in property 
2. Domestic energy consumption, which asked for sources of water 
and space heating, consumption of electricity and gas (in units or £), 
presence and rationale of selected microgeneration and efficiency 
installations, and electricity supplier 
3. Views about the national energy system relating to attitudes around 
increased renewable energy investment, demand reduction local 
energy decision-making and national energy decision-making (5-point 
Likert scales for each) 
4. Views about the local energy system relating to the importance of 
local energy production, local decision-making, local ownership, non-
local energy production, personal participation in making local energy 
decisions, and the degree of confusion around the variety of local 
energy options (5-point Likert scale for each) 
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5. Favourability of local electricity supply options, including coal/gas, 
nuclear, wind farms, individual turbines, rooftop PV, solar farms and 
out-of-county nuclear (5-point Likert scale for each) 
6. Carrying out of ‘sustainable’ practices, such as recycling, 
composting food waste etc 
7. Interest in engaging with WREN through investing in domestic 
microgeneration, receiving subsidised insulation, and receiving advice 
about a range of local energy-related services. 
The questionnaire was designed carefully with clear instructions for each 
question to minimise ambiguity. The majority of questions could be answered 
simply by checking tick boxes, although there was an opportunity to expand 
on those questions where ‘other’ was used as an option. Additionally, there 
was space at the end of the pack in which general comments could be 
included, allowing respondents to supplement quantitative answers with more 
nuanced opinions. The full questionnaire is given in Appendix 1. 
4.5.2 Sampling strategy 
The principle of census sampling as followed to cover the whole of the study 
area (as defined in Figure 3.1), and a total of 3459 questionnaires were 
delivered in June 2013. Household addressed were obtained from a 
database, and included all households in the area apart from those opting out 
of unsolicited mail (through the Mail Preference Service), those in newly built 
buildings (less than 6 months old), or who don’t have a registered address for 
other reasons (such as living in an annex with parents/children). All packs 
were addressed with occupant names to residential properties only.  
While census sampling theoretically gives all respondents the same 
opportunity to participate, it was acknowledged that self-selection bias might 
have led to nonresponse bias (the responding portion of the population 
differing from the nonresponding portion) (Groves, 2006). Representativeness 
was thus calculated by comparing response data with known strata (WREN 
membership, study site sub-area, and tenure), and improved by post-
stratification sampling by these attributes. Resource constraints did not permit 
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pre-notification or reminder stages, though it is acknowledged that response 
rates could have been improved by these means. Key characteristics of the 
sampling areas and five sub-areas are given in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Wadebridge sampling area characteristics 
Sampling 
area 
LLSOA 
code 
Households 
(no.) 
Home 
ownership 
(% of total) 
WREN Membership  
(per 100 households) 
Area 1 009A 655 78 14 
Area 2 009B 917 71 14 
Area 3 009C 890 45 10 
Area 4 009D 689 65 11 
Area 5 007A 577 56 12 
Whole area - 3728 63 12 
4.5.3 Response rates 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of response rates for the site as well as sub-
areas. This includes responses from a draft version of the questionnaire 
received during the pilot phase, meaning that some questions from the main 
phase were not answered. A number of reasons (e.g. addressee absent or 
address inaccessible) resulted in 72 packs being undeliverable, in an overall 
response rate of around 8.7%. While this is modest, nonresponse does not 
automatically increase nonresponse bias (Groves, 2006; Peress, 2010), and 
the post-stratification steps described above act as a check against this 
possibility. Response rates varied from 6 to 11 per cent across different sub-
areas in the study site. Higher response rates are returned from areas with 
higher social grades (Figure 5.4), a pattern consistent with other surveys 
(Demski, 2011), and suggests a slight bias towards more educated 
respondents. Self-selection bias arising from interest in the subject area is 
also expected to skew results somewhat. 
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Table 4.3 Response rates for the household energy survey 
Sampling 
area 
Distributed Returned Response rate % of completed 
questionnaires 
Area 1 629 64 10 20 
Area 2 886 76 9 24 
Area 3 1017 65 6 20 
Area 4 648 70 11 22 
Area 5 578 46 8 14 
Whole area 3758 321 9 100 
 
4.5.4 Data analysis 
Questionnaire data was entered into Excel and coded where necessary, 
before being imported into SPSS for analysis. Missing data was coded as 
such, and all data were screened for anomalies, for example answers that 
were outside of categories were coded as missing. Parametric t-tests were 
used to test for significant differences. Not all questions were used in the 
eventual analysis. 
124 respondents included additional comments about both the questionnaire 
and the issues raised within. These were collated, given identifiers, and coded 
manually according to broad themes, which were informed by research 
objectives. More specific themes were then identified as they emerged from 
the data, for example ‘Identifying specific energy priorities; aesthetics of 
renewables; understandings of trade-offs). Several of these comments were 
then used to supplement and explain findings emerging from quantitative 
data, and are coded in the analysis as Respondent 1, for example. 
4.6 Semi-structured interviews 
16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders from 
throughout the community energy sector, with the purpose of developing 
insights into the impact and value of WREN and of community energy more 
generally. With the exception of a few interviews with community energy 
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groups from outside of the area, the majority of interviews thus focused either 
specifically on WREN or more generally on the development of community 
energy in the South West. 
The interview as an “interchange of views between two persons conversing 
around a theme of mutual interest” (Kvale, 1996) is an established mode of 
qualitative data collection. In particular, interviewing can be used to develop 
deep insights into individuals’ experiences as well as feelings and 
interpretations of these experiences (Kvale, 1996, Mack et al., 2005). As 
concepts and impacts of community energy (and of energy policy more 
generally) are inherently subjective, the qualitative interview is especially 
useful here as a method of drawing out meanings and feelings ascribed to 
phenomena and experiences (Robson, 2002, Kvale, 1996, Rubin and Rubin, 
1995).  
Semi-structured face-to-face interviews in particular are sympathetic of 
nuance, complexity and sensitivity characteristic of the present subject area 
(Bryman, 2008, Robson, 2002, Kvale, 1996), again with relevance to the 
subject area. As with RE, perceptions of community energy are subject to 
nuance, so the ability of a method to be enable depth of discussion and 
enable open expression of perspectives in participants’ own words was key 
(Hancock). It is also well-suited to the kind of probing for clarification and 
meaning behind their positions and perceptions, which enhances the validity 
of data compared to shallower forms of data collection (Schuman, 1966, 
Øvretveit, 1998). The ability of the chosen method to be sympathetic to 
sensitive information was important (Bryman, 2008, Robson, 2002), 
particularly since issues of finance, personal relationships and micropolitics 
are central to community energy. 
With the exception of two phone interviews, all were conducted face-to-face. 
Such an approach is considered more conducive to developing rapport and 
empathy with participants, ensures non-verbal communication is not lost, and 
facilitates conveyance of depth of meaning (Gillham, 2000, Gillham, 2005, 
Shuy, 2003). Of the face-to-face interviews, one was held via Skype, and 
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while this method has some drawbacks (e.g. potentially obscuring body-
language), it offers the potential of maintaining the benefits of face-to-face 
interactions whilst offering a pragmatic response to time and place limitations 
(Janghorban et al., 2014). 
Semi-structured interviews also permits a balance to be struck between 
consistency between interviews (within stakeholder groups) and flexibility 
within interviews, a key consideration when interviewing participants from 
different groups (Denscombe, 2007, Myers, 1997). Employing similar 
questions between (similar) stakeholders focused interviews around key 
areas of interest. Outside of these boundaries however, discussions were 
allowed to flow around emergent issues raised during the conversation, 
resulting in a more natural, fluid conversation than would be possible with a 
survey-type interview technique whilst affording the flexibility to exploring 
emergent themes (Mathers et al., 2000). 
Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Initial informal, factual, non-
threatening conversations helped to prepare the participant for discussion 
before moving into heavier issues (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Interviews 
concluded when all key issues had been explored or allotted time was up. 
Switched off the voice recorder both signalled the end of the interview, and 
while casual chatting usually resumed, this often had the effect of 
encouraging participants to speak ‘off the record’ (Ibid). 
Content varied slightly according to the stakeholder involved. Interviews with 
community energy practitioners focused on the formation and dynamics of the 
group, practical issues of project progress and barriers, and the relationship 
with the policy environment. Discussions with installers focused on the 
practicalities and benefits of relationships with community energy groups, and 
interactions with policy. Local authority interviews focused on development of 
relationships with, and local policies pertaining to local community energy 
groups. As such, the interviews as a whole aimed to triangulate experiences 
and values of community energy from a number of stakeholder perspectives 
(Robson, 2002). 
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4.6.1 Sampling 
A summary of interview participants is given in Table 4.4 (overpage). 
Stakeholders were purposively selected (Bowling, 2002) on the basis of their 
individual ability to contribute an informed account of WREN in particular, 
and/or community energy more generally. The majority of stakeholders can 
thus be described as representing different actors within the energy system, 
whereas others (e.g. Charities) may have interacted with WREN as 
participants in specific programs. While the nature of the energy system 
means that everybody might fall into the category of an interested 
stakeholder, the intention was to sample a large enough range of 
stakeholders to reflect a range of perspectives on offer. 
Several stakeholders were well placed to report on experiences as 
representatives of more than one stakeholder group (for example, an NGO 
representative also had experience of running a community energy group). 
While the focus of the research was on the activities and impacts of WREN, 
interviews with a wider (in terms of context and approach) range of community 
energy practitioners were deemed necessary to build up a picture of the 
broader community energy sector. 
Interviews with several organisations with established relationships with 
WREN offered insights from beyond the immediate CE space. Contact with 
representatives from those organisations was made via an intermediary in 
WREN. All other interviewees were approached directly via email. 
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Table 4.4 Interviewees 
Interview number Position Organisation 
1 Director CE group 
2 Chair CE group 
3 Director CE group 
4 Chair CE group 
5 CE specialist Supplier 
6 Director CE group 
7 CEO CE group 
8 Project manager RE installer 
9 Managing Director RE installer 
10 Manager RE installer 
11 Strategy Officer Local Authority 
12 Sustainability Lead Local Authority 
13 Policy Officer Local Authority 
14 Chair Community group 
15 Chair Community group 
16 Chair Community group 
4.6.2 Ethics and consent 
After initial contact was made with the participants, the purpose and summary 
of the research was emailed to participants and then discussed again at the 
start of every interview. Every effort was made to ensure participants of the 
voluntary nature of their involvement and of their right to withdraw at any time. 
In line with the ethical guidelines provided by the University of Exeter’s 
College of Life and Environmental Science, informed consent was requested 
from each individual. Anonymity was offered to all participants, with the 
agreement that only the organisation with which they were representing 
mentioned. In addition, participants were assured that data would be held in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998, and were offered a copy of 
their interview transcript to comment on. 
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4.6.3 Data analysis 
The majority of interviews were recorded – with participant’s permission – and 
supplemented by additional notes taken throughout the interviews. Additional 
notes were also taken immediately after each interview, where key themes 
and sentiments were reflected upon, and unrecorded comments could be 
captured. Four interviews were not recorded: three took place over the 
telephone, making recording difficult, and one occurred more spontaneously, 
meaning recording equipment was not available. Notes were taken during 
unrecorded interviews and supplemented by additional notes expanding on 
key themes immediately afterwards. 
Recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim within a couple of days using 
‘F5 Transcription’ software, and uploaded into the NVivo software package for 
analysis, alongside notes from unrecorded interviews. Coding within NVivo 
permits sorting and organisation of large amounts of qualitative data into 
themes, or ‘nodes’. Such nodes can be organised linearly, nested within 
hierarchies, and cross-referenced with other nodes. Following the interviews, 
notes were identified as recurrent themes from each stakeholder group, and 
additional nodes added as themes emerged from the data. The structure of 
nodes and sub-nodes was incrementally refined during the coding process, 
with principal themes (‘parent’ nodes) forming the backbone of analysis and 
more specific topics (‘child’ nodes) bringing analytical depth and nuance. 
Verbatim quotes were selected on the strength of their representation of 
recurring and insightful themes and are presented throughout the analysis to 
illustrate key points and sentiments. 
4.7 Comparison with international exemplars 
The insights developed in Chapter three with respect to the experiences of 
Germany and Denmark provides valuable case studies for comparison with 
the UK. The chapter summarised the literature around community energy in 
these countries, with particular focus on the interplay between history, society 
and politics, as manifested in a suite of industrial and energy policies relevant 
to the development of more citizen-oriented energy systems. Such countries 
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are often cited by UK community energy proponents as exemplary of the 
potential scope and impact of the movement in the UK, the rationale being 
that if others can make progress, so can, and so should, we (Julian, 2014, 
Nolden, 2013). 
Analysis of such literature thus plays an important role in the analysis of the 
potential of community energy in the UK as it draws attention to issues of 
political feedback, path dependency, political control, and the interplay 
between citizens and the state in the formation of direct and indirect energy 
policy (Pierson, 1993, Pierson, 2000, Lockwood, 2014, Kahneman, 2011). 
4.8 Wider observations of community and citizen-led energy 
As previously highlighted, the research took place during a period of 
significant change within energy policy, as well as to both community energy 
and engaged, citizen-oriented energy more generally. As such, keeping up to 
date with such developments was key for the case-study-specific findings to 
be placed in context. 
Attendance at meetings, seminars and conferences was thus critical in 
gaining up-to-date, real-world perspectives of the sector and of wider policy 
developments, and provided opportunities to engage with key actors, 
including CE practitioners, intermediaries, and individuals from industry and 
policy. Through attendance and participation in such events, the research 
benefits from drawing from experiences and perceptions from throughout the 
energy world. 
Furthermore, the dynamism of the sector throughout the study period was 
manifested in a stream of policy documents (such as consultation documents 
and responses) from both government and key actors in the industry. Notes 
were taken on these releases, as well as during event attendance to provide 
an additional dimension through which insights could be drawn. 
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4.9 Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodological approach employed in this thesis. It 
argued that the value of community energy is best understood as both 
multidimensional and multiscalar, and as such requires a blend of quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, and an appreciation of impact over multiple 
timescales. The use of a case study within the context of broader 
observations of the community energy movement is proposed. A desk based 
study is complemented by a postal survey of Wadebridge households to build 
up a picture of the local energy economy, with the latter also eliciting data 
around local perceptions and attitudes around national and local energy 
issues. Semi-structured interviews are proposed as a tool for eliciting data 
around WREN and community energy more generally. 
Using the methods described here, the next chapter presents the local context 
for energy system change in Wadebridge. 
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5 The local context for energy system change Wadebridge  
The context dependency of community energy relates to the degree to which 
the movement is enabled or constrained by local circumstances (Seyfang et 
al., 2014). For example, progress against efforts to upgrade domestic energy 
efficiency will be determined in part by the quality of original housing stock, 
and medium-scale renewable energy projects may be constrained by 
availability of capital or other resources, such as suitable sites, or public 
support. The impact of a community energy project towards goals such as 
these is highly thus dependent on local opportunities and constraints, and 
how these are either grasped, or overcome. 
Taking a case-study approach, this chapter is concerned with establishing a 
baseline for a specific energy economy, that of Wadebridge, UK. The chapter 
continues with a discussion of the drivers, ambitions and approaches 
favoured by WREN as the principal agent of community energy in the study 
area. The local context for understanding the impact of WREN on the local 
energy system is then presented. This includes analysis of the local 
population and housing stock as the subjects of change, the physical and 
economic characteristics of local energy supply and demand, and social 
aspects relating to local perceptions and values with respect to local (and 
broader) energy system change.  
Aside from providing an empirical baseline, in depth study of the energy 
system in Wadebridge helps us to understand what ‘community energy’ 
means in terms of the local context. For example, who is the community one 
seeks to involve? What objectives are targeted, and why? Only by 
acknowledging the heterogeneity of community energy in this way is it 
possible to gain a nuanced understanding of the dynamics between CE 
groups and the systems they are seeking to change. Such nuance, this thesis 
argues, is central to understanding the value of community energy as not just 
an economic sector like any other, but a dynamic grassroots movement 
whose subjective values around what a ‘progressive energy system’ are 
helping to shape the energy system as we know it. 
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5.1 WREN’s drivers, ambitions and approaches 
WREN established itself as an Industrial and Provident Society (IPS) in May 
2011, with aims formalised in a business plan later that year. Within, several 
five-year objectives were established (WREN, 2011): 
1. Generate 30% of the town’s electricity from renewable sources by 2015 
2. Reduce electricity consumption by 5% by 2015 
3. Retain economic value of Wadebridge’s energy consumption locally 
4. Generate £200,000/year profit to be redistributed in a revolving 
community fund 
5. Engage the whole community in all aspects of energy production and 
consumption, and the wider implications of Wadebridge’s energy 
economy 
6. Develop in a way replicable by other communities, and subject the 
process to rigorous academic evaluation 
7. Build wider economic resilience in the form of the Camel Low Carbon 
Enterprise Zone within the Cornwall Local Enterprise Partnership 
The plan demonstrated considerable ambition in both the depth of the targets 
and the breadth of approaches. Aside from the targets identified above, four 
key principles were established to inform the initiative: 
1. WREN is an economic programme. It is of note that from the outset, 
WREN framed itself as an agent of economic change, and although 
environmental and social aspects were central to the delivery of this, 
the principles of economic resilience and independence were central to 
the approaches taken; 
2. Engagement of the whole community. In pledging to engage with 
the whole population of Wadebridge (rather than a self-selecting few), 
WREN both sought to confront the challenge of inclusion and gain 
legitimacy within the town’s population. 
3. Saving and generating energy at a scale that will have a 
meaningful impact upon the town’s actual consumption. The 
124 
 
 
implication here is that changes in consumption will be of a scale 
tangible to the population, and is related to a fourth principle: 
4. Subject itself to rigorous external evaluation. Acknowledgement of 
the value of objective evaluative study is important in developing 
credibility and trust. This final principle laid the foundation for the 
current research collaboration on which this thesis is based. 
WREN published an updated business plan in November 2012 (WREN, 
2012). This document significantly expanded upon the original plan, and while 
objectives remained broadly similar, it was significantly richer in terms of 
proposing in detail a 5-year programme of activities to meet these objectives 
whilst becoming financially self-sustaining.  
To meet the stated objectives, WREN has taken a broad approach comprising 
increasing local renewable capacity and demand reduction programmes, 
paired more general projects focusing on maximising local social and 
economic gain. The approach has focused on building capacity and 
developing rooftop solar, primarily on domestic properties but also on some 
commercial properties, as well as seeking to develop a community-owned RE 
installation. Considerable resources have been spent on the latter, a task 
made difficult by the limited availability of suitable local sites to develop, 
exacerbated by constraints on the distribution network in Cornwall (Simonds 
and Hall, 2013).  
Of particular interest to WREN at the time of writing (Mid-2015) is in the 
potential of local energy markets, i.e. local ownership and supply of energy. 
This has culminated in the development of the Wadebridge Energy Company 
as a vehicle through which this can be delivered. 
5.2 The local political environment 
At the county level, the Cornwall County Council White Paper Economic 
Ambition states that supporting the development of low carbon technologies is 
central to the economic vision of Cornwall County Council (Cornwall Council, 
2011). Supporting innovation and investment in low carbon technologies, 
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increasing private sector resource efficiency, and adopting sustainable 
practices throughout the supply chain are all cited as important stages in 
addressing growth priorities. These aspirations were further developed 
through the recently developed Green Cornwall programme, through which 
the council aims to ‘reduce its carbon footprint, facilitate community initiatives 
and provide the foundations for a low carbon economy’. The strategy, delivery 
programme and outcomes for doing so are laid out in the Green Cornwall 
strategy (Council, 2011). 
Embedded in this strategy are a series of quantitative and qualitative goals 
and targets spanning five strategic themes. In addition to these themes 
(summarised in Table 5.1), the vision states that in the longer term, the aim is 
for Cornwall to produce the ‘majority of its energy needs from renewable 
sources’. 
Table 5.1 Green Cornwall strategy objectives 
Theme Actions Programme outcomes and targets 
1. Leadership Council leadership in reaching 
Cornwall-wide targets and the 
transformation to a low carbon 
economy. 
Cutting CO2 emissions of the council 
by 40% by 2020 
2.Green Council Reducing the Council’s carbon 
emissions to both meet and 
exceed its carbon reduction 
commitment 
Contributing towards cutting 
Cornwall’s green house gas (GHG) 
emissions above national targets 
(34%) by 2020 
Providing leadership to promote 
non-transport related energy 
demand reduction of 10% by 2020 
3. Low Carbon 
Economy 
Providing the infrastructure, 
investment, and requisite skills to 
create the conditions for a 
measurable transformation 
towards a low carbon economy. 
A measurable transformation 
towards a low carbon economy. 
Specific indicators to be developed 
to capture the economic impact of 
low carbon technologies 
4.Sustainable 
communities 
Supporting communities to 
become more resilient, promote 
Measurable community benefit (fuel 
poverty levels, renewable heat 
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4.Sustainable 
communities 
(cont) 
demand reduction and increase 
renewable energy production.  
Develop community benefit 
models that tackle fuel poverty 
and provide local gain through FiT 
contributions. 
incentive (RHI) and FITs utilised for 
local benefit)               
 
A ‘significant’ reduction in fuel 
poverty levels 
5.Renewable 
energy 
Through Council, other public 
sector, private sector and 
community organisations activity, 
promote the use of renewable 
energy 
Supporting the increase in 
renewable energy production to 
meet the national 15% target of non-
transport related energy by 2020 
Source: Cornwall Council (2011) 
The aspirations outlined in the Green Cornwall Strategy establish accountable 
targets generally in line with the council’s sustainability policy that “the goal of 
sustainable development will be pursued by integrated actions designed to 
achieve a sustainable, innovative and productive economy that delivers high 
levels of employment; and a just society that promotes social inclusion, 
sustainable communities and personal wellbeing.“(Cornwall Council, 2011). In 
the broadest terms, this policy seeks to communicate a balance of economic, 
social and environmental objectives. 
With particular relevance for community energy, Objective 4 of the Strategy 
communicates an endeavour to support the development of resilient, low 
carbon communities. In practice, this has resulted in the establishment of a 
number of initiatives with partners including: 
• Development of a community energy forum for developing capabilities, 
sharing best practice, and developing better alignment with the local 
policy agenda; 
• Establishment of a revolving loan fund for CE groups seeking capital to 
developing local RE projects.  
• Partnering with local charities and other organisations to tackle fuel 
poverty in the area. 
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Consequently, the council has been regarded as relatively progressive in 
terms of developing local energy initiatives. As with many local authorities 
however, there are considerable constraints on resources (the Green 
Cornwall Programme has a staff of one), meaning that support for 
communities has relied on partnerships with intermediary organisations and 
political support for grassroots activities. Financial resources are limited, and 
where available (such as through the revolving loan fund mentioned above) 
are subject to strict measures of success based on repayment rather than 
broader social and environmental outcomes (Interview 12). 
The introduction of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in 2010 meant that 
the majority of investment for energy projects would eventually be delivered 
by the private sector (CIoS LEP 2012), and while this does not preclude 
community projects, investments in such projects would have to be business-
driven, i.e. based on a strong business case and proven revenue-generating 
capacity (Interview 12). It seems clear then that while community energy 
offers benefits outside of economics, it is politically impossible to rationalise 
spending without a firm belief that that spending can have a positive and 
measurable economic impact on the local economy. 
5.3 The local population and built environment 
In order to fully appreciate how WREN has impacted system-wide dimensions 
of the energy system, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive cross-
sectional baseline of the town’s energy system in order for change to be 
contextualised and so that the speed and direction of change across 
dimensions can be understood.  
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5.3.1 Housing stock and access to gas 
While the LLSOA13  classification ensures that the study’s sub-areas are 
broadly comparable, there are some differences in population and household 
numbers (Table 5.2). Number of people per household, however, is 
comparable across areas. There is a marked difference in household density 
(number of households per hectare) between sub-areas of Wadebridge town 
(Cornwall 009A – Cornwall 009D) and the surrounding rural area (Cornwall 
007A). 
Table 5.2 Population and household data for study area 
LLSOA 
code 
Area Population14 Number of 
households15 
Ownership 
(%) 
People 
per 
household 
Household 
density 
Cornwall 
007A 
Rural 1,140 467 69 2.44 0.09 
Cornwall 
009A 
Town 
(South) 
1,521 634 80 2.40 7.64 
Cornwall 
009B 
Town 
(East) 
2,015 851 77 2.37 6.35 
Cornwall 
009C 
Town 
(West) 
1,789 832 48 2.15 18.49 
Cornwall 
009D 
Town 
(North) 
1,396 638 71 2.19 6.25 
Total  7,861 3,422    
Source: ONS, 2011 
                                            
 
13 As defined in Chapter 4, LLSOA (Lower Level Super Output Area) codes relates to 
the subareas of the study site. Wadebridge town itself is made up of four areas 
(‘Cornwall 009A’,’B’,’C’&’D’), while ‘Cornwall 007A’ relates to the rural area 
surrounding the town (Figure 4.4). 
14 All usual residents 
15 Households with at least one usual resident 
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While access to the mains gas grid in Cornwall is limited in general, gas 
access in more rural areas is almost non-existent. This is reflected in the 
variations in numbers of off-gas households for the study site (Figure 5.1), 
with almost 70 per cent of households off-gas in the rural surrounds (007A) 
compared to between 14 and 32 per cent in Wadebridge town (009A-D). As 
gas is considerable cheaper than other forms of heating, this has implications 
for affordability and the associated policy objective of reducing fuel poverty 
(Baker, 2011).  
 
Figure 5.1 Percentages of off-gas and solid wall households in the study 
area. 
Source: CSE (2009) 
While sparsely populated rural properties are least likely to be connected to 
the gas network, they are also more likely to be built with solid walls rather 
than cavity walls (Baker et al., 2008), making them more costly to heat and 
difficult to insulate effectively. The combination of having no gas heating 
and/or a solid wall property means that the property is more likely to be 
considered ‘hard-to-treat’ (HTT) with traditional methods of efficiency 
measures16, a situation many homes in the study area are likely to find 
                                            
 
16 Defined by the Energy Savings Trust as “Homes that for a variety of reasons 
cannot accommodate ‘staple’ energy efficiency measures offered under schemes 
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themselves in, particularly in more rural areas (e.g. ‘Cornwall 007A’ in Figure 
5.1). In Wadebridge town itself, it is the presence of solid walls that contribute 
most to the efficiency improvement challenges, whereas lack of access to the 
gas grid is more problematic outside of the town. 
The combination of poor housing and expensive heating options in HTT 
homes means that payback times for remediation can be as high as 30 years 
(Hoggett, 2008). Additionally, Hoggett notes that since hard to treat properties 
vary in the problems they present, homeowners may need to invest 
considerable time to determine the most suitable, cost effective options for 
treating their home and finding appropriate contractors to carry out the work. 
The variation in household density across the study site also has implications 
for RE options at the community scale. For example, while communal, low 
carbon heating systems, such as Combined Heat and Power (CHP) units, 
offer considerable benefits for fuel-poor households, they require a minimum 
density of heat load and so are ill-suited to rural settings with sparsely sited 
domestic buildings.  
5.3.2 Socioeconomic and demographic considerations 
While local building fabric and access to gas determines the technical 
feasibility of making changes in terms of efficiency and RE measures, such 
changes are limited by social factors. Even if changes are both technically 
and economically feasible, whether or not residents engage is dependent on 
their individual circumstances, their needs, their attitudes and values, and 
their finances. Such factors can in turn be affected by the socioeconomic and 
                                                                                                                             
 
such as Warm Front in England [and] include homes that are off the gas network; 
homes with solid walls; homes with no loft space; homes in a state of disrepair; high-
rise blocks; and any other homes where for technical and practical reasons these 
staple energy efficiency measures cannot be fitted” Energy Saving Trust 2004. Hard 
to Treat Homes Guide. 
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demographic construction of the population, and so understanding these 
parameters is useful. 
The socioeconomic situation of the population is of particular interest, as the 
distribution of educational levels, income and time may influence engagement 
in low carbon energy transitions in different ways. For example, higher income 
households consume more energy (Brandon and Lewis, 1999, CSE, 2013), 
and investment in microrenewables occurs most among higher income 
households (Fischer and Sauter, 2004, DECC, 2012b).  
While income tends to be related to the age of householders, age itself 
determines energy consumption through a need for higher ambient 
temperatures through being more sedentary (Collins and Hoinville, 1980, 
Healy and Clinch, 2002), and the increased likelihood that these owned 
homes house out-dated heating systems (Hamza and Gilroy, 2011). It is not 
the case that elderly residents consume more energy through spending more 
time at home, and it has been found that many such householders heat less 
of the home (Age Concern and Help the Aged, 2009). These issues are 
affected and confounded by the fact that elderly households are 
disproportionately affected by lower incomes, under-occupation, and little 
scope for home improvements to deal with energy efficiency (Hamza and 
Gilroy, 2011). In terms of engaging with CE, anecdotal evidence suggests the 
time-resource intensity of these initiatives mean that it is often retired 
engineers that drive them, making use of experience and the spare time 
afforded by retirement (Seyfang et al., 2013, IET, 2013). 
With respect to the area of interest, the study population span a range of 
socioeconomic groups. One measure, the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
ranks deprivation scores across the whole of England (DTLR, 2002). Of the 
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domains captured within the IMD17 , the Income and Living Environment 
indices are perhaps of most interest for the current research. Both Income 
and Living Environment deprivation measures are related to energy issues 
through correlation with fuel poverty, and indeed has been used as a proxy for 
such (Baker and Starling 2003), while analysis of deprivation more generally 
might provide insight into areas where the time and financial resources 
required for energy engagement are more constrained. 
Income Deprivation18, is confined to small pockets in Cornwall, with around 
10% of sub-areas in Cornwall defined as lying within the most deprived 20 per 
cent in England as a whole (Figure 5.2). While there is some variation within 
the study area (inset of Figure 5.2), deprivation under this definition is not 
pronounced. 
 
Figure 5.2 Index of multiple deprivation (IMD) 2010, Income Domain 
Indicators. 
Darkest areas indicate LLSOAs with lowest 20% scores in England. Inset map 
gives detail for Wadebridge and surrounding area 
                                            
 
17 The IMD encompasses a broad range of deprivation domains including Income, 
Employment, Health and Disability, Education Skills and Training, Barriers to 
Housing and Services, Crime, and Living Environment.  
18 Income deprivation is measured by summing five indicators relating to numbers of 
individuals in families claiming various income and family support allowances 
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Rather more deprivation is evident under the Living Environment Index 
(measuring social and private housing in poor condition, houses without 
central heating, air quality and road accidents to pedestrians and cyclists) 
measure (Figure 5.3). This domain classifies central Wadebridge and the 
outlying area as within the 20% most deprived areas in England (along with 
60% of the rest of Cornwall’s LSOAs), whilst other areas within the study area 
score higher.  
 
Figure 5.3 Index of multiple deprivation (IMD) 2010, Living Environment 
Domain Indicators.  
Darkest areas indicate LLSOAs with lowest 20% scores in England. Inset map 
gives detail for Wadebridge and surrounding area 
Variation in this second measure is pronounced between urban and rural 
areas, and while deprivation in the study area is linked more to living 
conditions than to income, rural income levels in Cornwall are still low by 
national standards. Relating these indices to fuel poverty depends on which 
income measure is used. CSE have shown that there is a strong correlation 
between fuel poverty and the IMD according to ‘basic’ and ‘basic equivilised’ 
income definitions19, less so with the ‘full income’ definition (Baker et al., 
                                            
 
19 Baker et al (2008) use three definitions of fuel poverty: ‘full income’ where income 
includes Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, ‘basic income’ where income does 
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2008). Similar variations can be seen relating to social grade based on 
occupation 20  as opposed to deprivation, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. Of 
particular note is the higher proportion of individuals in the lowest grade ‘E’ 
relative to higher grades in central Wadebridge (coded 009C in Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.4 Social class stratification across the study site and Great 
Britain 
Source: ONS (2014) 
As touched upon above, measures of deprivation and affluence can be useful 
in helping to understand the potential for engagement with energy issues. For 
example, DECC analysis suggests that higher densities of household PV is 
installed in more affluent areas, by those using more electricity, by 
households in rural more than urban areas, and by those areas with less gas 
network coverage (DECC, 2012b). While lower income areas also install 
household PV, this analysis also suggests that these installations are more 
                                                                                                                             
 
not include Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit and ‘basic equivalised’ income, 
where income is equivalised to take account of household size and composition 
20  As defined by the National Statistics Socio-economic classification (NS-Sec) 
grading system 
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likely to be rented through ‘aggregators’ via rent-a-roof schemes rather than 
privately owned by the household itself. This has particular relevance in the 
study site (and Cornwall more generally), where the socio-economic range is 
relatively large. 
The demographics of the area may also affect engagement with energy 
issues in different ways. The study area as a whole has a higher proportion of 
older residents than in Cornwall as a whole, perhaps reflecting the rural 
nature of the area and associated availability of employment (Figure 5.5). 
Again there is some variation between sub-units of the study area, with more 
retirement-age individuals in central Wadebridge and west-Wadebridge (009C 
and 009B) than other areas. 
 
Figure 5.5 Proportions in different age groups throughout study site and 
in Cornwall as a whole 
Source: (ONS, 2013) 
While in-depth analysis is not possible without household composition data, 
DECC analyses find that the prevalence of fuel poverty increases as the 
oldest member of the household increases (DECC, 2013a). Age (which can 
be related to income) is another factor determining whether or not households 
invest in microrenewables, where the greater the average age of the LSOA 
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(up to age 65), the higher the proportion of households with PV installations 
(DECC, 2012b). 
The effect of age has also been explored with relevance to other areas of 
energy engagement. For example, CE initiatives often rely on voluntary 
resource base (Seyfang et al., 2012), which may mean that the participants 
involved most heavily might be those with most time to spare, i.e. in 
retirement, or in part-time employment rather than those at different stages of 
their lifecourse. Of course, and as will be seen, the wider organisational and 
support membership of CE groups means that a more diverse set of 
volunteers are necessarily involved, albeit in supporting rather than driving 
roles.  
5.4 The local energy economy 
CE initiatives, in general, seek to encourage a reconfiguration of local energy 
systems in terms of changes to supply through developing renewable 
resources and/or addressing demand issues through behavioural change and 
efficiency measures. The degree to which transformation in the energy 
economy is possible will largely depend on the baseline from which change 
takes place (and can be measured). While the previous section outlined the 
context in terms of the local population and built environment, this section 
establishes an energy-specific baseline of the locality with a view to drawing 
insights into both opportunities and barriers relating to altering the energy 
economy. 
5.4.1 Local energy consumption 
Average domestic electricity consumption in the study area largely follows that 
of Cornwall (‘Wadebridge and surrounding area’ in Figure 5.6), with figures 
higher relative to nationally derived figures. Higher relative electricity 
consumption can be explained by the combination of poorly insulated housing 
stock, and the lack of mains gas connections in rural parts of Cornwall. As 
highlighted in the previous section, this reiterates the variation within such a 
large study site encompassing both urban and rural settings, which may have 
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implications for the effectiveness of strategies to engage different sections of 
the population in different ways. In terms of gas, domestic consumption for the 
study area again closely matches that of Cornwall more generally, though is 
considerably less than that for GB as a whole21. 
  
Figure 5.6 Average domestic electricity and gas consumption for 
Wadebridge and the surrounding area. 
Source: DECC 2013 
The lack of gas access to much of the study area means that other, more 
expensive sources of heat energy (petroleum and solid fuels) are used to 
supplement electricity in many households (Baker, 2011). Data from county 
level shows that domestic consumption in Cornwall is far less dependent on 
gas relative to petroleum, coal and electricity compared to GB (Figure 5.7a). 
These differences are more pronounced in more rural areas; Figure 5.7b 
illustrates that households in the rural area surrounding Wadebridge (those in 
Area 007A) rely on a more diverse mix of non-gas heating fuels compared to 
in Wadebridge town itself. 
                                            
 
21 DECC does not supply data for the area surrounding Wadebridge (North Cornwall 
007A) as it would be disclosive. Both electricity and gas in Wadebridge and the wider 
study area have exhibited reductions in electricity (12%) and gas demand (31%) in 
the seven years from 2005. DECC attributes national reductions in both electricity 
and gas to improvements relating to more efficient appliances, improved insulation, 
and more efficient heating systems, in part influenced by expansion of the housing 
stock with associated improvements in building standards.  
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(a)  
(b)  
Figure 5.7 (a) Total domestic energy consumption by fuel type (2011) 
and (b) reliance on non-gas fuel for heating in different parts of the 
study site.  
Sources: Author’s own and DECC (2013d) 
5.4.2 Local energy expenditure 
The ultimate goal of some CE groups, WREN included, is to develop the 
concept of local energy markets, and although there are several hurdles to 
this becoming reality, this is expected to have significant local benefits to the 
economy. Combining the local fuel mix with costs for Wadebridge households 
makes it is possible to estimate the extent of energy spending in the local 
area, and in turn, how much of that remains local to Wadebridge.  
The differences in unit cost of different fuel types means that average 
household energy expenditure in Cornwall vary considerably from that of 
Great Britain. While energy prices vary across the country, an estimate based 
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on average costs for each fuel type Table 5.3 illustrates the impact of limited 
gas access on average annual household energy prices (Figure 5.8). 
Table 5.3 Cost assumptions for selected fuel types.  
Fuel Cost per 
unit 
(pence)  
Unit Energy content  
(kWh/unit)  
Cost per kWh  (%) 
Electricity 15 kWh 1 15 (100%) 
Gas 4.5 kWh 1 0.045 (90%) 
Petroleum22 55.3 litre 9.8 0.062 (90%) 
Coal  40 kg 6.85 0.053 (75%) 
Sources: Defra (2009); Bolton (2014) 
 
Figure 5.8 Indicative annual average domestic fuel costs (excluding 
transport) 
Source: DECC (2013e)  
While data from DECC helps to frame the relative scale of energy spending in 
Cornwall, localised household data collected through the household survey is 
more suitable in highlighting spending distributions relevant to the study site. 
67 per cent (n=224) of respondents chose to share energy expenditure data 
as part of the wider survey. Average annual expenditures for both electricity 
                                            
 
22 For the purpose of this analysis, petroleum is assumed to be kerosene, though 
consumption data include gas oil, LPG, butane and propane along with kerosene, all 
of which vary in price.  
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and total energy (£669 and £1272) are comparable with Cornwall averages 
(£739 and £1266 respectively), though a wide range of both electricity and 
total energy costs are captured even within this relatively small sample 
(Figure 5.9).  
 
  
Figure 5.9 a) Breakdown of annual energy costs as reported by 213 
residents of Wadebridge, b) Reported annual electricity costs and c) 
total energy costs for Wadebridge residents 
Notes: See 23 and 24 
                                            
 
23 Dashed line indicates average annual total fuel cost for the area (£1272) 
24 It should be noted that data is self-reported and as such can be only considered an 
indication of actual consumption and expense figures. There are some 
inconsistencies in the data, i.e. several respondents gave data for oil consumption 
but not electricity. Since it is improbable that some households do not use any 
electricity, it can be assumed the figure underreports actual energy consumption in 
the area. 
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Although comfort levels vary across households, housing quality and access 
to gas are considered to be significant drivers in determining energy costs. 
Figure 5.10 further highlights the effect of gas access on overall household 
energy costs, highlighting that those without access to gas25 have slightly 
higher average energy costs (a), and spend more on electricity as a 
proportion of total costs (b). The relatively high cost of alternative heating 
fuels means that heating is significantly more expensive for those without gas 
access. Since one of the study areas lies outside of Wadebridge town where 
gas access is very low, total energy costs can also be seen to vary 
geographically, with households in the rural outlying area of Wadebridge 
paying more (Figure 5.10c). 
  
                                            
 
25 It is assumed here that those households not reporting any spending on gas do not 
have access to gas. 
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Figure 5.10 a) Effect of gas access on total energy costs, b) proportion 
of bill spent on electricity, and c) differences in energy costs by study 
area geography 
Source: Author’s own 
The data presented above can be used to develop a bottom-up model of 
energy costs in the study area as a whole as well as between LLSOAs within 
the study area. This can then be used to determine the direct expenditure for 
domestic energy per household. As Table 5.4 shows, total area expenditures 
are broadly comparable across sub-areas, ranging from £0.68m to £0.84m. 
Costs per household exhibit considerable variation, ranging from £868 per 
annum for households within central Wadebridge to £1776 for those in the 
rural area surrounding Wadebridge. Adding transport (available at county 
level only) adds around £1300 to household expenditure. 
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Table 5.4 Breakdown of household energy costs for study site sub-areas 
LLSOA 009A 009B 009C 009D 007A All areas 
Electricity £615.53 £625.57 £593.26 £763.69 £901.44 £688.45 
Gas £358.03 £327.52 £247.72 £355.68 £140.87 £296.84 
Petroleum £61.89 £12.63 £16.63 £30.69 £575.77 £107.94 
Solid fuels £32.50 £21.05 £10.52 £25.26 £158.61 £41.83 
Total per 
household £1,067.95 £986.77 £868.13 £1,175.32 £1,776.69 £1,174.97 
Number of 
households 634 851 832 638 467 3422 
Total area 
cost (£m) 0.68 0.84 0.72 0.75 0.83 3.82 
Source: Author’s own26 
Of this expenditure, a notable proportion (that of electricity and gas) is spent 
outside of the locality, and the vast majority (87 per cent) of survey 
respondents source electricity and gas from one of the big six energy 
suppliers. It is assumed that the remainder (including petroleum products and 
solid fuels) are purchased from suppliers based in the South West with local 
supply chains (relating to storage, logistics and delivery for example). There is 
the potential for some of the costs spilling out of the area to be retained 
through local energy markets, a concept being actively explored by WREN 
and other CE groups.  
                                            
 
26 Recall from the Introduction of Section 4.4 that different research boundaries 
means that this data may not correlate exactly with that generated by WREN 
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5.4.3 Fuel poverty 
The disparity within the study site in terms of housing stock, gas access and 
energy expenditure has been highlighted, and previous sections have covered 
variances in income. Reducing fuel poverty is a key political objective at both 
local and national policy levels, it is important that it is addressed as an issue 
in its own right as well as being integrated to other policy objectives, such as 
the deployment of renewables. Figure 5.11 illustrates that the five sub-areas 
that make up the study area differ markedly in terms of the proportion of 
households in fuel poverty Low Income High Costs (LIHC) definition27.  
 
Figure 5.11 Proportion of households in fuel poverty (LIHC indicator) in 
Cornwall LLSOAs 
Sources: DECC (2009a), DECC (2009b), DECC 2013 
While the affordability of domestic fuel is clearly of importance in the context 
of the energy challenges more generally, the intricacies of the issue mean that 
CE groups may find it difficult to address the problem without significant 
support. Firstly, the cost of expanding the gas network is to bring cheaper 
                                            
 
27 Interestingly, using the ‘10 per cent’ measure rather than the ‘low income, high 
costs’ indicator which replaces places North Cornwall 007A highest in the County for 
fuel poverty at 37.7%, with the Wadebridge town areas at between 11 and 17%. 
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heating fuel to households is likely to be beyond the reach of CE groups28. 
Secondly, while groups may be well placed to implement Government-led 
efficiency programmes, the characteristics of the local housing stock 
(specifically lack of gas access and solid wall construction as outlined in 
Section 5.2.1) means that many measures, such as loft and cavity wall 
insulation may be relatively ineffectual. More recent policy measures to 
address harder-to-treat properties such as the Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO) may make some headway, but it is unclear how CE groups can play a 
role in helping to implement this. Where CE groups do have agency in 
tackling these issues, they are well placed to be able to target those areas 
that need most attention in each area, such as the rural area highlighted in the 
left of Figure 5.11. This is especially important for communities such as 
Wadebridge, which encompasses a diversity of challenges and opportunities, 
to be able to maximise impact for the local community. 
5.5 Local associations with energy and energy system change 
Understanding local attitudes and behaviours is key to identifying 
opportunities and barriers to changes in energy production and consumption. 
Societal associations with energy systems and energy system change are 
considered central in shaping specific energy pathways. For example, public 
acceptance is required for local deployment of energy infrastructures, (Cowell 
et al., 2011, Sauter and Watson, 2007, Wüstenhagen et al., 2007), as well as 
the establishment of new forms of local governance (Walker et al., 2010). 
With these key themes in mind, this section discusses findings from analysis 
of postal survey responses. 
                                            
 
28 Cornwall Council announced in March 2014 it will be funding expansion of the gas 
network to 50 council-owned homes in Wadebridge (Cornwall Council 2014). The 
scheme, which also includes installation of domestic gas central heating is a good 
example of a targeted programme to alleviate fuel poverty. 
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5.5.1 Perceptions of the need for energy system change 
In seeking to understand energy-related behaviours, several strands of theory 
seek to further the understanding of the processes through which individuals 
become motivated to become part of a changing energy system. Lorenzoni et 
al. (2007) for example posit that climate change engagement comprises 
cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects, i.e. “is not enough for people to 
know about climate change in order to be engaged; they also need to care 
about it, be motivated and able to take action”. The ‘knowing’ and the ‘caring’ 
about climate change are of primary interest in this section: people must 
understand and be motivated by the costs associated with climate change 
impacts before they can make individual changes.  
While this is clearly important to the current discussion, engaging with CE is 
about more than engaging with climate change, as Chapter 2 discusses. 
Thus, knowing and caring about climate change can be extended to specific 
elements of the energy system, for example, to the structure and governance 
of the energy system. While stimulating a degree of behavioural change may 
be possible in isolation, through financial incentives for example (Stern, 2000), 
cognisance and affection of these energy system dimensions is considered a 
prerequisite for engaging meaningfully with an energy system transition.  
The survey revealed that the majority of Wadebridge residents (84 per cent) 
agreed (either “strongly agreed” or “agreed”) that it is important that Britain as 
whole invests more in renewable energy technologies (Figure 5.12). This 
figure is in line with recent nationally-representative figures indicating support 
for RE technologies in general (61 – 85 per cent depending on specific 
technology), a belief that RE technologies are needed to meet electricity 
demand (74 per cent), and that they are a better option to help tackle climate 
change (71 per cent) than nuclear power (Spence et al., 2010, Demski et al., 
2013). Of course, perceptions around the suitability of specific RE 
technologies, scales and location options are more variable, reflecting the 
perception of how particular projects align or conflict with individuals’ values 
(explored in Section 6.4.2). 
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Figure 5.12 Levels of agreement of the need to reduce energy 
consumption and invest more in renewables 
Source: Author’s own 
The majority of respondents also believed that Britain at present consumes 
too much energy (83 per cent, Figure 5.12), which again is in line with 
nationally-representative figure of 73 per cent for the same question (Demski 
et al., 2013). The overall sentiment was echoed in several survey responses 
such as the following: 
“I think energy issues is one of the greatest facing us. I believe that the whole 
approach to consumption needs to change” (Respondent 33) 
While this type of broad commentary on the energy situation was one of only 
a few comments given within the survey, there was a large range of 
responses acknowledging the salience of the issues and the links with 
society/wellbeing, economics, politics, and governance. Reasons behind the 
need for demand reduction (at a national scale), given by Demski et al (2012), 
cover a range of motivations including the need to reduce unnecessary waste, 
the need to conserve finite energy resources, cost concerns, and 
environmental concerns. These factors echo some of those expressed by 
Wadebridge residents, with several reflecting on national energy security 
concerns and “keeping the lights on”. As might be expected, respondents 
framed these wider issues in terms of more immediate concerns relating to 
the impact on the household: 
“The cost of alternative energy is too high, e.g. the installation costs are 
expensive and taking into account the interest earned on the capital 
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expenditure (something I have not seen published) it does not seem cost 
effective” (Respondent 1) 
“Energy is too expensive, even more so now that British Gas have nearly 
doubled the number of units on the higher rate” (Respondent 3) 
A focus on cost was a strong theme throughout survey responses, relating 
both to the current as well as future energy system. This emphasis on cost is 
not surprising, and reflects current framings of cost as a key energy policy 
issue in terms of ongoing energy cost increases (and related discussions 
about the suitability of the UK energy market), and related to this, Prime 
Minister Cameron’s reported framing of environmental and social programmes 
as “green crap” (Mason, 2013). Cost savings also arose as a common feature 
in survey respondents’ motivations for installing household efficiency 
measures (section 5.4.3). While electricity consumption in particular then has 
been considered doubly invisible (Burgess and Nye, 2008) in terms of relating 
consumption to spending, current framings of a suite of energy issues has 
ensured that perceptions of cost implications of energy to households are not 
trivial. 
Although existing literature has either focused on acceptance or support of 
specific RE technologies, or on energy transitions more generally (Spence et 
al., 2010, Demski et al., 2013), little has been done on understanding 
perceptions and preferences of governance for energy transitions. This is a 
key element in CE initiatives, not least because such approaches imply a 
departure from centralised decision-making towards a more inclusive, 
democratic process of governance. The survey goes some way to exploring 
these themes from the perspective of Wadebridge residents, and helps to 
draw some conclusions on the degree of support for potential changes in local 
energy governance. 
5.5.2 Perceptions of local technological change 
In terms of the adoption of large and medium-scale renewable energy 
technologies, getting project proposals through planning is a considerable 
barrier (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007, Devine-Wright, 2005), and so garnering 
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local acceptance and support at the earliest possible opportunity is seen to be 
of paramount importance. Furthermore, the emergence of ownership (in part 
or in totality) of RE installations as a key characteristic of CE in recent years 
implies the necessity of both legal and financial structures to make this 
possible, and that local capital can be raised (i.e. that there is sufficient 
household income and savings, not to mention willingness to invest).  
While this study echoes national findings of high levels of backing for 
renewable technologies in general, it is well recognised that levels of support 
vary significantly when specific RE proposals are considered. There is thus 
both a ‘social gap’ and an ‘individual gap’ between supposedly high levels of 
national support but lower success rates in wind planning applications and 
individuals’ opposition respectively (Bell et al., 2005). Picking apart the 
reasons behind such gaps is therefore an important part in developing an 
understanding of the opportunities and barriers for renewable deployment in a 
given area. The following section explores how the tangibility and 
concreteness of energy system change at a local scale (as opposed to a 
national scale) removes discourse from the abstract and places the 
discussion amid a more realistic set of notions around willingness and ability 
to change and the public values through which these are manifest.  
In order to highlight specific opportunities and barriers to energy system 
change in the local context, survey participants were asked to gauge support 
for different generation technologies at different scales and locations. 
Respondents had seven options to rank: coal or gas power stations in 
Cornwall; nuclear power stations in Cornwall; wind farms in the Wadebridge 
area; individual wind turbines in the Wadebridge area; solar PV panels on 
local buildings; solar farms in the Wadebridge area; nuclear power, but 
outside Cornwall. While necessarily coarse given the constraints of a postal 
survey, these options were considered as covering a suitable range across 
which generalised levels of support could be identified. Clearly, decisions to 
support or object to specific energy options are more nuanced than simple 
trade-offs between groups of technologies; where these technologies are 
sited, their perceived social and environmental impact, cost, and potential 
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benefits all play a part, as does the embedded values and worldview of each 
individual. While these issues are explored further elsewhere, this section 
discusses perceptions of technologies in a more generalised sense. It should 
be noted that some options are necessarily more abstract than others: 
householders in Wadebridge can presumably relate better to extant wind and 
solar farms (or those with which they have had prior experience with) than 
installations with which they have had no relationship. That said, the 
prevalence of energy issues in the media means that it was assumed that 
most householders would have some opinion on how different energy 
infrastructures might affect them. It is important to note then that the 
perceptions discussed here might not be based on the real-world experiences 
of householders, and instead based on presumptions of experiences. 
Figure 5.14 illustrates levels of support for seven different technology options 
in and around Wadebridge. The data indicates that support levels vary across 
technologies, with thermal generation options (coal or gas in Cornwall, 
nuclear inside Cornwall, and nuclear outside Cornwall) attracting least 
support, and rooftop PV attracting the most support by mode29. This also fits 
broadly with nationally derived figures (e.g. Demski 2013), which similarly 
indicate more favourable opinions towards renewables than towards 
conventional energy sources.  
                                            
 
29 Mode relates to the value that appeared most, i.e. the specific level of support 
expressed by most respondents for each technology 
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Figure 5.13 Levels of support for various energy technologies in and 
around Wadebridge 
Source: Author’s own 
For most, rooftop solar PV is the most attractive option for local energy 
investment. Comments from respondents indicated that that PV is favoured 
because it has the best ‘fit’ with the existing environment, and also that it 
delivers direct benefit to householders by reducing household electricity bills 
and generate additional revenue. The small-scale nature of solar PV, more 
that any other technology, lends itself to ownership by individual households, 
who can often manage the installation process and garner benefits directly. At 
a larger scale, wind farms in the Wadebridge area seem to be as attractive an 
option as single wind turbines, suggesting that concentrating multiple turbines 
in one area does not make a difference to how they are perceived. This is in 
contrast to solar PV, of which significantly more respondents are “very 
supportive” of rooftop PV units than of solar farms in the Wadebridge area 
(and less are not at “all supportive”). This can be explained by the disparity of 
scale between rooftop PV and solar farms, and the similar scales of wind 
turbines and wind farms: the former imply a large difference in scale, and 
perhaps potential for ownership and benefits, whereas the latter are similar in 
that they are of similar magnitude and often similar in requiring either 
commercial or collective input.  
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The notion of Cornish nuclear power is, predictably, the least favoured option 
for producing Wadebridge’s energy. The prospect of nuclear power outside of 
the county is significantly more appealing than within, suggesting that it is not 
the idea of nuclear technology per se that is opposed, but the perceived 
negative effects of having a nuclear plant nearby, presumably because of the 
perceived heath and safety risks. On the whole, those opposing renewables 
of any form were more likely to demonstrate support for nuclear and coal/gas 
plants, perhaps demonstrating some acknowledgement of the need for 
alternative supply options. 
The ‘localness’ of energy production is as relevant to CE projects as its 
environmental sustainability, and indeed, it is a major driver for WREN’s 
activities. Around a quarter of respondents agreed with the statement “It is 
important that the energy I use is produced locally in the community“ (Figure 
5.14a). Also of note here is the large proportion (over one quarter) of 
undecided respondents reflecting a considerable degree of apathy towards 
the importance of localness of energy production. It should be noted that 
efforts were made to ensure that this question was not loaded, i.e. local 
energy was not communicated as an option that might have financial or local 
economic benefits; of course however, framing the option in this way may 
have made a difference. However, the perceptions of local energy 
infrastructures changes considerably when considering ownership, the 
majority of respondents believed local ownership was preferable (Figure 
5.15b), indicating that acceptance is related to an expectation of the local 
benefits of ownership. Indeed, only five per cent of respondents disagreed 
with the notion of local ownership. 
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Figure 5.14 a) “It is important that the energy I use is produced locally in 
the community” and b) “It is better that renewable energy technologies 
(e.g. wind turbines, solar farms etc.) are owned by the community rather 
than by an individual or a private company” 
Source: Author’s own 
There was also a significant positive correlation between those in Wadebridge 
who support more investment in renewables and support for local generation, 
and similarly, those respondents opposing renewables in general also 
disagree that energy should be produced locally. This is be expected of 
course, as opponents of RE often cite reasons of visual impact and other local 
effects rather than the usefulness of RE in terms of the energy system more 
generally, for example.  
Analysis of these perceptions should be tempered in light of the inherent 
complexity of the issues and the difficulties in making decisions based on 
limited knowledge or experience. There may be several ways of meeting the 
various energy challenges (at a local, regional or national level) and local 
perceptions are important, especially in terms of determining the paths of 
least resistance, but also to ensure widespread support of decision-making 
and deeper engagement in energy issues more generally. However it needs 
to be noted that it is unlikely that any decision-making at an individual’s level 
(though also perhaps at community or Government levels) is likely to be able 
to a) distil all relevant information and b) process that information in an 
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objective manner free from bias. Figure 5.15 illustrates that there are a range 
of uncertainties relating to the various renewable energy options in 
Wadebridge, and with around two fifths agreeing that the variety of options is 
confusing. This raises the question of at what level we can reasonable expect 
civil society to engage in complex decisions relating to changes in energy 
supply arrangements. As mentioned above, if we are to move to an inclusive 
and sustainable energy future, consultation and democracy are important to a 
degree, not least as they help us determine key opportunities and threats to 
making energy transitions. However, it is clear that the knowledge required to 
distil complex issues such as energy decisions may be a barrier to such 
participative democracy, and that a more strategic oversight mode of 
decision-making might be better suited to this, and wider energy transitions. 
Chapter 7 will explore how we might start to reconcile these two positions. 
 
Figure 5.15 “I am confused by the variety of options for renewable 
energy in Wadebridge” 
Source: Author’s own 
As discussed above, the strong levels of support for rooftop PV compared to 
other technologies and scales can be explained by the relative harmony the 
technology has with its surroundings, as exemplified by the comments made 
about more incongruous solar arrays and wind turbine developments. While 
wave or tidal power technologies were not offered as an option in the survey, 
many respondents presented these technologies as a sensible and 
appropriate alternative: 
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“Energy should be produced by wave power and use the use of our waters 
rather than ruin our countryside with wind turbines” (Respondent 82) 
“Transfer the River Camel, to electric production. No other wind farms or solar 
panels needed” (Respondent 180) 
“Why are there no observations/comments concerning hydro power, which is 
less intrusive and far more acceptable than covering good agricultural land 
with solar panels/wind farms” (Respondent 102) 
“Why, when Cornwall has such a long coastline are we not focusing on tidal 
power - feasible, reliable and virtually invisible; 2) Why, when Cornwall has 
such a history of mining and research into hot rocks are we not focussing on 
that, feasible, reliable and virtually invisible (or focused on a few sites). 3) 
Wind turbines and solar forms are an avoidable visual blight” (Respondent 
218) 
These comments (of which there were many more) demonstrate a desire for 
minimising visual impact and are perceived to have fewer trade-offs around 
the use of agricultural land. With the River Camel (upon which the town of 
Wadebridge is situated) as well as the coast in close proximity, hydroelectric 
generation was presenting as something of a panacea by many. This perhaps 
represents a perception that the energy challenge can be met by using only a 
single group of technologies and without the need for unnecessary trade-offs 
between renewable and visual amenities.  
In summary, the findings presented in this section have some implications for 
the deployment of key technologies in Wadebridge. The survey demonstrates 
a high level of support for rooftop PV, the initial technology of choice for 
WREN. This support can be demonstrated by the high levels of uptake of the 
technology, and has likely been bolstered by positive experiences. According 
to the data collected here, explorations into larger (>5MW solar or wind) 
technology options in the area is likely to be well received, though is likely to 
depend on the extent to which local benefits can be communicated and 
realised to the wider community. 
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5.5.3 Perceptions of changes to governance arrangements 
In terms of making decisions about energy production, Wadebridge residents 
revealed slightly more support for decision-making at a community level 
compared to Local Authority or Central Government levels (Figure 5.16).  
 
Figure 5.16 Preferences for decision-making around energy issues at 
national and local scales. 
Source: Author’s own 
This either demonstrates acknowledgement of the need for multiple scales of 
governance or indeed confusion in what each of these mean for energy 
decisions. Either way, it raises the questions of what kind of energy decisions 
are being made at these different scales. For example, some comments from 
respondents indicated a belief that government is best placed to determine an 
overall strategy for addressing national energy concerns:  
“Whilst I don't disagree with power being generated locally, it should be a 
national concern and policy” (Respondent 71) 
“The mix of energy sources (including renewable vs. non renewable) has to 
have a national overview, otherwise this will lead to disparity and potentially 
increase fuel poverty (in some regions where renewable resources could not 
meet demand)” (Respondent 278) 
These quotes suggest the opinion that that some energy decisions should be 
taken strategically, lest more localised decisions lead to inadvertent trade-offs 
between objectives. That said, when local energy decisions are considered, 
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more people than not considered local decision-making more suitable (60 per 
cent agreeing), suggesting that overall a balance between local and national 
concerns was felt to be important. Indeed, for some, process seemed less 
important than progress: 
“It doesn't matter who decides…just that it is clean, green, affordable [and] 
sustainable” (Respondent 35) 
While this might appear to highlight a dichotomy of opinion, Butler et al (2013) 
suggest some rationale for this, stating that it is not necessarily the case that 
(National) Government should lead the way in energy decision-making; rather, 
they must as they are the only actors that hold the requisite powers and are 
relatively more trusted than other actors, specifically industry: “at the core, 
publics locate responsibility for delivering transitions with Government, 
including local, central and wider governing institutions” (Butler et al, 2013). 
This sentiment was further echoed in the survey, with several respondents 
judging energy decisions to be of national importance, perhaps because of a 
perceived fairness in the Government’s allocation of resources: 
“leaving all decisions to local use may only encourage an element of 
selfishness and not keep the broader national picture in mind (Respondent 
47) 
“Power should be in the National Domain and not local...All power is fed into 
the national grids anyway” (Respondent 124) 
That said, while there is relative trust in central Government as strategists in 
making energy decisions, this trust may be compromised somewhat with the 
apparent complicity between Government and utilities, which affects 
consumers directly (through delivery of key policy mechanisms, such as the 
Green Deal) and indirectly (through, for example, manipulation of markets to 
favour large-scale generators and industry), as illustrated by the following 
quotes: 
“In my opinion neither [local nor national decision-making processes] look at 
the whole picture. [Government] make decisions that are quick fixes, providing 
them with easy political advantages” (Respondent 33) 
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“A lot of the statements in this survey are completely impractical. Energy 
supply is an economic and political driver” (Respondent 87) 
That many respondents appear to favour newer, more local versions of 
energy governance alongside national and local Government perhaps reflects 
the current salience of energy issues to households (e.g. ongoing electricity 
bill increases) and an increasing distaste for the status quo, but appears also 
to signify the public’s awareness of the possibility (and potential impacts) of 
energy system change. The development of larger and more ubiquitous RE 
installations, particularly wind and solar farms has perhaps had an effect of 
embedding the hitherto abstract nature of energy generation in peoples’ 
consciousnesses. Many of these developments has been the subject of 
discussion and debate (in the media and beyond) around the siting of such 
infrastructures, making it more normal for previously disengaged members of 
society to engage with these debates, particularly if developments have 
tangible positive impacts.  
While much of these debates are centred on visual impacts, particularly in 
rural areas such as Cornwall, a significant proportion of arguments against 
renewables installations focus on issues of equity, and the distribution of costs 
and benefits among those affected. Small and medium-scale renewables in 
general, as well as the CE initiatives within which they are developed offer 
alternative economic streams. New forms of ownership often create revenue 
streams for landowners, for example, providing a focal point for debates to 
centre on the creation of inequity, the situation of course made worse if 
installations are perceived to be visually unattractive: 
“As previous experience, wind farms only make a lot of money for the land 
owner on which land they are sited. i.e. rich farmers” (Respondent 160) 
“Only those on whose land they are, feel any benefit (financial). A blot on 
fantastic countryside” (Respondent 162) 
While these comments relate to renewable installations in general – rather 
than CE-led projects specifically, it illustrates the point that small-scale 
governance approaches are not always more favourable, and the extent to 
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which installations are supported depends on how well the project has 
engaged with, and benefits the community. It is perhaps telling that these 
comments were collected before WREN had a stake in any RE development 
beyond household scale, so it is possible that the views expressed here 
reflect only those of private sector RE developments. While perceptions being 
based on such a limited experience of developments does not suggest 
individuals would be more sympathetic of CE-based projects, it does reinforce 
the importance of CE-based schemes being different in terms of its ability to 
engage people and better distribute benefits. 
As discussed earlier, perceptions relating to energy transitions must of course 
consider technologies, but also how these technologies are owned and 
managed by different actors. For example, a wind farm owned and operated 
by a large-scale developer is fundamentally different from a community 
conceived, community-owned and managed wind farm, even if there is still 
involvement by a commercial-scale developer through part-ownership, for 
example.  
The suitability of more local governance arrangements to help deliver more 
favourable energy systems depends on how these arrangements can be 
trusted. Traditional modes of energy governance (Parliament, energy utility 
companies) suffers from significant public mistrust (Ofgem, 2014c, Butler et 
al., 2013), and so it is vital that newly-formed CE organisations can both gain 
and maintain trust throughout the communities in which they operate. Analysis 
of survey responses revealed an apparent dichotomy relating to trust. On one 
hand, several interviewees identified WREN as a trustworthy alternative in an 
otherwise irresponsible sphere of utilities and Government: 
“…they have helped translate the possibilities of renewable energy and 
through the trustworthy conduit of WREN – and they are trustworthy, they 
believe in what they do – they are a forum for local people, to talk to them to 
try to understand why they should be doing something, whether its financially 
or environmentally so they are pretty useful in that respect” (Interview 9) 
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This perception of trust is explained in this case by the ability to be able to 
effectively and objectively communicate energy options, a situation far 
removed from traditional relationships with the energy system. On the other 
hand, the appearance of a new actor for some seemed to be treated with 
some suspicion: 
“WREN” appears to be run by a cosy clique … and are not representative of 
the average Wadebridge residents (Respondent 107) 
 “Whilst some of the objectives of WREN are very well meaning, I also have 
some concern that the organisation is becoming self-fulfilling in a commercial 
sense and a more democratic body [is] required to overview” (Respondent 
278) 
These comments are indicative of some of the difficulties CE face in balancing 
project development with community engagement. For a segment of the 
population, blanket opposition to renewables (as indicated by Respondent 
107) may mean that any group looking to develop local RE options are seen 
as untrustworthy. For others, (such as Respondent 278, who favoured the 
expansion of renewable projects in general) the democratic process offered 
by CE groups may be limited in its effectiveness. All other things being equal, 
the governance of local energy decisions by CE groups should certainly be 
more democratic than the status quo, where (often limited) agency is only 
available through participating in planning processes. Of course, as in all 
democracies, while decision-making is participatory, decisions made are 
unlikely to please every member of that democracy. Moreover, for nascent CE 
groups, the emergence of a democratic process (where previously there had 
been none) undoubtedly raises expectations of heightened personal agency 
and autonomy, which may be unrealistic in retrospect.  
Herein lies a balancing act for CE groups in building expectations around the 
benefits of projects and delivering upon these promises. Such expectations 
may be as much about specific project outcomes (such as the delivery of a 
local information scheme) as they are about the processes followed in the 
pursuit of such outcomes (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). A key challenge 
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in the democratisation of energy (discussed at length in Chapter 9) is in 
widening participation in the development of these expectations, as well as 
the ownership of outcomes. In addressing these challenges CE groups such 
as are not only contributing greatly to learning around community-scale RE 
deployment, but also to the value – and challenges of – the democratic 
process. 
5.5.4 Propensity for change within the community 
Although Wadebridge residents communicated slight preference for local 
decision-making over county or national-level decision-making (as shown 
above, in Figure 5.16), this was not matched by a personal desire to be more 
involved in such a process, with only a fifth agreeing that they “would 
personally like to be more involved in deciding how our local energy is 
produced” (Figure 5.17). While just over a quarter of respondents disagreed, 
less than a quarter agreed with this statement, indicating that active 
involvement in the local decision-making process may depend on what 
exactly was involved, and perhaps how much of a time commitment it would 
be. Tellingly, the majority of respondents had no opinion, although the 
reasons behind such noncommittal it unclear i.e. whether they didn’t want to 
be involved (but didn’t want to be rude), or didn’t want to commit without 
having more information about what that engagement involved. 
 
Figure 5.17  “I would personally like to be more involved in deciding how 
our local energy is produced” 
It may be tempting to assume that apathy is the dominant factor here, though 
that would be overly simplistic. Rather, as Hoffman and High-Pippert (2005) 
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argue, publics do not necessarily want to be involved, but it is still important to 
“know that they will have the opportunity to participate if they should ever be 
motivated to do so, and … that the power of their elected representatives 
could be checked by their own political power” (Hoffman and High-Pippert, 
2005: 389). Moreover, the nature of the energy system and particularly the 
traditional mode of top-down governance by both Government and industry 
may have fostered civic apathy and helplessness through the absence of 
positive engagement by these actors. It could then be that the public are 
demotivated because of the perceived futility in doing so and the paucity of 
channels through which engagement can be made. This raises interesting 
questions about society’s acknowledgement of the right to reengage (i.e. 
awareness of ones agency) within these debates. While there has been 
relative inertia throughout civil society in engaging with something as 
impenetrable as the energy system, CE (and other grassroots activist 
organisations) are challenging the status quo and are certainly more visible to 
society as representing potential alternatives to the current system. 
Membership of and engagement (of different kinds) through organisations 
such as WREN are considered integral to this normalisation of alternative 
modes of governance. 
While this may tell us something about the willingness to engage actively in 
local decision-making, there are however many different ways of engaging 
with energy issues, as already discussed in previous sections. Additionally, 
there are multiple opportunities through which citizens of Wadebridge (and 
beyond) can become involved with WREN, ranging from tacit but latent 
acceptance of WREN’s goals, to membership and support, through to active 
involvement and investment of time and money. As is the case with most CE 
initiatives, WREN’s board is made primarily up of voluntary posts, meaning 
that it largely dependent on the goodwill and expertise of a group of 
committed members and how much time they are willing to invest. 
163 
 
 
WREN membership30 can be used as a crude gauge of levels of engagement 
and support at the most basic level31. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
the resource limitations of this study meant that it was not possible to 
undertake an in-depth survey of WREN members and the extent to which 
whether membership implies support. Additional work is therefore needed to 
better understand the drivers behind people joining WREN and other CE 
groups 
Membership growth is illustrated in Figure 5.18(a) and (b). Since its inception 
in January 2011, WREN membership grew to 1056 individuals in June 2014, 
around half of whom live in the study area and 95 per cent live within 
Cornwall. The proportion of membership living in Wadebridge itself has 
declined somewhat from around three quarters from the early days of WREN. 
In a population of almost 8000, this is a membership of around 7 per cent, 
with marginally more support in the suburbs than in central Wadebridge or the 
surrounding parishes. 
  
Figure 5.18 a) Growth of WREN membership within and beyond study 
site and b) change in local membership versus membership from 
elsewhere 
Source: Jerry Clark, pers comm. 
                                            
 
30 Lifetime membership costs £1 and is open to anyone over 16 years of age. 
31 It is of course possible that opponents to the goals of WREN become members in 
order to be able to influence its actions and derail efforts, and although WREN does 
have some known antagonists, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
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The change in distribution of WREN members across the county indicates 
that WREN is increasingly drawing interest and support from an increasingly 
wide area, most likely through media exposure and engagement in key 
networks relating to CE as a sector. This suggests a widening social network 
through which raised awareness of the notion of CE and associated social 
learning is more likely. While WREN’s broad and diverse membership tells us 
something about its national presence, the degree to which such members 
influence the workings of the organisation is more nuanced. Certainly, 
membership status permits voting on WREN’s board and direction, though 
turnouts at board meetings typically number 12 or less, while attendance at 
early AGMs have been up to 100.  
While the democratic structure of WREN means that all members are 
theoretically able to engage as much one another, levels of engagement 
varies considerably across the membership. The fact that membership 
appeared to grow slightly quicker on dates immediately preceding the voting 
processes for the release of community fund does seem to suggest that 
people were driven to joining WREN by the prospect of being able to vote, 
presumably for a particular cause (Figure 5.18). This perhaps indicates that 
by making the benefits of community energy relevant to the community at 
large, WREN can perhaps appeal to a larger audience that might be the case 
otherwise, and is supportive of the importance of framing. 
That the local population supports local governance (Figure 5.16) but prefers 
to be personally detached (Figure 5.17) supports the hierarchy of engagement 
evident in other CE groups (Seyfang et al., 2013). WREN, like other groups, 
currently has a core of one or two founding members, a small number of 
board members and project coordinators, a loose following of supporters and 
interested members of the community, and a larger network of relatively 
disengaged supporters, conceptualised in Figure 5.19.  
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Figure 5.19 Conceptualisation of WREN membership structure 
Despite the democratic framework in place, and the strong representation of 
Wadebridge residents in WREN, there was a concern by some survey 
respondents (See previous discussion in Section 5.5.3) that the views of 
WREN is not representative of the local population. As these claims came 
from non-members, the extent to which key principles of WREN represented 
the values of both members and non-members was analysed (Figure 5.20) 
with respect to four survey questions: “It is important that Britain invests more 
in renewable energy” (More renewables); “We need to reduce the amount of 
energy we use in this country” (Less consumption); “It is important that the 
energy I use is produced locally in the community” (Local production); and 
“Decisions regarding local energy issues should be left to the local 
community” (Local governance). 
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Figure 5.20 Comparisons of responses from WREN members with non-
members for key survey questions 
This figure illustrates that while there is some difference between the 
responses members and non-members gave, they are broadly similar with no 
significant difference between sets. It can be concluded that for these issues 
there is little difference between the perceptions of members and that of non-
members, and that membership is broadly representative of the wider 
population.  
5.5.5 Propensity for change within the household 
Exploring householders’ relationship with household energy services is also 
useful in determining opportunities and barriers to behaviour change. In terms 
of improvements to household energy efficiency, the disruption and expense 
associated with some improvements means that cost reduction (and other) 
benefits must outweigh these costs over a reasonable timescale. This means 
that householders must first accept that improvements would make a 
difference to the comfort of their home, and be willing and able to make 
changes. The ability to make changes relates first to whether the householder 
is authorised to do so (given possible tenure and planning restrictions) as well 
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as whether funding, sourced either personally or through grants/loans, is 
available.  
The household survey illustrates that 78 per cent of respondents had carried 
out at least one energy service-related installation in their homes, with around 
a half installing either double glazing or loft insulation since moving in, and 
one fifth installing more efficient boilers (Figure 5.17a). When interrogated 
about the reasons for carrying out these changes, more than half of 
respondents stated that combinations of warmth/comfort and cost savings 
were key factors, though very few (just over ten per cent) stated that these 
were the sole factors. Significantly, over a quarter of changes were taken 
during part of wider home refurbishments/extensions, or are triggered by 
sudden events, such as a boiler breaking down and needing replaced, or at 
the same time as home refurbishments. 
 
Figure 5.21 a) Types of energy-related household installations in 
Wadebridge and b) drivers 
This resonates with work by Wilson et al. (2013), who in a nationally 
representative survey found that efficiency measures in the household are 
rarely carried out unless other “amenity renovations” (major structural 
changes to kitchens, bathrooms and other living areas) are taking place. 
Indeed, several respondents to the current survey reported that such 
renovations were required to deal with ageing and/or poorly constructed 
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buildings, with several commenting on specific issue of damp32.  It is apparent 
then that householder decision-making in relation to energy is complex and 
context-specific, and programmes focusing cost savings alone, for example, 
may find it difficult to gain traction unless householders are both already 
unhappy about their living conditions and considering carrying out work to 
address existing problems 
For those households undertaking microgeneration measures (e.g. PV 
panels, solar water units), cost savings was cited as a key driver. In an area 
with low levels of access to the gas network, it is clear that cutting electricity 
consumption is a key priority, and for those able to, investing in 
microgeneration can be an attractive option. In this sample, 100 per cent of 
energy generation installations took place on owned, rather than rented 
properties, indicating that financial security is important (or indeed that there 
are other barriers for those living in rented properties).  
A broader level of engagement with the energy system can be gauged by the 
diversity of suppliers used by consumers in the study area. According to the 
household energy survey, 85 per cent of respondents purchased electricity, 
gas, or both from one of the Big Six energy companies, and while this is lower 
than the national level of around 96 per cent (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, 2012), it is clear that there is room for more competition. WREN is 
currently investigating whether local supply arrangements are possible, and 
local engagement with such a programme would be insightful in terms of 
engagement and receptiveness to change. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has established the local context of energy system change in 
Wadebridge, UK. WREN has established itself as an economic programme 
                                            
 
32  Problems with damp are particularly common in Cornwall as a result of the 
combination of the maritime climate and inefficient and poorly insulated buildings 
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seeking to engage the whole community in localising energy system value. As 
such, it is operating within a relatively large and varied population compared 
to many other CE groups. This, as well as variations also in the type and 
quality of housing stock offers both challenges and opportunities for local 
change. 
Analysis into consumption and production of electricity and gas in the study 
area drew attention to unequal distributions of energy-related costs among the 
population, with implications for targeting specific areas. Social aspects were 
then explored, first in relation to perceptions of the current energy system, and 
then relating to the prospect of change to energy system change, specific 
technologies, and governance arrangements. While small scale solar PV was 
viewed most favourably among the local population, larger scale, locally sited 
wind and solar installations were also viewed positively, though this was 
tempered somewhat with a desire for local tangible benefits.  
In terms of governance, respondents displayed support for a range of energy 
governance scales, from the local to the national, though was slightly skewed 
towards local decision-making, though again, this data can perhaps only be 
assessed in the context of local expectations not yet being realised. In terms 
of personal involvement however, individuals were relatively noncommittal in 
terms of playing more of a role in local governance processes.  
WREN enjoys considerably high levels of local membership, though like other 
groups, the depth of engagement of these members it highly variable. 
Nonetheless, membership numbers both imply a tacit approval of the ethos 
and activities WREN is undertaking and reinforces the importance of linking 
energy with social objectives, through the community benefit fund, for 
example. 
Overall, this chapter forms the context of, and highlights several potential 
opportunities and barriers to community energy expanding in Wadebridge. 
The following chapter builds on this context and examines the degree to 
which WREN’s activities have impacted different dimensions of the energy 
system. 
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6 Evidencing the impact of a community energy initiative 
“I strongly believe that there is appetite for this grassroots approach and want 
to see nothing short of a community energy revolution” (Ed Davey, June 
2013) 
“Any decision to offer additional support for community energy projects needs 
to ensure value for money, and balance any benefits against costs. That is 
why it is important to establish robust evidence to underpin the Community 
Energy Strategy” (DECC (2013b)) 
The two quotes above, which came out of the same Government department, 
in the same month, neatly capture the gap between rhetoric and the reality of 
policymaking in DECC. The benefits of community energy do seem to be 
acknowledged by government, not least because it is recognised that 
communities have the potential to “tackle the most challenging issues more 
effectively than Government alone” (DECC, 2013b). There is however, an 
apparent reluctance on the part of government to support the growth either of 
CE in particular, or of inclusive energy policy more generally. Indeed, the 
government’s inaugural Community Energy Strategy was developed within 
the explicit constraint that it “could not seek to modify policies, except in 
respect to approaches to community partnerships and community support” 
(CECG, 2012). 
One explanation for this gap in political support for CE may be that there 
insufficient evidence that CE is worthwhile, or rather there is insufficient 
evidence ‘of the right kind’ to demonstrate the value required to provide 
support. For example, while the purpose of the CE Strategy Call for Evidence 
(DECC, 2013b) was to fill this gap, the Strategy itself concluded that 
“quantitative evidence on the social impacts and relative costs and benefits of 
community energy remains quite limited” and it “will be important to build on 
this in the future as the sector grows… to inform future policymaking” (DECC, 
2014b). As Chapter 3 explains, the paucity of quantitative evidence around 
CE is partly a consequence of the infancy of the sector. The usefulness of 
evidence of this type is critiqued in Chapter 8.  
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This need for evidence for policymaking sets the scene for the current 
chapter. Specifically, it seeks to address a key issue relevant to 
understanding the role of CE within the wider energy system: what is the 
impact of community energy projects? A case-study approach is adopted to 
understand in depth the evolution of a specific CE project and its coevolution 
with the wider energy system. As such, the chapter documents the impacts 
and experiences of WREN as they relate to a wide and evolving range of 
desired outcomes.  
Consideration of multiple dimensions i.e. technological, economic and social 
are taken to capture the variation in how community energy is valued by 
different stakeholders. However, it is noted that community energy is unlike 
other innovations in that the establishment of social networks and their actions 
define it. As such, the role and impact of social networks and their dynamics 
for CE is the subject of chapter 7. This chapter then is concerned solely with 
the technological and economic aspects of WREN’s impacts. 
This chapter thus introduces the thesis findings with a discussion of impact as 
it relates to CE, which can be differentiated in terms of dimensional, 
distributional and temporal aspects. What is meant by impact, and why we 
should measure it, is central to understanding decisions around energy, in 
policy circles and among other stakeholders including civil society. The 
second section then dissects specific impacts arising from WREN’s activities, 
in terms of the impacts of local energy production and consumption and the 
economics thereof.  
6.1 Conceptualising impact in community energy 
Before specific impacts can be discussed, it is important to first consider what 
is meant by impact (i.e. what is being measured, and what is not). Specifically, 
if CE does affect change, which elements are we most concerned about? 
How should we treat distributional effects? And over what timescales are 
impacts important? Addressing such questions will help to conceptualise 
impact in a way that will be of use for analysing the role of CE. Each question 
is addressed in turn here.  
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6.1.1 Dimensions of impact 
A whole systems approach to analysing issues in energy requires 
consideration of technological, business, policy and behaviour components as 
related to the demand and supply of energy, as well as the interconnections 
between these components. In order to fully appreciate the impact of 
community energy (and indeed the impact of any approaches or interventions 
to energy issues) it is thus necessary to analyse the effect of the approach on 
the whole system, i.e. on all components.  
Moreover, the way in which stakeholders understand impact has implications 
for the immediate and eventual role of CE within the wider energy system. 
There are a number of approaches to understanding and measuring policy 
impact relevant to the current research. Principally, the established need for 
socially and environmentally responsible energy policy-making in the last few 
decades has been manifested in the incremental development of traditional 
decision-making frameworks to incorporate non-monetary cost and benefit 
impacts. For example, the creation of DECC itself was an acknowledgement 
of the intimacy between energy and climate change challenges, and coincided 
with a gradual reframing of energy as an multidimensional issue concerning 
society and the environment, rather than simply technologies and economics. 
While in practical terms this has been shaped by external pressures (e.g. EU 
emissions and RE targets), there is evidence to suggest that wider cultural 
shifts in the need for increased moral responsibility were instrumental33.  
Methodologically, approaches to consider social, economic and environmental 
impacts simultaneously can crudely be divided into those with foundations in 
ecological and environmental economic principles (e.g. the Capital Theory 
Approach (Harper and Kelly, 2003)), or traditional economic development 
objectives (e.g. Social Cost Benefit Analyses; Policy Impact Assessments). 
                                            
 
33 Discussions around the moral obligation to address climate change is discussed in 
relation to society (e.g. Gardiner, 2006) and to Governments (e.g. Stern, 2007). 
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Despite the differences between approaches, the common thread is the 
attempt to consider economic alongside social and environmental impacts. 
This is especially important for energy system decision-making, not least 
because the energy system is considered central to the healthy functioning of 
economic as well as social and environmental systems.  
While this research does not subscribe to a single specific method of impact 
assessment, the typological frameworks developed therein are of some use in 
delineating different dimensions of impact. In particular, the Capital Theory 
Approach (CTA) establishes several components of capital whose levels 
should be maintained such that their contribution to wellbeing is non-declining 
over time, in order to ensure sustainable development (Harper and Price, 
2011). These capitals, termed financial, produced (or human-made), human, 
social and natural, can be used to produce all goods and services, whose 
consumption contributes to human wellbeing (Figure 6.1). Although this 
approach (and other indicator-based methods) has limitations34 , they do 
provide some useful conceptual starting points for identifying components for 
mapping impacts. 
                                            
 
34  Limitations include the ethical and methodological difficulties in assigning a 
common unit of measurement (money) to all forms of capital, the degree of 
substitutability between capital forms, and the emphasis on the absolute 
maintenance of capital rather than how it is allocated among the population. 
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Figure 6.1 A Capitals Theory Approach 
Source: Adapted from Harper and Price (2011) 
In terms of the current research, a primary purpose of small-scale energy 
initiatives is to change the quantity, structure, or quality of energy produced 
and consumed within a given area35, and while some groups may have more 
of a focus on emissions reductions (for example) than renewables 
deployment, every community energy group, by definition, seeks to alter the 
supply and/or demand of energy resources in a specific area in order to 
improve the flows of goods and services, and ultimately enhance wellbeing. 
Broadening out from the CTA, the impact of CE can be categorised into the 
following broad dimensions: 
• Resource attributes describe the supply types and quantities 
produced, transported and consumed in the area of interest, for 
example, the proportion of electricity delivered by renewable sources in 
                                            
 
35 ‘Structure’ in this case refers specifically to the fuel type and location of 
energy generation and consumption, while ‘quality’ refers to the energetic and 
environmental qualities of primary energy. 
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a given area, and the implications for wider energy infrastructure. 
Embedded within this set of attributes are environmental 
considerations e.g. carbon intensity of resource, and thus encompass 
produced and natural capital components; 
• Economic attributes describe the monetary costs and benefits of 
supplying and consuming the current energy mix, and may include, for 
example, capital costs of renewable technologies deployed in a given 
area. The change in financial capital within the study area is related to 
the balance of such monetary costs and benefits; 
• Social attributes may be defined by the ways through which people 
and groups of people engage directly or indirectly with the energy 
system. This includes civil society and formal and informal networks 
(including the community group themselves), but also those actors 
involved with institutions of technology, governance and markets 
related to the energy system and energy system change. This broad 
social framework encompasses both human and social capital36. 
Although these attributes are considered in parallel, how they are weighted 
depends on the specific goals in question. For example, one community 
energy group may be focused on generating revenue from RE installations, 
making economic attributes a central component, while another may be more 
interested in fostering wider engagement in energy transitions more generally, 
and might thus weight social attributes as most important. How impacts are 
perceived by different groups of actors has relevance for how CE is valued by 
these groups, and in turn, how opportunities and barriers for CE are 
manifested.  
                                            
 
36 Two other forms of capital, ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ are used elsewhere (e.g. Flora 
et al., 2004 to define notions of shared identity and engagement with political 
processes as key elements of sustainable communities and economic development. 
Both concepts are used here within the overarching notion of social capital, and as 
such are discussed alongside broader social impacts. 
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As with many CE groups (Seyfang et al., 2013, Walker and Devine-Wright, 
2008, Walker, 2008b), WREN cites local economic resilience as a leading 
driver for local activities: “WREN is primarily an economic programme of 
community investment, where environmental and climate issues are implicit” 
(WREN, 2012). This framing of community energy is interesting: by presenting 
itself as a key part of the local low carbon economy, with benefits including 
community income generation, local industry development and high value 
employment, WREN at once identified and occupied a role as a distributed, 
community-based deliverer of low carbon policy in Cornwall. The importance 
of framing, either by groups themselves or by the wider sector has been well 
documented as a key element of developing niche innovations (Geels and 
Deuten, 2006, Hargreaves et al., 2013). 
Aside from the economic imperative, WREN’s focus on the local suggests that 
for them, the economics of energy are inseparable from social issues: “WREN 
seeks to engage the entire population” and “save and generate energy at a 
scale that will have a meaningful impact upon the population’s actual 
consumption” (WREN, 2012). Since the principal approach is on RE 
generation and related savings and income, the ‘social’ side of WREN is thus 
that of engagement and benefit sharing, and while addressing fuel poverty, for 
example, does feature in WREN’s business plan, it is perhaps secondary to 
RE-led projects. 
Although energy-related objectives are not necessarily aligned with economic 
goals (there are many ways to reduce carbon emissions, all varying in cost), 
changes in patterns of the generation, transmission and consumption of 
energy all affect economic flows, with implications for the health and 
sustainability of the local and national economy. Arguably, a key theme within 
energy policy goals is that they can be more directly related to the concept of 
wellbeing than ‘purer’ economic goals of growth, measured by GVA and 
employment. Specifically, the success of any energy policy will depend on its 
ability to encourage supply to meet demand, but also, the ability to do so 
within climate change targets while maximising affordability, both of which are 
more closely linked to wellbeing than to economic growth itself. If we therefore 
177 
 
 
agree that wellbeing is more or at least of equal importance to growth, then 
taking a whole-systems perspective to energy is crucial. Taking such a whole 
systems approach, this chapter attempts to consider all dimensions of impact 
simultaneously to reflect the need for all dimensions to be impacted 
favourably, if the goals of moving to a sustainable energy system are to be 
met. 
It should be highlighted that these dimensions are interconnected to varying 
degrees, such that analysis of the economics of community energy, for 
example, necessarily takes into account distributional aspects of revenue 
generation, which of course can be considered a social dimension. Similarly, 
analysis of household energy consumption would inevitably take in all three 
dimensions by, for example, speaking to household fuel requirements, costs, 
and related social issues such as fuel poverty. 
6.1.2 Distributional aspects 
While any analysis of impact would consider the magnitude of change, the 
issues and challenges associated with energy system change are also related 
to the distribution of changes among stakeholders. Embedded throughout the 
dimensions outlined above (resources, economics, and society) are 
distributional aspects, which this thesis considers as being central to a move 
to a sustainable energy future. While impacts on any one dimension can be 
described in terms of the depth of impact (e.g. increase in RE capacity), the 
degree to which this has a societal benefit, say, might be conceptualised as 
the breadth of impact. 
In a wider sense, taking the energy policy goals of security, affordability, and 
low carbon, this thesis argues that it is the distribution of costs and benefits 
relating to these goals that is key to meeting policy objectives without 
sacrificing other objectives of interpersonal or intergenerational wellbeing and 
equity. Taken in turn, each goal can be considered. Conventional ideas of 
energy security relate narrowly to security of supply at a national level. It has 
been argued however that the property of security is both multidimensional 
and multiscalar (Mitchell et al., 2013), meaning different things to different 
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actors, over different timescales such that it is the distribution of energy 
accessibility that should provide the focus of analysis. Meanwhile, affordability 
in the context of energy policy is usually taken to mean the affordability of 
energy to householders. The distributional aspect of affordability depends on 
the interplay between fuel prices, income and how easy it is to heat one’s 
home, and thus affects some sections of the population more than others. 
Finally, from a macro-policy perspective, low carbon is taken as shorthand for 
emissions and renewable targets at a national scale. Much debates around 
RE however focus on how such infrastructures are distributed across the 
landscape, particularly in relation to the proximity to populations. Focusing 
solely on the amount of RE capacity, rather than its distribution among 
populations, is misleading. 
In terms of community energy then, the dimensions outlined in the previous 
section can be related by considering the distribution of different types of 
benefits and costs. Economic analysis of a community energy initiative must 
include consideration of how costs and benefits are distributed among 
stakeholders. A social analysis in turn might relate to the extent to which 
people are engaged with energy decisions, in terms of how decision-making 
agency is distributed among the population, for example. The geographical 
distribution of technologies and infrastructure of different scales has different 
requirements in terms of siting and proximity to the grid, and to consumers, 
thus affecting distribution of both social and economic costs and benefits. 
These distributional aspects are fundamental to understanding CE, not least 
because notions of justice, democracy and equity are embedded within CE as 
a whole. Although CE is often concerned with the local deployment of low 
carbon energy technologies, the type of technologies are often secondary to 
the economic and social benefits that these technologies can unlock. Indeed, 
the premise upon which WREN is founded, that “each locality can transform 
energy from an individual cost to a collective asset” (WREN, 2012) comments 
both on the economic as well as the social benefits (of redistributed 
economics) that is possible. It is the process rather than the progress that is 
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emphasised, and as such, conceptualisations of ‘impact’ must take this into 
account. 
Furthermore, one might consider the redistribution of governance as a key 
goal of CE. The shift in how people relate to energy has the potential to 
enable citizens to renegotiate the governance arrangements of the current 
energy system to a more favourable arrangement, with less volatile energy 
costs, and less dependence on energy companies with whom transparency 
and public trust is extremely low (Edelman, 2014). Owning and producing 
energy for oneself then becomes a way to participate more directly in a 
system that has hitherto been publicly inaccessible. Of course (and as pointed 
out by the findings of the household energy survey), it is plausible that the 
development of another layer of decision-making at the community scale risks 
disenfranchisement of those who feel excluded by developments. For 
example, those privately owned RE installations (and with no local benefits 
redistribution process) are likely to be associated as a retreat from, rather 
than an advance to, a fairer energy system, as demonstrated by some of the 
remarks made during the household energy survey.  
6.1.3 Temporal aspects 
An extension of the distributional aspects described above, temporality 
describes how the energy system dimensions (resources, economics, and 
society) are distributed over time. As discussed previously in Chapter 4, 
temporal aspects have enormous implications for how impact is measured, 
and how their effects are perceived. Different actors may be addressing 
issues through the lens of different timeframes, and thus have conflicting 
perceptions about the value of specific changes to the energy system. In 
terms of CE, some impacts (e.g. increasing local RE capacity, deploying 
household efficiency measures) may be expected to take months or years, 
whereas more profound impacts in low carbon innovation, political 
engagement, or cultural shifts, for example, can be expected to take years or 
decades.  
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WREN’s initial business plan was explicit in setting a 5-year timeline over 
which objectives would be measured (WREN, 2011, WREN, 2012), a 
timeframe which was deemed ambitious, though achievable. Business plans 
are typically short-termist, focusing on 3-5 year horizons during which 
meaningful steps toward progress can be made, not least because investors 
typically look for appropriate returns within that timeframe. While the formation 
of business plan helps to establish objectives, budgets and approaches, for 
some practitioners becoming more business-like runs counter to the ethos of 
the CE sector as a grassroots movement (Seyfang et al., 2014). 
In dissecting the impact of a specific CE project, this analysis explores the 
impacts brought about by WREN over a relatively short timeframe of a few 
years, as constrained by the research resources of this particular study. It is 
acknowledged that two or three years is unlikely to be enough to measure 
profound changes to an energy system, even at a local scale, taking in all 
dimensions. It takes time for objectives to be set and resources to be found. 
Energy generation resources (particularly at medium to large-scales) can take 
several years in planning and to access finance. It can therefore take 
considerable time for impacts arising from these new resources to become 
measurable. In presenting the impacts of WREN then, it is important to 
consider pipeline as well as completed projects, as well as to reflect on those 
activities that do not have any tangible output but contribute to the group’s 
goals at a deeper, more strategic level. 
Additionally, and as has been discussed, WREN (and the CE sector more 
generally) has not evolved in a vacuum, and so cannot be analysed as such. 
Rather, WREN has developed within the context of CE growth more 
generally, as well as within the context of developments in technology, policy, 
economics and society, with timescales of years, decades or generations. 
While the overarching focus of this thesis is situated at the junction between 
real-time impact and longer-term structural change in the energy system, the 
remainder of this chapter provides a snapshot of the evolution a specific CE 
project and its impacts over just a few years.  
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6.1.4 Energy production 
WREN has sought to affect local energy production through a number of 
channels. To date, the focus has been on providing advice to householders 
and businesses interested in installing, or finding out more about, renewables 
(but specifically domestic PV and heat). This has in many instances led to 
WREN recommending specific businesses to carry out installations, implying 
that for many, WREN occupies an informed and trusted position within the 
community.  
Figure 6.3a illustrates the growth in solar PV in and beyond the immediate 
study area as directly supported by WREN through referrals and facilitating 
the rent a roof scheme, amounting to 328kW37. WREN-influenced installations 
comprised around a fifth of the total for the study site (Figure 6.3b) 
  
Figure 6.2 a) WREN-influenced Solar PV installations including those 
outside of study area and b) WREN-influenced PV in the Wadebridge 
area only, as compared with total installed over the same timeframe. 
Sources: WREN (2013, pers comm), Ofgem 2014 (2014b)  
As highlighted previously, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
influence takes place. It is true that some households may have installed PV 
anyway (i.e. without WREN’s assistance), although offering information, 
                                            
 
37 Recall from the Introduction of Section 4.4 that different research boundaries 
means that this data may not correlate exactly with that generated by WREN 
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guidance and access to a trusted local supplier is likely to support uptake. 
Furthermore, peer influence has been found to play a role in influencing RE 
adoption (Bale et al., McMichael and Shipworth, 2013, Michelsen and 
Madlener, 2013), suggesting that it is plausible that those supported by 
WREN are likely to have influenced others, both to use the same referral 
service, but also to have PV installed without WREN’s assistance. One might 
reasonably suggest then that WREN has influenced more than that 
represented by the dark-grey area in Figure 6.2b through the aggregative and 
peer-dynamic effects of PV adoption. 
As well as those installations directly supported by WREN, several other 
installations in the study area and beyond have connections to the group. 
Installers of a 242kW solar array at Chapel Amble, north of the study area, are 
members of WREN and contribute to the WREN community fund. Cornwall 
Council has also installed several (around 200kW capacity) installations in 
and around the area on social housing and council-owned buildings (e.g. 
library, leisure centre), and was directly influenced by WREN’s activities in 
making these decisions (Clark 2013, pers comm). 
WREN has also focused significant resources in encouraging the adoption of 
renewable heat installations in the area, resulted in 55 installations38 totalling 
850kW, made possible through administering one-off grants available through 
the Renewable Heat Premium Payment Communities (RHPP2) scheme. In 
addition to these, the group also helped to facilitate several more commercial 
installations, totalling around 510kW. As with small-scale solar, it is possible 
that these installations, through social networks have further influenced 
energy-oriented decisions in other households and businesses, though this is 
not quantified here. 
Based on these figures it is possible to roughly quantify the change in 
financial flows resulting from WREN’s programme of activities relating to 
                                            
 
38 Around half of which were in the immediate study area 
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renewables. Table 6.1 summarises estimated spending and revenue both 
within and beyond the study area for small-scale renewable installations. 
Table 6.1 Estimated financial flows resulting from WREN-supported 
domestic solar and heat installations to Dec 2013 
Intervention Solar PV ASHP GSHP S. therm Biomass Total 
Number of installations 144 4 1 26 21 
 Unit cost (£) 8,000 15,000 15,000 6,000 6,000 
 Annual bill savings (£) 140 700 700 90 400 
 Ann FiT/RHI revenue (£) 1,500 1,000 1,000 330 750 
 Ann export revenue (£) 75 
     Total expenditure (£) 1,256,000 60,000 15,000 156,000 126,000 1,613,000 
Year 1 revenue (£) 247,275 2,800 700 8,580 15,750 275,105 
Year 1 savings (£) 21,931 4,000 1,000 2,340 8,400 37,671 
Year 1 rev & savings (£) 269,206 6,800 1,700 10,920 24,150 312,776 
Source: Author’s own. See 39 and 40 for notes 
At the small-scale end of the renewables market, this suggests that WREN is 
directly and indirectly responsible for supporting over £1.6M of investment 
within the study area alone, mainly for household rooftop PV, and has 
facilitated savings and revenues of over £300,000/year41. This excludes local 
                                            
 
39 Includes an estimated 75 installations influenced by WREN; south-facing homes 
consuming 4800kWh electricity/annum; average unit costs based on Energy Saving 
Trust data (http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk); FiT and RHI rates based on 
average for period of study (40p/kWh, 7.3p/kWh, 18.8p/kWh,19.2p/kWh and 
12.2p/kWh for PV, ASHPs, GSHPs, solar thermal and biomass units respectively); 
PV export rate of 4p/kWh 
40 Recall from the Introduction of Section 4.4 that different research boundaries 
means that this data may not correlate exactly with that generated by WREN 
41 This correlates well with WREN’s figure of £1.5m of local installer sales as stated 
by Hiles (2014) 
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expenditure and revenue from non-domestic schemes, some of which are 
large-scale. 
Understanding the distribution of these costs and benefits is a little more 
complex. In general, higher income households are more likely to invest in 
microrenewables (Fischer and Sauter, 2004, DECC, 2012b), suggesting that 
the direct benefits of reduced fuel costs and revenue generation accrue to 
those households least in need. Some commentators have suggested that the 
current FiT regime amounts to a socially regressive tax, in that only those who 
can afford to invest in panels can benefit, while bill-payers of all means pay 
the costs. (e.g. Monbiot, 2010). Whether this is the case clearly depends on 
how the panels are financed, for example, purely by householders, by taking 
out loans, or through so-called rent-a-roof schemes, whereby third party 
organisations effectively lease panels in return for FiT and export revenues. 
For the majority of WREN-influenced PV installations in Wadebridge, panels 
were financed by householders themselves or through loans.  
The constituent costs of renewable installations vary across technologies and 
scales, and thus affect the impact of this spending on the local economy. For 
solar PV, small-scale installations (under 10kW), module and inverter (which 
are typically sourced from overseas) costs make up less than half of total 
installed costs, with the remainder being made up of fixings and other 
components, labour, scaffolding, transport and other overheads (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff, 2012) which can accrue locally. Therefore, since the favoured 
installers are local to Wadebridge it is likely that a significant proportion of 
local solar expenditure remained local to Wadebridge, and certainly within 
Cornwall. For those local installers focusing on small-scale PV installations, 
staff costs were identified as the single largest cost to operations (Interviews 8 
& 10). Similarly, for renewable heat technologies, labour costs average 
between 22 and 42 per cent of total installed costs depending on technology 
type (SWEETT, 2013), meaning that the majority of sales income for the 62 
WREN-led installations accrued local to Wadebridge. 
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The majority of domestic heat installations took place under the Renewable 
Heat Premium Payments Community (RHPP2) scheme, whose purpose was 
to encourage community-led deployment of renewable heat systems, 
specifically targeting middle to low income households and those off the gas 
network. While the scheme was relatively well taken-up by WREN, it was felt 
that the scheme did not work as well as it could in engaging lower income 
households (Clark 2013, pers comm).  
In addition to the above, WREN has also engaged with larger commercial-
scale installations both inside and outside of the study area. For example, the 
group facilitated, through garnering support, the repowering of a wind farm 
(replacement of eleven 450kW turbines with five 2MW turbines) in the west of 
the primary study area in St Breock, with the developers in turn identifying 
WREN as independent administrators of a community benefit fund worth 
£50,000/annum. As of Autumn 2015, WREN had also been appointed to 
administer funds from two other commercial projects in the area, highlighting 
the role of CE beyond influencing deployment. 
WREN is also currently working on plans to develop a medium-scale (>5MW) 
project to be funded through a local share offer. That there is a considerable 
membership suggests that there would be significant local interest in investing 
in such a project and it is likely that the requisite finance will be raised. The 
economic impact resulting from such an intervention would be substantial. 
6.1.5 Energy consumption 
Although it was not possible to determine significant changes in average 
household energy consumption resulting from WREN’s activities within the 
boundaries of this research, several observations can be made. Firstly, DECC 
estimates electricity and gas consumption data at LLSOA level (DECC, 
2014e), which, if analysed over a longer timeframe, may be useful in tracking 
accelerated changes in average consumption. The household-specific 
consumption data presented here provides a baseline against which 
longitudinal analysis could determine changes at a finer scale, although 
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longer timescales would likely be required to be able to ascertain significant 
changes. 
Outside of this study, WREN has begun to make steps to gather household-
scale data, both to help understand local energy consumption levels, and to 
explore the possibilities for demand reduction through behavioural change. 
Activities have included trialling smart meters in 100 households in the town, 
with a view to observing electricity consumption changes in real time, and 
collaborating with Cornwall Council to trial a localised smart grid through the 
Smart Cornwall programme and understand potential impacts.  
In terms of affecting change, WREN has sought to reduce household energy 
consumption through a variety of activities (a non-exhaustive summary is 
given in Table 6.2). These have generally focused on facilitating and 
supporting Government-funded efficiency installations, as well as information 
and efficiency awareness schemes.  
WREN has also sought to reduce household energy consumption through 
encouraging and supporting uptake of the CERT (Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target) programme, which wound up in Dec 2012. WREN 
partnered with an intermediary, CEP to publicise subsidised loft and cavity 
wall insulation. Of the 98 completed household installations, almost three 
quarters were in the immediate study area. Table 6.3 estimates household 
and total cost savings for the study area resulting from this programme. 
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Table 6.2 Financial impact of WREN-led CERT deployment in the study 
area 
 
cavity 
wall 
loft 
insulation both total 
Number of installations 7 36 29 72 
Reduction of gas consumption 
(%)42 7.8 1.7 9.4 
 Saving per household43  £23.17   £5.05   £27.92  
 Total annual savings  £162.16   £181.76   £809.62  £1,153.55  
Source: Installation rates courtesy of Jerry Clark (2013, pers comm); Also 
DECC (2013c) 
As with FiT uptake, it should be pointed out that some households signing up 
to CERT through WREN may have done so without their instigation, though 
this is difficult to quantify. It is likely however that WREN would have had the 
effect of accelerating uptake by administering it locally, and through raising 
awareness and communicating potential financial savings to householders.  
WREN has also sought to encourage adoption of electric vehicles by 
negotiating a £200 cash-back deal from local dealership, payable in the 
WREN local currency (see below). Ten such purchases have been made 
through this scheme. 
                                            
 
42 Based on weighted savings for all UK house types (rather than the actual house 
types). This table uses DECC (2013c) estimates of savings based on matched pairs 
of intervention and comparator properties of five house types for interventions 
undertaken in 2010, and differs markedly from other estimates from, for example the 
Energy Saving Trust 
43 Based on an average household gas expenditure of £297 as estimated in Chapter 
5. Using the average total heating costs (including oil, solid fuel etc) of £446 
increases the estimated total annual savings to £1732. 
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6.1.6 Other economic impacts 
The direct economic impact of WREN refers to forms of local financial capital 
spent, and created by WREN on employment and expenditure. Financial 
resources flow into WREN through grants, donations, finders’ fees and 
membership fees, and are spent either on procuring goods and services, or 
the creation of a community benefit fund44. Indirect economic impact can be 
defined as the impact on firms that (directly and indirectly) supply the activity 
identified as direct impacts (discussed above). For conventional commercial 
businesses this would typically include the spending on employees and the 
impact on local businesses arising from the firm’s expenditure. For CE, 
however, the focus is on distributing impacts rather than accumulating profits, 
so additional impacts should be considered, and in WREN’s case, the impact 
of business partnerships and community fund spending is of particular 
interest. 
At present a large proportion of the group’s income is in the form of grants 
from central Government, with smaller contributions from the Local Authority 
and the EU. Of externally sourced funds (those from outside of Cornwall), 
grants made up the vast majority in the year 2012-13 (Figure 6.3a) These 
have primarily been energy focused (administered through DECC), though 
several have been from rural support agencies (e.g EU Rural Development 
Fund; Defra), or indeed a combination of energy and rural-focused funds. The 
surplus, from donations, finder’s fees (commission from business referrals) 
and income from the use of the WREN currency45 is mostly sourced locally 
(from within Cornwall).  
                                            
 
44 Re-spending of the community benefit fund is considered an indirect impact 
45 10 per cent of each ‘WREN’ (the local currency) spent in the town comes accrues 
to WREN 
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Figure 6.3 a) WREN’s external and internally-sourced income and b) 
sources: 2012-13 
Source: Alexander (2013) 
While there is almost an even split between local and non-local income, the 
bulk of expenditure occurs locally (Figure 6.3b), with most being spent on 
rent, wages, subcontracting and professional fees. Minimal expenditure 
accrues outside of the locality, primarily on utilities and insurance. While 
WREN employs very few staff (two in 2012/13), subcontracting of individuals 
and businesses to undertake technical work relating to programme delivery 
and carrying out professional services (accountancy, auditing etc.) occurs 
local to Wadebridge, and is significant. It is perhaps expected that an 
organisation of this size would employ local rather than non-local individuals 
and services, though the ethos behind WREN as a driver of local economic 
resilience however makes this more certain. Indeed, since most human 
resources are contributed voluntarily, it is the presence of local skills and 
experience that ensure initiatives such as WREN are viable. CE is initially 
dependent on tapping into local skills, though can also have impact in terms of 
supporting the local economy via employment and augmenting the local skills 
base. 
While the contribution of volunteer time is clearly integral to the progress of 
CE group, it is difficult to quantify precisely this contribution. WREN estimates 
that in 2012/13 it benefitted from something in the region of 5000 hours. 
Valuing this voluntary time is similarly complex, not least because the skills 
contributed by different volunteers is highly varied. It should be noted however 
that many CE volunteers have considerable past experience and expertise 
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from which to draw from careers in technical, professional and management 
positions.  
Another way in which the group supports the local economy is through 
passing on leads to ‘preferred’ RE installers, procured and vetted by WREN. 
As noted previously, it is difficult to ascertain fully the impact of WREN in 
accelerating local RE deployment in total, as it is likely that many installations 
would have gone ahead without WREN’s interventions. What is likely is that 
RE deployment in the area has been catalysed, through for example 
facilitating knowledge about RE options and making introductions to favoured 
installers. One installer, while suggesting that WREN might not have had a 
huge impact on business, highlighted that the value of WREN as a trustworthy 
‘brand’ should not be underplayed: 
“[WREN was not] massively influential for what we did, but they were 
useful…if there were WRENs about everywhere there’d be a lot more 
renewable energy business” (Interview 9) 
Regardless of the scale of the impact, it seems likely that the customer leads 
helped to favour local installers over national competitors and thus 
concentrate overall spending on local rather than national goods and services. 
Due to strong competition between installers, particularly in the domestic solar 
market, customer acquisition is ever more important and can contribute 
considerably to overall installation costs: 
“…there is a difference between being busy and making money. We have a 
lot of people shouting at us to look at things, but its not like fitting gas boilers. 
People have wonderful ideas of holiday complexes and they want us to quote 
for this and that and in the end the groundwork cost 100 grand more than it 
should have been. In the end there’s quite a lot of renewables businesses for 
the money…You know, we win jobs off other people, but its very easy to lose 
work, very easy. We have to be very competitive. There’s a lot to look at but 
translating that into work is a challenge” (Interview 8) 
For several businesses, WREN acts as a useful trusted point of contact for 
prospective customers, removed from often-aggressive sales techniques seen 
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elsewhere in the microrenewables sector (Interviews 8,9 & 10). Indeed, it is 
likely that acting through intermediaries such as WREN can ease the labour 
and costs associated with customer acquisition, even when finders’ 
commission fees are taken into account. 
Aside from WREN’s energy-related activities, several parallel strands seek to 
retain the economic and social value of energy-related projects within the 
local community. One such strand is community benefit funds, which 
redistribute money towards a range of social, environmental, cultural and 
sporting projects in the local area. Several funds have been released to date, 
including WREN project-specific funds (arising directly from WREN’s projects) 
as well as local commercial-led projects that have used WREN to administrate 
annual community benefit funds locally. Up to late 2015, the former had 
released £10,000, and the latter £40,000. Additions of new commercial-
sourced funds means from 2015, annual payments of £70,000 will be made 
from three developments to local community groups. 
Funding has been used by recipients in a variety of ways, from covering the 
cost of project premises to supporting general running costs, most of which 
are sourced locally. One youth project used the fund to match another funding 
application to purchase a minibus, again sourced from a business in Cornwall. 
Although the sums involved for each beneficiary can be relatively small, they 
are well-received charities and other small organisations who are often reliant 
on such funds, particularly if they can be used to leverage additional funds 
from other sources. 
Another such strand is the WREN currency, the ‘Wren’ (Wr), which WREN 
issues for use as an alternative local currency. Wrens are printed by WREN, 
and distributed to the community as incentives for engaging in one of several 
WREN-based activities, including using WREN to act as intermediaries for 
Green Deal or RHI schemes, or switching electricity suppliers to a favoured 
energy supplier. As of August 2015, around 50 independent businesses in 
Wadebridge accept the currency, in return donating 10 per cent of all Wrens 
received back to the WREN community fund.  
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Such a scheme is likely to have several benefits across multiple dimensions, 
as discussed by Seyfang and Longhurst (2013). For example, social networks 
are strengthened, and civic participation rewarded; shorter supply chains are 
favoured, reducing transport emissions and better linking local consumption 
with local supply; and local trade is enhanced, resulting in both local multiplier 
effects and income for WREN to be reallocated in the community benefit fund. 
Further work would be needed to ascertain the actual value of this scheme to 
the local economy, although a positive net impact on the local economy is 
certain. 
Of course, as with all of WREN’s projects, while the local currency has a 
monetary focus, it is directed towards maximising social as well as economic 
benefits. As such, WREN (and most other CE groups) hold clear value in 
terms of being driven by progressive agendas, and providing the processes in 
place are fair and robust, are likely to garner local support in ways that 
commercial enterprises cannot. However, working from limited resources 
does mean that commercial firms can often facilitate some functions (such as 
RE deployment) more effectively, which raises questions around how energy 
policy can better value a broader and more progressive set of objectives. 
6.2 Conceptualising WREN’s impact  
Figure 6.4 conceptualises the range of potential local and immediate impacts 
on resources, economics, and society influenced by WREN’s activities. 
Building on the capitals approach outlined in Figure 6.1, this outlines the direct 
and indirect use of internal and external resources to create a set of goods 
and services. Such a framework emphasises a) the multiple dimensions of 
value stemming from WREN, and by extension other CE initiatives, b) the 
importance of the distinction (but inclusion) of direct and indirect impacts, and 
c) the duel importance of local value retention alongside wider societal value. 
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Figure 6.4 Framework of impacts 
In terms of the emphasis of multiple dimensions, this framework rejects the 
notion that community energy can be boiled down to crude metrics around 
only economics, or only renewables deployment. The strength of community 
energy is not just in the ability to deploy renewables, and do so with 
favourable economics, but to do so in a way that is sensitive to local contexts, 
and within local populations. Commercially deploying renewables is likely to 
be quicker and easier without engaging communities, although doing so 
would be far less likely to be valuable to local communities. In the context of 
the need for transformational change in the energy system, consideration of 
the social and political aspects of community energy – explored in the 
following two chapters – is at least as important as economic arguments. 
The inclusion of indirect impacts is central to the argument that CE initiatives 
and practices cannot be meaningfully separated from the populations within 
which they are embedded. These include effects that are likely to have taken 
place without WREN’s input, but which were catalysed by the existence, 
encouragement, or support of WREN and its activities, such as through peer 
influencing of innovation adoption and contributions to wider cultural shifts 
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towards a low carbon economy (Bale et al., McMichael and Shipworth, 2013, 
Michelsen and Madlener, 2013, Brohmann et al., 2007).  
The dual emphasis of the framework on local value retention alongside 
societal value is a departure from existing analyses of community energy, 
which tend to focus either on single projects or the whole sector. Considering 
both simultaneously captures the located, grassroots nature of community 
energy practice although recognises that this exists within the context of 
networking and learning with other groups and with the sector as a whole. 
This dimension also captures the importance of CE from a policy perspective 
in that sectoral impact arises not only from the aggregated impacts of groups, 
but also from the implications of the synergy between them, i.e. the value of 
CE as a dynamic, responsive, and innovative movement. 
This framework does not seek to offer simple answers, for example by 
presenting the monetary benefits of WREN, and indeed, it is argued that such 
analyses would be flawed in their understanding of the value of community 
energy. Rather, it seeks to provide an overview of the varied ways of 
assessing value, and provides a template for a wide range of stakeholders to 
consider a broad range of impacts and values from different perspectives. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter has conceptualised and analysed the impacts of WREN’s 
programme of activities. The first section set out a discussion around the 
concepts of impact as related to the dimensions, distribution and temporal 
nature of impact in community energy in general, and the WREN initiative 
more specifically, providing the framework onto which impact can be 
understood. It was established that the nature and complexity of CE and 
energy systems more generally requires a whole systems approach, taking 
into account multiple dimensions (physical, economic and social) 
simultaneously. Understanding how such impacts are distributed is 
considered key to providing a meaningful presentation of impact, not least 
because CE is often based on notions of equity and justice. The distribution of 
impacts across time was also discussed, with particular reference to potential 
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struggles between short term-objective-based analyses and longer-term 
observations of energy system evolution. 
The second section documented specific impacts resulting from WREN’s 
programme of activities. The group’s drivers, ambitions and approaches 
provided context and goes some way to explaining the trajectory of the 
group’s approaches as ways of addressing their objectives. WREN is having 
demonstrable impact on stimulating the deployment of small-scale PV and 
renewable heating the locality both directly as trusted intermediaries and 
indirectly through influencing and supporting deployment more widely. Some 
progress has also been made in addressing demand reduction, particularly as 
intermediaries between households and national programmes, though this is 
difficult to quantify. Although WREN does not yet own any RE infrastructure, 
the group has shown that even without ownership, there are considerable 
opportunities to tweak parts of the energy system so as to maximise local 
economic impact and improve the distribution of economic flows throughout 
the locality. 
This chapter discussed how WREN’s activities have altered the physical and 
economic aspects of the local energy system. The following chapter continues 
the discussion around impact by looking at social impacts, and in particular 
how WREN has impacted on, and been impacted by local human and social 
capital. 
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7 Social capitals and wellbeing within community energy 
The distribution of financial capital in WREN’s locality is a key objective to the 
group. However, the processes and outcomes taken by WREN (and CE more 
widely) are predicated on the availability and deployment of other forms of 
capital, rather than just financial. Human and social capitals are of particular 
importance in this regard, and indeed are defining characteristics of the 
‘community’ part of community energy. 
Some of the social impacts of community energy were explored in Chapter 6, 
and can be related to wellbeing directly, e.g. employment, or more efficient 
energy use in households. The collective nature of CE however implies 
intrinsic value in the collective nature of CE, i.e. that societal interaction is 
valuable in some sense. Indeed, as this chapter shows, CE is a product and a 
function of societal interaction in a number of different ways. So, while 
produced and financial capital resources were the focus of the last chapter, 
this chapter focuses on the value of people, i.e. human and social capital in 
community energy. 
Specifically, this chapter presents findings related to the importance of 
people-oriented capitals to WREN. It begins by introducing human and social 
capitals as useful terms for understanding the social element of CE. The role 
of human capital and bonding social capitals are then discussed in relation to 
the establishment and early development of WREN. The role of bridging 
capital is then explored with reference to WREN’s relationship with the 
broader community. Finally, the ways through which WREN has employed 
linking capital to establish and utilise links with influential individuals and 
organisations is related to the development of legitimacy and political agency. 
7.1 Conceptualising people-oriented capitals 
While the local creation and accumulation of physical and financial capital is 
of clear importance to the development of CE, progress towards CE goals on 
an individual as well as a sectoral level influences and is influenced by the 
establishment and growth of both human and social capital. To help 
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understand this, it is first necessary to conceptualise human and social capital 
in this regard. 
7.1.1 Human capital 
In an economic sense, human capital relates to “any stock of knowledge or 
characteristics a worker has (either innate or acquired) that contributes to his 
or her “productivity” (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In a broader sense, human 
capital is defined by the OECD as “the knowledge, skills, competencies and 
attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social 
and economic wellbeing” (OECD, 2001: 18). Since the focus of this chapter is 
on the social, rather than just the economic impacts of CE, this distinction is 
relevant.  
For example, the human element of CE is more than just as a factor of 
production. If a firm’s employees are merely resources from which profits can 
be derived, social enterprises in general seek to use human resources to 
leverage further human and social resources, and focus on wellbeing rather 
than economic productivity. In the specific case of WREN then, individual 
members make up a key resource with which CE projects can be imagined 
and carried out, as well as the beneficiaries of their actions. In the sense that 
most CE groups seek to create wealth in the form of self-sufficiency and wider 
wellbing of their communities, CE practitioners might be termed social 
‘entrepreneurs’ (Chell, 2007). 
Although human capital is usually taken to represent the stock of knowledge 
or skills of an individual acquired through education or experience, other 
personal characteristics such as confidence, optimism and resilience (often 
considered as psychological capital (Luthans et al., 2004)) are also of 
relevance here. 
7.1.2 Social capital 
Much has also been written about the concept, measurement and application 
of social capital. While the vast literature around social capital has explored a 
variety of definitions, the political scientist Robert Putnam described it as 
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“features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” (Putnam, 
2000). Kay (2003) further summarised six key components of social capital as 
trust; reciprocity and mutuality; shared norms of behaviour; shared 
commitment and belonging; formal and informal social networks; and effective 
information channels. As with financial or physical capital, social capital can 
be thought of as productive, existing as a ‘stock’ or ‘resource’ that can be 
drawn upon to meet certain goals. In the context of the current research, the 
broad goal of interest is that of the move to a sustainable energy system. 
Since the development of CE operates across scales from the micro to the 
macro, it is perhaps most appropriate to explore social capital issues across a 
commensurate range of scales. Gittel and Videl (1998) proposed two 
dimensions of social capital, bonding and bridging, which in turn relate 
networking within and between social networks. Bonding strengthens the 
connections between people who already know one another, while bridging 
connects strangers. Bonding social capital is useful for reinforcing existing ties 
and sharing internal resources, for example to help less fortunate members of 
a group, thus further promoting solidarity and reciprocity (Putnam, 2000). 
Bridging, on the other hand is most useful when external resources (including 
information) are useful, such as when seeking employment. In this case, weak 
social ties are more valuable as they provide channels to other individuals, 
particularly because these individuals move in different circles (Granovetter, 
1973).  
Further nuance can also be found within bridging capital to differentiate 
between the type of actors involved. The term linking capital has been used to 
describe relationships with those individuals and organisations not on equal 
footing, particularly if they hold power and/or influence (e.g. Putnam, 2000, 
Narayan-Parker, 1999, Woolcock, 1998, Harper and Kelly, 2003). In terms of 
community energy then, bonding capital is that present within CE groups, 
bridging capital is that between CE groups and others, such as the local 
community, while linking capital may be that between CE groups and 
policymakers, for example (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 Bonding, bridging and linking social capital 
As many of the impacts of WREN’s activities relate either directly or indirectly 
to the development and maintenance of human and social capital across 
these three dimensions, this section uses these dimensions as a framework 
on which to hang analyses of the social impacts of WREN. Understanding the 
roles of these dimensions is a key part in determining how better decision-
making (in policy as well as among CE practitioners) might better maximise 
the potential of the sector. 
7.2 Bonding social capital: setting a course 
Much of the literature on CE has emphasised the need for local knowledge, 
skills and leadership for the initial creation of groups, the development of 
agendas and putting ideas into action (Haggett et al., 2013, DECC, 2014b, 
Houghton, 2010, Martiskainen and Watson, 2009). This need for capacity 
within individuals is echoed in Government calls for, and the literature on, Big 
Society as a form of decentralising power. The entrance of the 2010 coalition 
Government and the advent of an era of austerity stimulated both short-term 
public sector cuts and widespread reform, as enshrined in the Localism Bill. 
Principles of reform included localising power and funding, increasing diversity 
of provision in public services, and supporting communities, individuals and 
volunteers to determine and participate in service provision (Treasury, 2010).  
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Despite criticisms around its delivery (Jones, 2011, Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2011), many agree that the underlying principle of rebalancing power is not 
unappealing, particularly as it concerns energy policy. Roberts (2011) asserts 
that such principles are central to meeting the energy challenges as it requires 
engagement of individuals, communities, business and all levels of 
Government. What is clear is that decentralisation of process implies the use 
and development of local skills and expertise, and a renewed capacity to work 
together. One of the main selling points of Big Society is thus that it helps to 
create and foster capacity within and among individuals, and that such 
enhanced capacity is self-reinforcing (King et al., 2010). Local groups thus 
both require human and social capital to come into being, and can maintain 
and nurture both forms of capital as they develop. 
7.2.1 Development of shared interests 
The importance of social capital to the evolution of WREN is evident from 
analysis of the history of the group. Like the majority of CE groups (Seyfang et 
al., 2013), WREN was formed by individuals, rather than being business or 
local authority-led, for example, in this case a handful of local business 
owners to oppose proposals for a fourth supermarket in Wadebridge early in 
2010. Bonding through a shared interest in retaining local economic 
resilience, two opponents to the supermarket established the ‘Love 
Wadebridge’ campaign, arguing that an additional supermarket would be 
detrimental to the local economy. While the founders of this campaign (who 
would later become WREN cofounders) had had little prior contact (let alone 
bonding), a set of shared interests was considered instrumental in bringing 
them closer together: 
“we only met a few days before we got into [the Love Wadebridge Campaign]. 
Weirdly, we met through my son, who’s a musician. He bumped into him at 
the folk festival because [the Chair] had been quite prominent at some things 
he had been playing at…and we got together through that really. We found 
we had lots of other shared interests (like green building) and so it went on 
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from there, and sort of a mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities” 
(Interview 1) 
This importance of shared interests, as a form of social capital, has been 
found to be the common thread among other successful social enterprises. 
Indeed, Evans (2003) document the influence of social capital on eight social 
enterprise case studies, and note that shared interests and values are a key 
determinant in helping groups to cohere and initiate social enterprises. While 
such shared interests were seen as highly influential in bringing core 
members together, it is worth highlighting that this was made possible through 
the connections made through informal social networks, in this case the local 
folk music scene.  
Cornwall Council eventually approved the supermarket plans in early 201146. 
By then, however, the common interests and values held by the group had 
been strengthened through pursuing a common goal, and the group had been 
successful in strengthening the core group and building a wider network of 
supporters. When DECC rolled out the small-scale FiT in April 2010 the core 
group’s momentum helped it to reconfigure the focus from local food to local 
energy. While the goods and services demanded from food and energy 
systems are clearly different, the parallels (e.g. centralised incumbent 
infrastructures, few market leaders, vertical integration) meant that the 
interests held by Love Wadebridge were already aligned with that of its 
successor, WREN, with the focus being on local economic resilience through 
sustainable consumption. 
The shared interests, and later, the shared experiences gained during the 
Love Wadebridge campaign provided a valuable prototype through which the 
foundations of trust and reciprocity could be built and tested. Putnam 
proposed that this kind of sustained contact is needed, in order to build the 
                                            
 
46 The supermarket subsequently pulled out of the development and as of August 
2014 no further plans were in place. 
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relationships, but importantly, to be able to experience first hand the benefits 
of social capital. (Putnam, 2000, Gittell and Vidal, 1998). That the 
supermarket campaign itself was not a success was irrelevant; by then the 
core group of WREN had a shared satisfaction from simply working together 
and strengthening relationships.  
7.2.2 Expanding membership 
As already noted, CE groups are most likely to succeed if they are able to tap 
into local human capital, specifically in terms of the particular sets of 
knowledge, skills and experience relevant to setting up social enterprises in 
general and engaging with energy issues more specifically. Of the 14 
directors, and particularly the fewer core members, the range and 
complementarity of knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes was seen 
as instrumental to the functioning of WREN as a coherent and coordinated 
enterprise, as highlighted in these two quotes from a board member 
“My role is more along the lines of making the things that do come to fruition 
actually work, and it’s not just the two of us… John is brilliant on how 
cooperatives work and all the fuel poverty elements…then we’ve got Pete on 
board who’s good at drawing all the strands together and making sure we’re 
not doubling up on work. We’ve got 14 directors all together.” 47  
(Interview 1) 
Of importance here is the perceived value in the range of human capital 
WREN draws upon, and in particular the balance between the capacity to set 
the agenda and overarching vision, facilitating often quite technical activities, 
and organising a diverse programme of CE-related activities. Of course, such 
a range of capabilities and experience would be common to any well-
functioning (for-profit) business, the lack of resources and specialist nature of 
CE might suggest that drawing such a range from a potentially small 
                                            
 
47 Names have been changed 
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geographical area would be challenging (Harris and Kor, 2013). However, 
there is evidence to suggest that since social enterprises are typically more 
resource scarce and have weaker institutional structures, human resources 
therein often demonstrate quicker knowledge and skill acquisition, increased 
flexibility, creativity, entrepreneurial drive and strong intrinsic motivation (Miller 
et al., 2012). Additionally, the absence of monetary incentives for staff (the 
majority of WREN directors are volunteers rather than employees) suggests 
that social incentives such as shared norms and belonging, trust and 
reciprocity are more important in acquiring and maintaining human resources 
in CE48. 
So, while individual human capitals are both required for and developed by 
effective CE groups (or indeed any organisation), social capitals, and 
particularly bonding social capital, are key to ensuring that these components 
work well together by reinforcing relationships and sharing resources. 
Importantly, Putnam (2000) notes that such a process is self-reinforcing, in 
that simply working together towards a common goal serves to bind the group 
further: even if the group is comprised of people from different backgrounds, 
shared norms, the trust and reciprocity fostered simply by working together 
help to strengthen ties.  
For several reasons bonding social capital is likely to be especially important 
within CE organisations. Firstly, the time and expertise offered by group 
members is more often than not voluntary, meaning that members 
presumably trust others to pull their weight and offer reciprocal resources in 
kind. Labour may be free, but is not necessarily worthwhile if it is 
counterproductive in terms of meeting the objectives of the group as a whole. 
Secondly, most CE groups also require (initially at least) financial backing as 
                                            
 
48 Of course, such rewards are also needed for one to be satisfied in an employed 
position, but are perhaps more likely to influence behavior where conventional salary 
rewards are not present, as in social enterprises. 
204 
 
 
well as time resources from members to help with buying essential resources 
and ensure projects get to a point where they are self sustaining. Again trust 
and reciprocity are considered central in ensuring these initial investments are 
not unduly at risk from freeloading, irresponsible, or members who otherwise 
risk that investment. In WREN’s case, six directors were directly and 
substantially financially invested in the organisation. Finally, as discussed 
previously, the range of possible directions a given CE group can take is as 
varied as the possible approaches to meet such challenges, so agreement on 
specific missions and agendas can be valuable. Thus, shared commitment to 
a particular set of causes, and effective communication in addressing 
objectives is important.  
Within the sociotechnical transition literature, trust and the localness that 
supports it, has found to be of importance for experimentation in niche 
projects. Coenen et al (2010) in particular notes that geographical proximity 
(or physical closeness of actors) is most likely to encourage social networking 
and help to foster trust through mutuality and reciprocity. This trust (or social 
proximity) built through mutual experiences and kinship is vital in articulating 
expectations among niche experimenters (WREN members, in this case): 
developing promises of future benefits helps to attract interest and mobilise 
resources, and sets the agenda and writes the script that positions and 
influences others. Importantly, Coenen et al. (2010) find that such 
expectations have been found to be most powerful when they describe 
tangible rather than abstract outcomes (e.g. such as reduced household 
energy costs), and when they are specific rather than general (e.g. describing 
a process of energy-related activities rather than a utopian vision). 
Additionally, a variety of studies have demonstrated that niche expectations 
are most powerful when shared by an increasing number and variety of actors 
(Coenen et al., 2010, Borup et al., 2006, Brown, 2003, Smith et al., 2005). In 
the case of WREN, shared expectation can be considered as key to the 
strength of group: key decisions are unlikely to be made without mutual 
understanding of the potential benefits and vision of the outcomes. 
Additionally, the increasing levels of membership within WREN are 
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considered testament to the local legitimacy of the group. While it may not be 
explicit, becoming a WREN member implies support for, and a sharing of the 
group’s overall vision and specific agenda.  
7.3 Bridging capital: Broadening the appeal of community energy 
The importance of human and social capital within community energy groups 
extends outside of the boundaries of the group and into the wider 
communities in which they seek to encourage change. As already stressed, 
the ways in which the local community values a local energy approach will be 
in part down to the impacts of economic and energy resource changes affect 
people, but will also be affected how social impacts are felt. Indeed, these 
impacts will be especially important if more tangible impacts (such as locally 
reduced electricity costs, employment etc.) are not immediate. If bonding 
capital can be recognised as a key component in the development of WREN 
as a niche actor, ‘bridging’ capital is arguably equally as important in helping 
to legitimise the niche within the wider population. 
Niche innovations are “carried and developed by small networks of dedicated 
actors, often outsiders or fringe actors” (Geels and Schot, 2007). The growth 
of these networks in terms of increased local support is thus critical to niche 
development. In the case of the CE niche, bridging capital can be understood 
as those links between those inside, and those outside, of the core body of 
CE group members, through which resources external to the original group 
can be secured. 
Furthermore, while the 14 directors of WREN can be considered as bonded 
(through trust, reciprocity etc.), it is bridging capital that brought them together 
in the first place. WREN’s initial vision can be traced back to two members, 
and it was their ability to attract and bring into the fold other, previously 
unconnected individuals that formed what is now known as WREN, especially 
those whose skills and expertise could augment WREN’s existing human 
resources. Indeed, while local skills are important for setting up CE projects in 
the first place, the absence of local skills may not limit the potential for 
success. For example, Haggett et al (2013) found that while local skills do 
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provide confidence and a can-do attitude to get things off the ground, in-
house knowledge does not guarantee success and many other factors come 
into play not least being able to identify gaps in expertise and making the 
necessary links to external human resources. 
7.3.1 Developing local legitimacy 
Secondly, as stated in the original WREN business plan, a key objective of 
the group is to engage the whole population of Wadebridge in energy issues. 
Forging meaningful links with members of the community is thus considered 
by the group to be a measure of success. This is important in itself: making 
progress towards the energy challenges in general necessarily requires 
widespread engagement of publics, and so engaging whole communities such 
as Wadebridge may be an important step. The importance of engagement to 
WREN is also in part a practical consideration, since support and buy-in from 
the wider community suggests a degree of legitimacy. Indeed, some of the 
findings that came out of the household energy survey suggested that some 
local residents remained unconvinced about the potential benefits of local 
decision-making, citing fears about not being representative of the community 
at large. 
There is a balance then to be struck between bonding and bridging social 
capital. If too much resource is spent on building bonding capital (by simply 
running projects without expanding membership), there is a risk of becoming 
too insular and neglecting the outside community (Putnam, 2000). Spending 
time developing bridging capital would ensure inclusivity and 
representativeness, but may limit the resources available for actually carrying 
out projects. 
Again, trust is an important factor in making links with members of the 
community. As highlighted in the Chapter 5, some household energy survey 
respondents were automatically sceptical of WREN’s intentions because of 
the perceived potential for WREN’s activities to bear winners as well as 
losers. While it is perhaps inevitable that we will have winners and losers in 
efforts to change the energy system, this only makes it more important that 
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the group demonstrates adherence to certain principles such as fairness and 
transparency in the ways it pursues goals. In this sense then, process may in 
some sense be more important than progress, i.e. building legitimacy through 
membership and trust is a necessary prerequisite to actually making changes 
on the ground, with large-scale RE installations for example. 
7.3.2 Broadening the appeal 
While much of WREN’s investment in bridging capital is focused around 
developing knowledge, support and activity around energy projects, it is also 
possible for bridging capital to be developed without directly engaging people 
with energy issues. This is especially valuable since doing so offers 
alternative routes into bringing the community together. One such approach 
(common in many CE initiatives) is through WREN’s community benefit fund, 
which seeks to channel profits into a variety of community-related projects. 
The fund is open to any community project that can demonstrate how 
additional funds would help the local community, meaning that financial 
benefits accrued through energy projects are disseminated across the local 
community. While a proportion of the population indicated wilful 
disengagement from participating directly in CE (Section 5.5), it could be 
argued that the fund enhances the relevance of CE to those individuals, i.e. 
by making clear that WREN is concerned with community as much as it is 
about energy. Certainly it provides the community with a real and near-
immediate stream of benefits resulting from CE, itself an important factor in 
developing trust in WREN’s activities as already discussed. 
Additionally, depending on where the fund is awarded it has the potential to 
bridge the divide between energy issues and wellbeing, as all beneficiaries 
are directly or indirectly involved in addressing local social issues, although 
this was not a prerequisite of obtaining funds. However, several interviewees 
from beneficiary groups highlighted that their organisation’s activities 
extended past their formal remit, meaning that incoming funds have the 
potential to have multiple, and often socially-directed impacts. These include 
formal and informal support roles. For example, the local food bank also 
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provides a “free hot drink, a listening ear and additional support where needed 
to break the cycle of poverty” (Interview 16). An interviewee from the marine 
conservation group meanwhile stated how important participating (in the 
group) was for some volunteers, particularly for elderly individuals who were 
dealing with ill health and bereavement (Interview 14). For other organisations 
funds had spillover impacts to other groups: the youth group minibus whose 
purchase was supported by WREN funds was also to be used by the local 
Age Concern organisation, as a potential lifeline to isolated rural households 
(Interview 15). 
That social organisations have the propensity and capacity to support other 
social organisations is important in itself. All of the groups contacted 
emphasised that funding in general was extremely difficult to come by and 
required considerable resources to seek funding sources and fill out 
applications. One saw attracting funds as a “full-time job”, meaning that 
receiving the WREN fund allowed the group to breathe and stop fundraising 
for a while (Interview 14). Another group highlighted that the fund was vital in 
helping to attract and snowball additional match funding. With one key goal of 
most groups being to become self-sustaining to help focus on key goals, this 
peer-to-peer support of social organisations is extremely important, and the 
role of WREN and other CE groups in this regard cannot be disregarded.  
Aside from through the community benefit fund, WREN has sought to engage 
with a wide range of community members from children, through talking to 
school classes to the business community through being active in the town’s 
chamber of commerce. Additionally, the group’s premises (the “Energy Shop”) 
in Wadebridge’s town centre serves as a visible and accessible manifestation 
of the group’s readiness to bridge the group-community divide. Indeed, the 
shop is somewhat unique in that it provides a place for energy issues, which 
can be both complicated as well as sensitive, to be discussed in confidence. 
Some use the shop as a first point of contact in enquiring about domestic RE 
installations, and is valued as a neutral provider of information amid a 
potentially otherwise confusing landscape. Others are able to discuss 
209 
 
 
concerns about energy costs and indeed, more general issues related to 
inadequate, poorly insulated housing and their effects on wellbeing: 
“This particular chap it was more to do with the state of the house. There was 
mould growing up all the walls, and I could see looking at the photographs 
what some of the problems were. There was clearly an issue with the gutter 
that was probably blocked or overflowing, and that was causing damp on the 
inside, and some serious condensation issues. It was probably 70s built social 
housing…not ancient. Definitely got a cavity, probably not cavity insulation. If 
we have to embarrass the council into getting it done, then that’s a shame” 
(Interview 1) 
While the issues described here of general housing quality, the links to 
heating and home comfort are clear, and for this person the Energy Shop was 
seen as a sensible source of advice and providing a service that others had 
not seemed to be able to. The accessibility of the shop is likely influential in 
facilitating bridging interaction with Wadebridge residents. Indeed, it means 
that WREN has the capacity to develop bridging capital passively whilst still 
actively engaging the community through other means. Trust, as already 
mentioned, is extremely important in building bridging capital: the individual 
referred to in the passage above exhibited trust in WREN to help address 
issues with his home, for example. Additionally, the shop itself provides both a 
hub for social networks and a conduit for effective information channels, and 
both, along with trust seen as vital components of social capital. 
7.4 Linking capital: reforging local energy governance 
WREN and its impacts do not exist in isolation. Rather, it is part of a wider 
network of grassroots CE initiatives operating in the context of both support 
and hindrance on the part of political institutions at local, regional and national 
levels including Government departments (notably DECC), Ofgem as energy 
regulators, the DNO (Western Power Distribution) and Cornwall Council 
departments (primarily economic development and planning). The ability of 
WREN (and other CE groups) to relate to and negotiate with these kinds of 
institutions is vital if CE is to have any future. 
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Linking capital in the current context then refers to the relationships WREN 
forms and develops with those institutions that hold influence over WREN, 
and indeed the wider CE sector. If bonding and bridging capital are about 
‘getting by’, and ‘getting ahead’ in life, linking capital is concerned with making 
things happen by creating rather than merely taking opportunities. This is 
especially important in the context of the energy system, as incumbents 
actively oppose and constrain the actions of new entrants and new business 
models.  
Sector learning is understood to develop through the networking (linking) of 
niche actors with sector intermediaries, in terms of the abstraction of local 
lessons towards more general principles (Kemp et al., 1998, Schot and Geels, 
2008). Furthermore, direct networking can also take place between 
practitioners and incumbents, such as policymakers, creating opportunities for 
aligning practices with policy, and vice versa. In this context, linking capital 
and the opportunities it affords are important factors in initiating whole system 
change. 
7.4.1 Building supportive niche networks 
With reference to sociotechnical transition theory, the strength of actor 
networks is an important factor in determining the form, direction and rapidity 
of transition (Schot and Geels, 2008). For example, an increased number of 
engaged participants both from within the niche and in supporting 
organisations contribute to the articulation of pressures which challenge 
incumbent actors to support burgeoning movements (Smith et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the interaction between niche actors and incumbents is 
important in terms of guiding and shaping transitions, particularly by aligning 
expectations and sharing of resources between stakeholders, including 
information (Rotmans et al., 2001, Kemp et al., 1998) 
Niche-regime interactions can play out as direct or indirect processes. In 
documenting the emergence of CE intermediaries, Hargreaves and fellow 
authors chart three distinct ‘waves’ responding to a shifting funding and policy 
landscape (Hargreaves et al., 2013): 
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• A first wave of pre-1990s organisations (e.g. Centre for Alternative 
Technologies, Centre for Sustainable Energy) focused on encouraging 
alternative (or ‘appropriate’) technologies and the ‘soft energy paths’ 
they can facilitate; 
• A second wave comprising organisations (e.g. the Energy Savings 
Trust and Community Renewables Initiative-supported regional 
initiatives) to manage spending of public funds; 
• A third wave of independent organisations and wider interest from think 
tanks and NGOs to provide support and advice to the burgeoning CE 
sector, largely stimulated by the emergence of FiTs and RHIs for small-
scale developers  
The current structure of CE intermediaries comprise all three layers, each 
supporting CE within the context of their own contexts (Ibid). While the first 
wave, which were driven largely by the appetite for self sufficiency and 
different approaches to technologies, the next two waves were supported by 
central Government, first under New Labour’s new-localism and latterly 
through the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition’s Big Society agenda, 
and it is in these waves that CE has gained mainstream momentum. This 
suggests that while CE is viewed as ‘grassroots’, the development of the 
sector has both been helped by and acted as a catalyst for the growth of a 
supportive network of intermediaries49.  
Such a network of intermediaries is considered central to the development of 
CE as a niche, not least because it establishes what Geels and Deuten (2006) 
term the ‘creation of institutional infrastructure’, which enables the “gathering 
and interaction of actors, the exchange of experiences and the organisation of 
collective action” (Ibid). Hargreaves et al (2013) also highlight the role of 
                                            
 
49 While it is true that most CE groups can be described as grassroots, i.e. self 
starting, most would agree that external support (particularly financial opportunities 
afforded by the FiT) have been critical in their development 
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intermediaries as extending to brokering and managing interactions with other 
actors, including energy companies, developers and policymakers. This role is 
seen as an important step towards mainstreaming CE, either through drawing 
interest and finance from private developers or by lobbying Government for 
changes to CE-related policy or wider energy policy reform. Either way, the 
creation and development of these networks both contribute towards a form of 
directional coherence through an articulation of selection pressures (Smith et 
al., 2005) in such a way as to negotiate with and challenge the incumbent 
regime. 
The relationships between CE and outside actors are developed over local as 
well as national scales. Locally, WREN formed alliances with a number of key 
organisations (and the human capital therein) that helped to strategize, plan 
and implement activities. These included Green Trust Wind/Communities for 
Renewables (a CE-focused social enterprise who has provided assistance 
with technical and financial aspects of projects), Community Energy Plus (a 
local energy-focused charity with experience in administering efficiency 
measures). Existing links with the town council and the Chamber of 
Commerce were instrumental in attracting support from local decision-makers 
and the business community.  
7.4.2 Niche-policy advocacy 
For some groups, including WREN, affecting the politics of energy is as 
important as affecting local energy systems and indeed, evidence suggests 
that such work is important part of niche development (Smith et al., 2015, 
Smith et al., 2014).  
For example, WREN’s presence and relationship with individuals and 
institutions from outside of the network have been important in moving 
forward the CE conversation as a whole. Of primary significance is WREN’s 
representation on the Community Energy Contact Group (CECG), a 
practitioner focus group established by Greg Barker to identify and address 
the needs of CE groups across the country in the context of Localism and 
exploring the opportunities for communities to play a “significant role in the 
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transformation of the UK energy systems” (DECC, 2014a). The group set the 
agenda and significantly fed into the Government’s first Community Energy 
Strategy (DECC, 2014b). For DECC, the contact group established a single, 
manageable point of contact for the sector, though there is evidence that for 
some CE groups, the reduction of CE to a single voice was seen as relenting 
again to a minority-led top-down agenda (Hargreaves et al., 2013). 
It is not incidental that all of the founding members of the CECG representing 
CE groups occupied (or had previously occupied) executive or senior 
positions in their fields, only some of which were energy or sustainability-
related. Additionally, several held positions either in or well aligned with policy, 
including the WREN representative, who held a senior position in the NHS. 
Such experience and competence was felt to be of considerable value in 
being able to speak at an appropriate level: 
“He’s very good at picking up on new angles and very good at tapping into the 
right people, partly because of the positions he’s been in in the past, dealing 
with Government ministers.” (Interview 1) 
While it is not clear that the ability to network was a prerequisite for joining the 
CECG, it doubtlessly helped, not least in having the capacity to converse 
around complex issues. This high level of competence and ability to engage 
at a high level is undoubtedly related to human capital, not least educational 
attainment. There does appear to be a correlation between human capital and 
(the ability to nurture) social capital: CE leaders are often well educated and 
often have many years of experience in a professional capacity, making them 
well disposed to the importance of directed and purposive social networking. 
While this relationship makes sense in terms of building linking capital, it is 
less clear that this extends to all forms of social capital, particularly when 
class stratification is considered. For example, Gamernikow (2003) 
documents disagreement in the literature around whether social capital is an 
inevitable outcome of education itself, or if it is a sign of social and 
educational advantage, i.e. whether social capital is embedded in, and 
contributes to the reproduction of, social stratification. 
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WREN has also been active within local policy circles, with the group’s 
progress lauded by Cornwall Council as something of a regional exemplar. 
While such a relationship has proved mutually beneficial, some interviewees 
indicated concern that this meant that the Council was neglecting the needs of 
other CE groups, who also may have been making progress but who didn’t 
have the presence of WREN. On one hand, this use of linking capital was 
thus seen as a potential threat (to other groups), but on the other placing 
WREN on a pedestal meant that that it was in danger of becoming “too big to 
fail”, i.e. that as long as WREN - as something of a flagship scheme - was 
supported, CE in the region more generally more generally would be safe. 
It is in issues such as these that the micro-political aspects of CE come to the 
fore. Several interviewees stated that despite the intricacies of technologies, 
planning, and economics, the success or failure of CE all hinges on personal 
relationships (Interviews 2 & 11). Such relationships are necessarily both 
strategic and political in nature, and require a strong set of leadership and 
personality competencies. Bridging and linking social capital is then key to 
navigating the politics (at both national and local scales) of energy system 
change, not least because of the importance of local support and acceptance 
of technologies, managing stakeholder expectations, and the balancing of 
democratic participation and autocratic action. It is no surprise then that 
community energy in any given region is likely to be made up of a handful of 
key stakeholders who lead local CE efforts and act as stalwarts for energy 
system change. While CE is often considered to be about people power, it is 
powerful people, i.e. a small number of leaders, who appear to be 
instrumental in shaping and driving change. 
Aside from engaging with political processes, interacting with the Distribution 
Network Operators (DNOs) is seen by some commentators to be of 
fundamental importance in addressing the challenges associated with the 
installation of medium-large scale RE (Simonds and Hall, 2013). This is 
particularly important where there are grid constraints (such as in Cornwall) 
especially as commercial developers have the resources to be able to move 
quickly and saturate available grid capacity, either by themselves or through 
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consortia building to fund grid upgrades (Communities for Renewables, 2013). 
The relative infancy of CE in the UK means that such technical and 
institutional barriers are commonplace, and that dialogue between CE 
practitioners and intermediaries and incumbents, such as DNOs, the regulator 
and the Government are required to identify and overcome these issues. 
WREN has made important steps in this regard by initiating collaborative links 
with the DNO as well as other organisations with interest in strengthening the 
local energy system. 
However, it is not only engagement with those in levels of authority and 
influence that is important. Indeed, the importance of engagement within 
multiple actor networks is a key theme across the CE sector, meaning that 
linking capital is a necessity rather than an ancillary attribute for CE 
practitioners. For example Seyfang et al. (2012) survey of 354 groups 
highlights that the opportunities afforded by outside organisation networking 
was seen as the second most success factor only to the group’s own 
qualities50.  
Networking in this context referred to a broad set of relationships with Local 
Authorities, other CE groups, businesses, schools, NGOs/charities, and 
National Government Departments, and making links with a range of 
organisations is likely to require a breadth of skillsets. In WREN’s case, there 
was a clear division of labour among directors between networking tasks: for 
example, a director who had existing contacts within the local business 
enterprise community was charged with managing relationships with local 
businesses, while another director with a background in finance could liaise 
directly with finance-oriented intermediaries. 
                                            
 
50  
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7.5 Leadership 
Although social capital is clearly central to the processes and outcomes of 
community energy, the creation and momentum of CE is fundamentally 
underpinned by human capital. Indeed, given the multiple layers of barriers 
CE groups face, the importance of human capital for CE in general has been 
highlighted elsewhere (e.g. see (Haggett et al., 2013, DECC, 2014b, 
Houghton, 2010, Martiskainen and Watson, 2009), and leadership itself has 
been identified as an important factor in successful CE projects (Seyfang et 
al., 2012, van der Horst, 2008). 
The range of competencies required of CE groups is vast, and depending on 
the context can require expertise in community engagement, website 
development and social media, technical issues, finance and accounting, 
project management, business planning, planning and legal issues, and 
project evaluation (DECC, 2014b). However, it is the manifestation of 
personal qualities in the leadership of CE groups that influences the speed 
and direction of CE efforts, and consequently the movement as a whole. 
Three key roles of CE leadership can be identified in relation to human and 
social capital: group formation, maintenance of momentum and niche policy 
advocacy. 
7.5.1 Group formation 
While community energy groups may ostensibly be run by the ‘community’, 
the role of influential leadership in these groups, and in the sector as a whole 
cannot be understated. As with WREN, around 60 per cent of groups are set 
up by individuals (Seyfang et al., 2013) meaning that the majority of groups 
were reliant on the one or two individuals to act on perceived failings and 
opportunities within the energy system and be both willing and able to draw in 
form a group to draw other members to the cause. This suggests the need for 
considerable human capital in terms of the knowledge needed to be able to 
identify problems and potential solutions in the form of a local vision, the 
ability to encourage and mobilise others, and the will, determination and 
tenacity to drive ideas towards tangible outcomes. 
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Vision creation is particularly important here, as it helps to create a salient 
narrative around local issues, enlightening others to problems, and 
establishes expectations around the benefits to be gained from acting, both of 
which are considered important processes in niche development (Hargreaves 
et al., 2013, Coenen et al., 2010, Kemp et al., 1998). While a group’s vision 
can be shaped by process of negotiation, for some groups, the vision of key 
individuals (as discussed in Section 7.2.2) was instrumental in guiding the rest 
of the group 
7.5.2 Maintenance of momentum 
In such a challenging, resource-scarce environment, the need for optimism 
and determination was considered vital in taking projects from inception to 
delivery, as highlighted here: 
“You need to believe that you’ll find a way through anything…sooner or later. 
People might say “what’s your business plan?. You shouldn’t be doing this if 
there’s not a business plan.”…And we say…we will find a way through it.” 
(Interviewee 3) 
For this participant in a burgeoning CE group, faith, determination and vision 
was considered more important than other forms of capital, the sentiment 
being that without such traits, other key pieces of organisational or financial 
capital that would be needed to take their project to the next level could never 
be attracted. Where benefits can be social rather than financial, value must be 
believed in and promised by creating a ‘market of expectations’ (Kemp et al., 
1998) before it can be realised. 
Previous portrayals of CE practitioners as ‘retired engineers’ sought to 
communicate the importance of time-rich, technically minded tinkerers in 
driving the sector (IET, 2013). However, while understanding and overcoming 
technical challenges might be important, they are likely to be secondary to 
more fundamental attributes such as determination and belief, and the ability 
to form and communicate a vision, attributes which may be more difficult to 
‘buy in’ than technical expertise. 
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In WREN, several directors made clear that the group Chair was instrumental 
in identifying opportunities and holding the Group’s overall vision, and that 
there was a process of the rest of the board “catching up” with the next big 
idea: 
He (the Chair) doesn’t necessarily set the agenda, but he does have the 
vision to see the agenda in the first place. Sometimes I think “what’s this one 
about?”…a couple of days later I get it, and off we go. (Interview 1) 
This suggests that considerable faith was placed in the Chair in identifying 
opportunities and appropriate pathways for moving forward, a position. The 
relationship between the Chair and the other board members was clearly then 
one of trust: Trust by the board (and indeed the wider community) in the 
various strategies and approaches presented, and trust by the Chair in the 
board to be capable of being able to deliver this vision.  
7.6 Summary 
This chapter explored the concepts of human and social capital, and 
discussed their importance in relation to the development of WREN. In 
summary, the chapter suggested that human capital, along with three types of 
social capital: bonding, bridging and linking have all played significant roles in 
WREN’s evolution.  
Bonding around common interests and goals around energy can be related to 
previous learning and relationship building around a previous project. The 
appeal of these interests and values were also instrumental in bringing in a 
core membership with a range of valuable experience and expertise. 
Legitimacy within the community is shown to have been dependent on the 
availability and deployment of bridging capital, which for WREN has been 
achieved by broadening the appeal of the programme, by, for example 
making energy relevant to wider needs and aspirations of the community. 
WREN’s ability to gain political legitimacy within both local and national 
government is related to linking capital and associated human capital 
attributes. Finally, leadership is discussed in relation to the importance of 
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specific personal qualities in forming and maintaining momentum in CE’s 
evolution. 
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8 The growth and diversification of community energy in the UK 
Of course, over the course of this research, WREN has not developed in a 
vacuum; it has evolved in parallel with a multitude of other CE groups across 
the UK, with the growth of citizen-led energy more generally, and within the 
context of (and in response to) considerable changes to the energy system 
and to energy policy in general. Moreover, the impacts of the sector are not 
only local, but have national consequences in terms of both the aggregation of 
local impacts, and the broader evolution of the sector to comprise an 
increasing diversity of actors, approaches and impacts. 
While no sector-wide quantification of impacts has been carried out, impacts 
of the kinds discussed here, and of similar magnitudes have been 
experienced in hundreds if not thousands of other localities. Moreover, the 
growth in the number, size and impact of CE during the course of this 
research has influenced and has been influenced by growing support from a 
range of actors, including civil society, intermediaries, business communities, 
local authorities. Recognition of the sector by national government has come 
in the form of the development of the UK’s first Community Energy Strategy 
This chapter thus moves on from analysis of a single project to consider the 
impacts of the community energy sector, as well as of citizen-oriented energy 
as more broadly defined. It first offers a critique into the importance and of 
expectations, networks and learning as three elements considered in the 
transition literature as critical to the development of niche innovations. 
Recognising that CE does not develop in a vacuum, it then discusses how 
ongoing change in the broader context of the energy system is opening up 
opportunities for both CE, particularly through the process of the 
democratisation of energy. The chapter concludes with reflections on how 
other actors beyond the traditional CE niche are adapting to these 
opportunities, particularly as a response to pioneering approaches taken by 
CE actors. 
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8.1 Consolidating approaches, aggregating impact  
In seeking to understand the aggregative impact of local projects on wider 
sociotechnical change, Strategic Niche Management (SNM) offers one 
analytical perspective. This approach emphasises the role of networking and 
social learning in reinforcing positive expectations around an innovation 
(Hoogma et al., 2001, Kemp et al., 1998, Schot and Geels, 2008). Community 
energy thus represents an innovation whereby aggregation of impacts and 
learning from local experiments contributes to a ‘global’ level of shared rules, 
which are then abstracted and disseminated back down to niche actors via 
intermediaries (Seyfang et al., 2014, Hargreaves et al., 2013), culminating in 
the standardisation and institutionalisation towards a more efficient innovation 
trajectory (Kemp et al., 1998, Geels and Raven, 2006, Geels and Deuten, 
2006). 
 
Figure 8.1 Local projects, global rules, and an emerging innovation 
trajectory 
Previous work, notably Seyfang et al (2014) has sought to understand the 
growth CE with respect to SNM. Specifically, these authors considered three 
factors identified by the transition literature as influencing the direction and 
outcome of niche development: expectations, networks and learning. This 
section reflects on these findings and critically examines the use of SNM as 
an appropriate analytical framework for understanding CE 
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8.1.1 Developing expectations around community energy 
In order for community energy to progress from isolated projects to a coherent 
niche, they must first demonstrate value to those stakeholders able to 
influence its evolution. However, since niche innovations are, by definition not 
market ready, they do not have current market value and must instead rely on 
promises that future performance is valuable (Kemp et al., 1998). As such, 
niche formation and development is dependent on the ability of stakeholders 
to understand and realise expectations around the benefits of an innovation. 
Niche formation in other words is reliant on the development of a ‘market of 
expectations’ (Ibid) around an innovation, thus making the evolution of which 
a self-fulfilling prophecy (Geels and Deuten, 2006). 
The stakeholders within CE of course spans a wide range of actors capable of 
influencing the trajectory of the movement, including CE practitioners 
themselves, but also the business community, intermediaries, policymakers, 
and civil society. Such actors can either exert influence positively or 
negatively, i.e. a local population supporting or opposing a CE development, 
or a Government department enabling or constraining local ownership of 
energy assets. Furthermore, influence can be imposed both directly, through 
the deployment by DECC of a CE-directed policy mechanism for example, or 
indirectly, through increased support for large-scale generation with 
opportunity costs relevant to small-scale technology deployment.  
However, while UK energy policy has so far been supportive of RE 
deployment in general, CE has developed in spite of rather than because of 
directed support for the movement. This has been explained by the inability of 
the Government to recognise value in the non-market goals of community 
energy in ways that civil society can, perhaps because of the dominant market 
paradigm that defines current Government. For policymakers to support 
community energy, it must simply be able to demonstrate cost-effective 
delivery of energy policy goals, which clearly ignores the wider benefits it can 
offer, for example to social innovation or transformational change. 
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Professionalization of parts of the movement go some way to satisfying the 
expectations of policymakers. Under such professionalization, robust 
business plans are central to identifying and communicating visions and 
deliverables; stakeholder confidence is central to local legitimacy; and 
financial sustainability is the endgame. However, policy support only for CE 
groups of this mould does naïvely assume that all CE groups are similar in 
terms of drivers, values, objectives, and approaches, which clearly is not the 
case. 
Expectations around community energy are thus shaped by perceptions and 
actions of a large set of actors, whose agency and interests vary widely. 
Though linked, a distinction can be made between local expectations, which 
develop around specific CE experiments searching for viable local solutions, 
and ‘global’ expectations around functionality, which arises in part from 
aggregation of local lessons, but more strongly from external circumstances 
(Figure 8.2), such as the availability of RE support. For community energy to 
flourish then, it must prove capable of marketing expectations around the 
technological and social innovations that comprise it, and simultaneously to 
local and ‘global’ actors.  
 
Figure 8.2 Relationships between levels of expectations 
Source: Raven (2005) 
The literature suggests that expectations are most powerful if they are shared 
by many actors, credible, specific and coupled with societal problems (Kemp 
et al., 1998, Coenen et al., 2010, Borup et al., 2006, Brown, 2003, Smith et 
al., 2005). To what extent do these criteria hold when considering community 
energy as a niche?  
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8.1.1.1 Shared versus diverse expectations 
As Geels (2006) suggests, shared, positive expectations help to align actions 
towards promoting the development of niches, particularly where cognitive 
rules (such as goals, problem agendas, problem-solving strategies, current 
theories, tacit knowledge, design methods and criteria) are also shared. In 
terms of the development of a shared vision within the community energy 
sector, Seyfang et al argues that plurality in both rationales and vision within 
CE results in an overarching niche that does not yet communicate any 
coherent vision (Seyfang et al., 2013).  
This does not suggest that CE is unable to develop without coherence, only 
that the framing of CE as a niche, and the use of SNM as an analytical tool 
may well be inappropriate. CE comprises a multitude of technological and 
social innovations in different configurations, such that expectations of CE at 
both local and global scales may be affected by expectations and perceptions 
around specific technologies. For example, if one’s only experience with RE 
has been negatively affected by commercial ventures (with minimal 
community engagement or community benefits), it may be difficult for the 
promises around fair processes and outcomes of community energy to find 
traction.  
Furthermore, a niche understanding of CE supposes that cognitive rules are 
shared between stakeholders, which is unlikely given that the grassroots 
nature of CE is synonymous with subaltern goals and objectives. For 
example, the radical drivers behind many CE practitioners can contradict both 
commercial and policy priorities through pluralism of social, environmental 
and economic objectives. As a result, policies that encourage 
‘professionalization’ of CE may be frustrated, as many groups wish to remain 
niche and eschew professional norms of commercialisation and competition 
(Seyfang et al., 2014). 
The credibility and specificity of expectations relates to the ease in which they 
refer to measurable outcomes, and although this is possible for most aspects 
of community energy, it is more difficult for others. For example, while the 
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financial outcomes of community wind ownership might be easily understood 
and communicated, the benefits of other projects focusing on community 
participation and democracy may be more nebulous, indirect and subjective, 
and are thus more difficult to convey. However, the apparent failure of the CE 
sector to produce specific and credible expectations is a consequence of its 
diversity, which is only an issue when viewed under an SNM spotlight.  
In light of the diverse and pluralistic nature of CE, it seems inappropriate to 
pigeonhole CE into a tightly-defined niche, if only that it risks closing down 
innovation around different approaches, with different resources and towards 
different objectives (Stirling, 2014a, Stirling, 2015, Seyfang et al., 2014). 
Rather, diversity resulting from the movement’s grounding in civil society, 
grassroots innovations and sustainability (understandings of which are also 
pluralistic) brings inherent strength to the sector, not least because it opens 
the door to being able to address multiple objectives at once (Seyfang et al., 
2014).   
8.1.1.2 Linking energy with societal issues 
Aside from expectations being shared, credible and specific, it is also 
suggested that expectations around innovations can be powerful if they help 
address a range of societal problems (Kemp et al., 1998). This thesis 
suggests that this aspect of expectations is particularly relevant because of 
both the plurality within community energy and because the scale in which it 
operates is relevant to people and communities. From a pragmatic 
perspective, social framings can also help to legitimise local energy 
governance. It is from here that sensitive framing of CE emerges as a 
lynchpin in maximising stakeholder support, both for the sector and for 
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individual community groups (Hargreaves et al., 2013, Geels and Deuten, 
2006)51.  
As chapter 5 discussed with reference to WREN, many CE initiatives frame 
energy objectives only as incidental to social objectives. For example, while 
drivers may include helping to meet national renewable targets or emissions 
reductions, they are often more fundamentally interested in the social impacts 
of change (such as the redistribution of wealth) and indeed are often bound as 
social enterprises to act towards such goals.  
Focusing on community-specific objectives is possible because CE groups 
are usually embedded within communities, and become more so as 
(particularly bridging) social capital grows. Additionally, energy often 
intersects with other issues more directly relevant to households, such as 
poor quality housing, health, employment and inclusion, providing 
opportunities to address individuals’ wellbeing more directly than broader 
policy measures. The ability of CE groups to understand and help address 
such a wide range of issues means that CE becomes both appealing to a 
broader audience than would be possible by focusing purely on energy, and 
legitimises CE groups as new actors within local energy systems. CE 
organisations thus have the potential to inhabit a valuable position of trust 
previously absent from the energy system. 
Expectations around redistributing wealth is especially persuasive in the 
context of both increasing energy bills and decreasing trust in energy 
companies, and the framing of CE has developed to reflect this. As the 
                                            
 
51 Of course, it is the diversity and plurality within CE that enables it to be sensitively 
framed to satisfy the needs of a range of stakeholders. This suggests that while CE 
may not currently be coherent enough for some stakeholders (specifically those 
looking to professionalise CE), plurality and diversity within the movement lends itself 
to co-option by other stakeholders.  
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proportion of CE-led RE increases, the ability to extract and retain value in the 
form of ownership and management of energy assets, including generation 
but also networks also increases. The development of both technological and 
social capital within CE initiatives is paving the way for a shift in dominant 
framings and aspirations away from ‘local economic resilience’ towards ‘local 
energy supply’. While the latter does imply the former, it also importantly 
contains more direct connotations around wresting control from the Big Six 
and implies a new form of energy democracy. 
In terms of alignment with wider societal goals, expectations around local 
energy markets goes some way to capturing the transformative nature of the 
movement. Paradoxically, this may mean emphasising not only its 
contribution towards current energy objectives, such as decarbonisation, but 
also its role in more progressive terms through addressing wider social issues 
such as inclusion, democracy, justice and equity. The notion of the 
democratisation of energy in this sense includes not only the distribution of 
wealth-creating potential among society, but the distribution of power and 
agency in having more prominent roles within energy system governance. 
8.1.2 Networking with civil society 
Past discussions of networking have focused on the development of links 
either between niche innovators, i.e. between CE groups, or between groups 
and intermediary organisations (Seyfang et al., 2014, Hargreaves et al., 
2013). To this end, the growth in the number of CE groups over the last few 
years has created increasing opportunities for between-group networking, 
particularly as more and more groups are created in proximity to existing 
groups. This growth has stimulated the development of administration-wide 
representative bodies in the form of Community Energy Scotland, Wales and 
England (in 2008, 2012 and 2014 respectively), all of which have further 
enhanced opportunities for networking both horizontally and vertically. 
However as previous chapter also highlighted, networking with civil society is 
at least as important, particularly as the resources these stakeholders hold 
has consequence for the success or failure of individual groups. These 
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resources include physical assets (such as rooftops and land for siting RE), 
financial capital (by way of investment in efficiency and RE technologies), and 
social (such as the trust and support which legitimises the actions of groups). 
As Chapter 7 discussed, building social capital by way of membership and 
support was an important outcome for WREN, and indeed is seen as an 
important strategy for many CE groups.  
The importance of civil society to CE as a grassroots innovation distinguishes 
it from conventional sociotechnical innovations somewhat. While the latter 
does acknowledge the role of social networks, including civil society, in 
shaping niche development, their role tends to be limited to adopters of 
innovations (Verbong and Geels, 2007). Grassroots innovations by contrast 
are activities of rather than for civil society: the innovators are members of 
civil society, and the innovations often comprise social innovations around 
new ways of social organisation (Seyfang and Smith, 2007). 
As such, community energy cannot be considered in isolation from the 
communities in which they are embedded, and from which they have grown. 
The groups that carry out CE may be formalised, legal entities with a small 
core of active members, but their vision and actions are shaped by the needs 
and constraints of the wider community. As such, policies that seek to develop 
CE must have at their heart acknowledgement the inseparability of CE groups 
from their civil society foundations, for example by providing directed support 
for building social networks. 
8.1.3 Learning within community energy 
Strategic Niche Management (SNM) theory posits that the development of 
local, context specific projects coalesce into progressively coherent networks 
of learning through the growth of networks and intermediary organisations 
(Geels and Deuten, 2006). Figure 8.1 illustrates this linear progression, from a 
set of isolated local projects (with no networking or knowledge sharing); an 
inter-local phase of increased knowledge-sharing within networks (which 
initiates formation of a coherent niche); a trans-local phase of systematic 
sharing of knowledge as a more abstracted level; and a global phase, 
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whereupon institutionalisation and standardisation establishes dominant 
cognitive rules, with profoundly frame and influence the further development 
of local practices (Geels and Deuten, 2006). 
 
Figure 8.3 Phases in the development of shared knowledge and niche 
coherence  
Source: Geels and Deuten (2006) 
Seyfang et al’s analysis of community energy as a grassroots innovation 
found that the sector in 2013 displayed some knowledge sharing, but that this 
mostly took place between groups, i.e. at the inter-local phase. While learning 
was found to be of particular importance for individual group development, the 
authors did not consider learning structures to offer prospects of challenging 
the regime, at least under the framework of learning set out by the SNM 
(Seyfang et al., 2014). 
While this thesis broadly supports Seyfang et al’s findings, CE has continued 
to expand significantly over the last few years, both in terms of the number of 
active groups, as well as associated intermediaries. The formation of 
representative bodies (as discussed above) represents progress towards a 
better-developed institutional infrastructure, facilitated by more networking by 
way of conferences and workshops, and informal networking through the 
increased proximity and contact between practitioners. 
Several pieces of nuance can also be added to current understanding of 
learning in CE. First, not only is the configuration of resources important for 
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CE groups (as discussed in the previous chapter), different forms of 
information appear to have different value according to the needs of groups at 
a given time. The generalised knowledge available obtainable through training 
and advice from intermediaries for example is of general use at a group’s 
beginnings, but the availability of ad-hoc advice from peers is valuable in 
terms of being able to tackle problems as they arise. The value in these 
mentoring relationships was in turns both practical and pragmatic: Other 
groups had ‘been there’ and might have the answer to a particular problem, or 
they were ‘at the coal face’ and encountering similar issues, so the groups 
could thus provide moral support to one another. In such a challenging, 
resource-scarce environment, the need for such moral support and optimism, 
between as well as within groups came up time and time again.  
Second, while in some senses the communitarian ethos of the CE sector 
encourages a sharing economy, resource scarcities paired with competition 
between groups may mean that sharing is not automatic. Whether or not 
groups are willing to share learning depends on perceived losses of doing so, 
i.e. the chances that other community groups can use such learning to get 
ahead. This suggests that to get ahead, there is pressure on groups to tend 
more towards the ‘enterprise’ end of the social-enterprise spectrum.  
8.2 Articulation of selection pressures: a shifting context 
Community energy is not emerging into a vacuum; rather, its development 
can be understood in relation to momentous shifts in context in terms of 
science and technology, politics, and culture. Such broad shifts present new 
opportunities and constraints on the current energy system, and are thus 
instrumental in affecting the shape of decision-making, and its ultimate 
direction. This section considers these broad pressures and discusses how 
they are likely to impact on the development of community energy in the UK. 
The literature on sociotechnical transitions suggests that for innovations to 
have transformative impact on systems, having coherent niches is only part of 
the picture (Kemp et al., 1998). Policymaking can of course be influenced by 
the emergence of new innovations, but only insofar as power and politics 
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allow (Smith et al., 2005, Meadowcroft, 2005). In other words, whether or not 
niches break into the mainstream is also dependent on whether the pressure 
on regimes is such that niche innovations start to appear attractive to regime 
actors (Smith et al., 2005). As Smith et al (2005) state, “without at least some 
form of internal or external pressure…it is unlikely that substantive change to 
the developmental trajectory of the regime will result”(Smith et al., 2005).  
Selection pressures of course include the emergence of innovative niches 
themselves, but can also be exerted by ‘landscape’-level pressures affecting 
the technological, economic, political, and cultural context (See Figure 4.2). 
This section thus discusses several key pressures relating to the emergence 
of community energy as an appealing prospect for actors within the current 
UK energy system. 
8.2.1 Democratising effect of small-scale technologies 
A large part of CE is about gaining control over the way energy is produced 
and consumed in a locality. Such control may be important by itself (especially 
if subsidiarity in energy issues is considered important), but importantly 
facilitates the empowerment of communities by way of localising both assets 
and their value. By virtue of their size, safety, cost, and ease of deployment, 
the technologies in use by CE groups today are far more amenable to 
distributed ownership than large-scale fossil fuel technologies. In short, small-
scale technologies are in effect democratising the energy system. 
The democratising potential of small-scale energy was a key driver of their 
early development of RE technologies. The first electricity from wind power 
was produced in the late 1800s, bringing together recent advances in 
electrical engineering with turbines originally developed to provide mechanical 
power for milling and pumping (Rivkin and Silk, 2013). Over the next few 
decades, technology was driven variously at small-scale by their use in rural 
farms unconnected to supply networks, and later at grid-connected utility 
scales as their use in avoiding fossil fuel shortages (Vestergaard et al., 2004). 
Incremental improvements in the price/performance ratio at a range of scales 
means that generation from wind is now efficient enough to be economically 
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feasible for a range of users at utility, down to community and domestic 
scales. 
Solar electricity’s beginnings can too be traced to the late 1800s, though early 
experiments with selenium were vastly improved by the use of silicon in the 
1950s (Perlin, 2013). Advances in electronic engineering enabled their use on 
space applications through the 1960s and paved the way for further 
improvements, and experiments with terrestrial applications in the 1970s 
(Ibid). These were initially limited to remote locations with no grid connectivity, 
particularly in marine settings, but became increasingly relevant in grid-
connected settings to reduce domestic electricity costs, the growing 
employment of which has driven rapid improvements in price/performance 
ratios in recent decades (Fraunhofer ISE, 2015).  
While CE may of course employ other technologies, the stories of wind and 
solar illustrate how RE has evolved in large part to meet the needs of society 
at a scale relevant to the user. The scale and modular nature of solar PV 
means that it is particularly suited to domestic settings, bringing significant 
benefits in terms of avoided electricity costs, and for a level of investment in 
line with household finances. The physics of wind technology means that unit 
efficiencies increase dramatically with increased size, meaning that wind 
power is most feasibly deployed at community or utility scales.  
While centralised technologies may have for the most part satisfied societal 
needs up of the past, emerging energy technologies have coevolved with 
society’s need to have cleaner, more affordable, and more secure energy. To 
that end, increasing deployment of RE by an increasing numbers and diversity 
of owners is democratising the energy system in ways that would not be 
possible with traditional technologies. As of September 2015, 770,000 PV 
units had been deployed in the UK (97 per cent of which are under 50kW in 
capacity), enabling a huge number of households to gain some control over 
the UK’s energy assets, as well as their own energy expenditure.  
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8.2.2 Embedding consensus around climate change 
The environmental pressures of climate change are associated with political, 
economic and social pressures on the incumbent energy regime to mitigate 
impacts. These issues have become more widely understood over the last 
few decades, and society is transitioning from a point of ignorance to 
progressively broader scientific, political and societal consensus of the 
mechanics and impacts of climate change.  
Isolated theories in the early to mid-1900s were substantiated with increased 
scientific efforts in the 1970s and 80s to understand the impact of GHG 
emissions on the climate. This culminated in the establishment of the IPCC in 
1988 as the first in a series of attempts to summarise knowledge, and 
subsequent reports of which communicate overwhelming scientific consensus 
around climate warming and its anthropogenic drivers (IPCC, 2013). The 
IPCC and others also makes clear the consensus around the environmental 
and economic risks associated with climate change (IPCC, 2014, Stern, 
2006), and provides the backdrop for global efforts to limit both GHG 
emissions and associated temperature increases. Despite global variations in 
both awareness, and perceptions of threats, political rhetoric in the UK 
appears to reflect global consensus. 
This political support is part and parcel of widespread associated societal and 
corporate acknowledgement of climate change and its implications. There are 
significant global variations, but the majority of the UK public both believe in 
climate change, accept that anthropogenic impact is a factor, accept there are 
risks to people in Britain, and that individually they can and should do 
something to help reduce climate change (Spence et al., 2010, Parkhill et al., 
2013).  
Such growing consensus theoretically legitimises governments to mitigate, for 
example by supporting the development of domestic RE technologies, whilst 
limiting the use of fossil fuels for energy production. The role of renewable 
and small-scale energy technologies in reducing emissions is well 
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understood, and again, theoretically provides an opportunity for CE as a body 
through which RE can be deployed. 
8.2.3 Individualistic means for collectivist ends? 
Another example of landscape change with relevance for community energy 
is the creep towards a more individualistic society, away from 
communitarianism. While CE might ostensibly appear to be driven by a 
selfless empathy towards enhancing wellbeing of wider communities, it is also 
possible to relate the drivers and processes within CE to more individualistic 
notions of autonomy, trust, and reciprocity. 
Various studies have documented societal trends towards individualism, 
particularly in the west. Drivers including increasing complexity and 
stratification of society, increased secularism, and the growth of capitalism 
have been attributed to the growth of individualism over collectivism as the 
dominant doctrine in western society (Allik and Realo, 2004, Durant, 2010, 
Dumont, 1992).  
The protection and encouragement of individual interests over those of the 
state or wider society forms an important part of capitalism and the basis of 
Western market-led ideologies previously discussed (Lukes, 2004). This is in 
part related to political individualism, whereby opposition of interference or 
obligations by the State or other social institutions. The individual’s perception 
of, and relationship with the state however can play out in very distinct ways, 
liberalism and anarchism being two sides of the same coin (Brown, 1993). 
While both moral stances share the emphasis on individual freedom, the 
former is centred on negative liberty (absence of coercion or restraint), while 
the latter focuses on ‘positive liberty’ in terms of the right to agency via self 
management and equal access to develop personal capacities (Berlin, 1969). 
At first glance, these societal and political trends seem to be at odds with the 
emergence of community energy – and indeed the growth of other 
communitarian movements beyond energy. One response to this might be 
that the heightening dominance of individualism provides both the context and 
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a driver for anarchistic struggles by radical subsets of society to create and 
support niche alternatives, and to resist and encourage radical change.  
Both negative and positive liberty dimensions of individualism are relevant 
here, in the rejection of incumbents as de jure holders of power, as well as in 
the expression of personal agency. In terms of the former, the 
democratisation of energy technologies provides the means for individuals to 
challenge norms around energy governance. Indeed, that individuals initiate 
the majority of CE groups suggests that individual autonomy is an important 
foundation on which collective autonomy can be built. However, while the 
absence of restraint is universal, the right to agency is not; it is in examining 
positive liberty that CE can be more critically examined. For example, it has 
already been suggested that the unequal distribution of capital within and 
between communities has the potential to contribute to unequal 
concentrations of power, and thus liberty. 
Individualism can also be examined with respect to autonomy and 
independence, particularly as they relate to social capital, and the cooperation 
and social solidarity that define it (Allik and Realo, 2004). For example, 
divisions of labour, functions and roles in modern society (and indeed in 
community energy) means that autonomy and independence serves to unite, 
rather than separate individuals (Durkheim, 1884, Allik and Realo, 2004). As 
Putnam attests, social capital serves to “improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions”, and that individual benefits cannot be 
attained without collective pursuit of goals, whether collective or not (see 
Putnam, 2000, p. 124). 
This becomes somewhat clearer when key elements of social capital, 
particularly, trust, reciprocity and shared norms, are examined in relation to 
individualism. For example, while Chapter 7 highlighted the importance of 
social capital to the formation and growth of social enterprises, trust, 
reciprocity and shared norms evidently form the basis of neoclassical 
assumptions of self-interest: participants must have trust in each other and in 
the market; reciprocity is central to exchange; and exchanges take place 
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within the agreed conventions of the market. Furthermore, the importance of 
individualism and self-interest is of course pertinent to society as a whole, as 
conceptualised by the mutual societal benefits of Smith’s invisible hand 
(Smith, 1776).  
This all suggests that the continued rise in individualism does indeed open the 
door to the emergence of communitarian niches, including community energy. 
Even though social enterprises may have social (rather than profit-based) 
objectives, these are paradoxically, but most effectively pursued by those with 
individualistic morals in terms of expectations of autonomy, responsibility, 
trust and reciprocity. 
8.2.4 Niche development 
Last, but certainly not least, niche development itself can be considered an 
important contributor of selection pressure on the regime. As with other 
selection pressures, the emergence of promising niche innovations helps to 
highlight the need for change, but they also present real opportunities for 
responding to that change.  
While expectations, networks and learning developing around CE can be 
understood as contributing to pressure for regime change, as discussed 
above it has been argued that the CE sector is currently too incoherent to 
challenge the established energy regime in any meaningful way, at least 
according to SNM theory. However, it seems clear that the CE movement is 
displaying considerable momentum, in itself as well as in its influence across 
the wider regime. This is observable in the expanding ownership of small-
medium scale renewables by individuals and communities, the steady growth 
of communities of businesses and intermediaries, and the establishment of 
the UK’s first community energy strategy in 2014. 
More importantly perhaps, CE practitioners can in retrospect be considered 
pioneers, in that the approaches and innovations they employ are being 
increasingly adopted by other actors. It is to this onward evolution of 
community energy that the final section of this chapter turns. 
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8.3 Emulation of community energy pioneers 
The focus of this chapter so far has been on the groundswell of pressures 
supporting community energy, and broadly reflects the emphasis on the niche 
within sociotechnical change literature. However it has been argued that such 
emphases neglect the importance of politics and power that underpin 
policymaking, while incorrectly assuming that incumbent regimes are 
monolithic barriers to be overcome (Smith et al., 2005, Meadowcroft, 2005, 
Geels, 2014). This section thus considers the role of politics and power in 
resisting, but also positively responding to pressures to adopt community 
energy approaches. While many regime actors are clearly resistant of change, 
it is also evident that some are actively and positively adapting to by way of 
appropriation of the principles and approaches CE has pioneered. 
8.3.1 Material, institutional and discursive regime resistance 
In the face of prevailing pressures to adopt niche innovations, Geels (2014) 
describes three key forms of resistance: material, institutional, instrumental 
and discursive, all of which contribute to stabilising incumbency and defy 
pressure to change. The effect of each of these forces can be discussed in 
terms of the barriers community energy is facing. 
Material forms of power relate to the employment of technical capabilities and 
financial resources to maintain the status quo of incumbents (Ibid). Such 
power can be seen in recurring promises about the potential of new large-
scale infrastructures to deliver upon energy goals. To incumbents, Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) and new nuclear both represent innovation step 
changes, but importantly favour established scales of infrastructure and 
ownership, and a particular form of governance. As such, their familiarity is as 
potent as that of the silver bullet symbolism they seek to represent. 
Conversely, small-scale energy is underestimated as contributing only 
marginally, and understood as incompatible with sunk capital, such as existing 
centralised generation and distribution networks. 
Related to this, institutional resistance relates to the effect of dominant 
political cultures, ideologies and governance structures in strengthening 
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incumbents while actively resisting change (Ibid). For example, the liberal 
market economic framework through which energy policy are implemented de 
facto privileges large utilities with greater capabilities and resources than both 
smaller companies and new entrants (which are small by nature).  
Depoliticised governance structures favour techno- economic analysis rather 
than democratic scrutiny (Kuzemko, 2014, Hay, 2007, Mügge, 2011). Such 
processes are clearly unsympathetic to community energy, whose non-
monetary and distributive benefits are difficult to fit into existing analytical 
frameworks, such as cost benefit analysis. The inadequacies of established 
methods of appraisal means that despite DECC’s acknowledgement that CE 
can help address areas of energy policy that traditional approaches cannot 
(DECC, 2014b), the absence, in the eyes of incumbent decision-making 
frameworks, of ‘robust’ ways to capture this provides a rationale for limiting 
policy support. 
Institutional resistance can also be seen in terms of the limited agency the 
state has in steering change resulting in the energy system from market-led 
ideology driving depoliticisation (Kuzemko, 2014). It is as a result of such 
drivers that large-scale energy options continue to be pushed through by 
regime incumbents, despite being uneconomic, undemocratic, or otherwise 
unsuitable, as the case for the proposed nuclear renaissance in the UK. This 
of course has the added effect of shutting out competing technologies, 
including small-scale technologies. This is reflected also in the wielding of 
instrumental forms of power, referring to the relative wealth of resources (e.g. 
positions of authority, media access, finances etc) available to incumbents to 
help meet objectives. 
Finally, discursive strategies can be employed to shape dominant discourses 
in terms of both what is discussed, and how these things are discussed (Ibid). 
Particularly relevant to community energy for example is the degree to which 
incumbent interests are represented in Government, which extends beyond 
lobbying, to holding positions within DECC for example, through industry 
secondments. Subaltern interests in CE can of course seek control over 
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dominant discourses around both prognostic (defining problems) and 
diagnostic (defining solutions) framings of energy problems (Ibid). This might 
involve, for example, highlighting climate change as a social rather than 
techno-economic problem, and thus requiring consideration of social 
approaches. However, discourse remains to be shaped by a ‘discourse 
coalition’ (Hajer, 1995) of policymakers and incumbent firms, who exert far 
greater power, not least through control of media (Lindblom, 2002). 
The importance of discursive strategies was particularly evident in the framing 
of a raft of changes to energy policy in summer 2015, including reduction of 
support for onshore wind and solar, and scrapping of several energy 
efficiency mechanisms. Faced with the challenge of reconciling the perceived 
need for a continued deepening of austerity measures with climate and 
energy challenges, Energy Secretary Amber Rudd stated that “climate action 
is about security, plain and simple - economic security” (Rudd, 2015). Such a 
statement not only demonstrates an extremely narrow view of energy security, 
but appeared to look to foreclose any discussion about other objectives, such 
as sustainability or affordability in the pursuit of austerity-driven short-term 
cost savings over long-term societal benefits. 
8.3.2 Increased market share of independent suppliers 
While it is true that many incumbents within the energy regime are resisting 
change, some key actors are actively adapting to the new energy reality of 
alternative technologies and engaged communities. In many ways the 
development of new business models within energy supply are adopting 
principles and approaches pioneered by the CE sector. 
One key group is the utilities themselves, either as innovative business 
models within established businesses or as new entrants. Many of these new 
suppliers eschew traditional business models of the Big Six, instead focusing 
on customer service, and by offering a small number of competitive tariffs, 
with electricity sourced either wholly or mostly from renewable sources.  
Growth in the market share (up to 12.6 per cent in June 2015 (Utility Week, 
2015)) of these smaller suppliers has been attributed to a number of factors, 
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including the fact that they benefit from exemption from social and 
environmental obligations such as the Energy Company Obligation (Ofgem, 
2014c). Price rises by the Big Six also stimulated switching to non-
incumbents, some of whom were actually able to reduce prices at the same 
time (Ibid). Although market growth of non-incumbents is not directly related 
to community energy, it does reflect wider societal dissatisfaction in the ways 
in which traditional business models deliver homogeneous energy products 
with opaque pricing and tariff structures. Instead, increased competition 
means that greater attention is being paid towards gaining and retaining 
customers, which is creating room for business models seeking to gain 
customers’ trust through offering transparency and better customer service 
experiences. 
8.3.3 Experimentation in local supply  
Alongside the new utility entrants described above is an emerging set of 
entities seeking to develop local energy supply models. Being able to 
generate energy for local consumption is perhaps a natural progression from 
conventional CE models, most of which centre around generation and 
localisation of the value associated with generation. Indeed, while local supply 
arrangements are not solely being explored by CE entities, they are grounded 
in, and seek to further develop the main principles, values and goals of civil 
society movements, including local economic development, socioeconomic 
equity, environmental protection and self-governance (Hall and Roelich, 
2015). Furthermore, as with community energy, local supply arrangements by 
definition have geographical foci. 
Although the past few chapters have shown how community energy in a 
broad sense can help address energy policy objectives, Hall et al (2015) 
highlight that local energy supply specifically can offer four key opportunities 
that incumbent business models are unable or unwilling to pursue:  
• Better routes to market for local generation than Electricity Market 
Reform currently permits, thus supporting community and small scale 
generators; 
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• Better fulfilment of the potential for demand side response, particularly 
by way of geographically-specific supply markets and better customer 
engagement, and with associated behavioural, economic and technical 
benefits; 
• Better gains in energy efficiency through better engagement with 
consumers, and roll-out of energy service company (ESCo) business 
models; 
• Relocalising energy value by retaining local energy expenditures. 
The eight local supply archetypes identified by the authors offer each of these 
aspirations to a greater or lesser degree, whereas the current archetype (the 
traditional non-local utility business model) is wholly negligent of these 
broader system benefits at the expense of maximisation of throughput and 
profit (Table 8.2). 
Table 8.1 Local supply archetypes and opportunities. 
 
Source: Hall and Roelich (2015) 
This experimentation with local supply is hindered somewhat by a regulatory 
and institutional system that has traditionally served, and indeed favours 
large-scale suppliers (Mitchell, 2014a, Mitchell et al., 2014). However, some 
efforts are being made by Ofgem as the UK energy regulator to better 
understand the opportunities afforded by so-called non-traditional business 
models (NTBMs) in order to understand the regulatory changes needed to 
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support their development (Ofgem, 2015b). This can be contrasted with some 
overseas examples where local supply is already the norm, such as Germany 
(Julian, 2014), or in New York State, where energy regulation is undergoing 
reform to enable local supply (New York State PSC, 2014).  
8.3.4 Emulation of CE by Local Authorities 
Local supply arrangements of the forms outlined above are being investigated 
by a number of actors, including community groups and social enterprises, but 
also local authorities. The involvement of the latter group in particular is of 
particular interest here, as it represents a reconfiguration of an existing set of 
regime actors towards the opportunities created by community energy. 
Although LAs might not be considered as central to the energy system as 
industry or central Government, they can nonetheless be considered as key 
regime actors. Up until recently, the role of LAs in the energy system has 
largely been to transpose national policy down to the local level, through, for 
example facilitating complex planning processes (DTI, 2006b, CCC, 2012) 
and coordinating local responses to national policy initiatives (Walker and 
Devine-Wright, 2008). Wider potential roles around acting as efficiency 
champions and as agenda-setters in setting local targets have been 
discussed elsewhere (DTI, 2006a, DTI, 2006b, CCC, 2012, Burton and 
Hubacek, 2007), although rarely have such approaches proved especially 
innovative. 
The inexorable growth of community energy is presenting both new 
challenges and opportunities for Local Authorities. For example, CE groups 
are increasingly addressing energy issues that may have previously been 
deemed the responsibility of LAs, such as driving local energy efficiency 
programmes, identifying vulnerable households, and shaping local RE 
deployment. In many ways the objectives of CE groups are well-aligned with 
that of LAs in terms of emphases on deployment of renewables (and 
associated carbon reductions) local economic resilience, and development of 
local economies in terms of increased employment and skills development. 
However, in terms of fuel poverty, while CE groups are well placed to identify 
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vulnerable households and inadequate properties, resource constraints mean 
that they are rarely able to make meaningful headway into the issue. 
The closeness of objectives between CE and LAs is further helped by 
complementarity in resource availability; CE groups often have local 
legitimacy and specific local expertise and enthusiasm, while LAs can often 
offer organisational and financial support for local projects. CE and LAs often 
have symbiotic relationships, which are often informal, but which offer 
significant opportunities for mutual working.  
Such symbiosis, Geels (2007) states, can provide the basis for adoption by 
regime actors of innovations, the development and embedding of which can 
ultimately contribute to major reconfigurations of regimes. For example, it is 
conceivable that development of a LA-backed RE portfolio can provide the 
basis for local revenue generation, which can then be used to make progress 
into addressing fuel poverty. Each of these strands may represent a single 
innovation (crowd-funding through local share offers, RE technologies etc), 
but combined they offer potential to change dramatically the remit, resources 
and reach of local authorities as actors in the energy system. 
Indeed, several local authorities – namely Plymouth and Swansea City 
Councils - are in the early stages of experimenting with models of this kind. 
With these exemplars, the LA has been instrumental in the formation of 
standalone CE entities to help deliver local RE projects on behalf of the LA. 
Although technically autonomous, such closeness enables significant 
efficiencies to be made through sharing of organisational and human 
resources (which may help overcome legal and financial barriers for instance) 
and cutting down on bureaucratic barriers such as those involved with siting 
RE infrastructures. The relative wealth of resources means that projects can 
be brought to completion at a speed more closely resembling that of corporate 
entities than of social enterprises. 
For Local Authorities with responsibility as public service providers, engaging 
in community energy offers the potential for greater engagement with local 
populations with implications for wellbeing. For example, such partnerships 
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can act as vehicles for delivering services traditionally falling under LA remits, 
such as coordinating local responses to national efficiency measures, 
coordinating fuel switching campaigns, and addressing local fuel poverty 
concerns by building relationships between local housing, health, employment 
and other wellbeing service providers under one roof. In a sense the adoption 
by LAs of CE objectives and approaches brings together many of the services 
already in their remit, but is enhanced by adding key dimensions of cost 
savings and revenue generation enabled through RE ownership. 
These models are demonstrative of the innovations tested by CE being 
adopted, and no doubt improved by regime members. The reason the model 
appears to work is fourfold. First, it combines a blend of tried and tested social 
and technological innovations that compliment and reinforce one another. 
Second, the objectives of LAs are already closely aligned with those of many 
CE groups. Third, they control many of the resources required to implement 
CE projects, such as financial and organisational capital, as well as access to 
natural capital in the form of potential RE sites. And fourth, they bridge the 
divide between local populations, community groups and national 
government, all of whom play key roles in the energy system. Taken together, 
this suggests that the emergent role of local authorities as deliverers of 
community energy is only the beginning. 
8.4 Summary 
Moving on from the previous chapters, which focused primarily on WREN, this 
chapter takes a broader perspective of the evolution of the CE movement as a 
whole. In doing so it considered the aggregative effects of the development of 
multiple CE projects on both the direction of the movement as a whole, as 
well as on key actors within the broader energy system. 
The conceptualisation of CE as a niche innovation was critically examined 
with respect to the development of expectations, networks and learning within 
the movement. Although coherence of vision and expectations can be 
considered an important part of niche development, it is argued here that 
more value lies in maintaining a diversity of visions, not least because it is 
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more supportive of grassroots interests. Additionally, the critical role of civil 
society within CE means that aligning and fulfilling expectations around 
societal issues is a particular strength of the movement. This also has bearing 
for the importance in networking and building relationships with local 
communities. In terms of learning, it is suggested that the value of networking 
and learning varies not only between CE groups, but also between according 
to the specific needs of groups at particular times. 
Ongoing shifts in the context within which energy policy exists is also of 
consequence to the development of community energy. Four specific 
pressures are described as articulating towards the wider adoption of CE. 
These are a) the continued development of small-scale RE technologies 
driving the democratisation of energy; b) deepening consensus around both 
climate change impacts and the need for mitigation; c) societal trends towards 
individualism and its relationship to communitarianism; and c) the momentum 
of the CE movement itself. These all contribute to a wide scale shift in the 
rules and preferences of people towards small-scale energy. 
Finally, while it is clear that some regime actors are exerting resistance to 
these pressures, others are actively and positively adapting by way of 
appropriation of the principles and approaches CE practitioners have 
pioneered. This last point suggests that the momentum behind community 
energy has started to instigate structural changes in the energy system. The 
following chapter continues in this vein to explore more fully the 
transformational potential of community energy. 
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9 The transformational effect of democratisation 
Chapter 8 placed findings from a single community energy case study within 
the context of the broader evolution of community energy. It demonstrated 
how aggregated impact of local expectations, networks and learning is 
contributing to sector-wide change, and how the formal community energy 
sector has influenced adoption of key principles and approaches by other 
regime actors. As well as describing energy system in transition however, the 
evolution of citizen-oriented energy more widely (and encompassing 
community energy) can also be described as transformative in that it is 
affecting the fundamental structure of the energy system, including 
technologies, actors, and the relationship between them.  
A discussion of the democratising effect of small-scale energy follows, in 
which the emergence of distributed technologies creates value throughout 
energy networks, as opposed to a conventional system whose value is more 
centralised. The changes to the energy system afforded by such 
democratisation, it is argued, are transformative in that they change 
fundamentally the structure of the system, the actors within that system, and 
their agency.  
A discussion of the democratising effect of small-scale energy is followed by a 
summary of the key elements of transformative change arising from small-
scale energy. The chapter concludes with a discussion around the relative 
role of different scales of governance in shaping energy system 
transformation. 
9.1 The redistribution of power 
As the previous chapter introduced, the emergence of a new scale of 
technologies is having a democratising effect on the energy system. This is 
valuable not only from a position of the distribution and devolution of power to 
a wider diversity of actors, but also in terms of a systems resilience 
perspective. Furthermore, it is argued here that the distribution of both assets 
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and agency in the energy system is self-reinforcing because of network 
effects. 
makes economic sense in the sense of the optimisation of modern energy 
networks. 
9.1.1 New technologies, new actors 
Fossil-fuel-based energy production exhibits economies of scale that favour 
centralisation of geography as well as concentrations of capital that 
necessitate centralised ownership. These economies of scale are far less 
relevant to emergent small-scale renewable energy technologies: the value of 
the latter increases less in line with the scale of individual plant than with the 
distribution of (smaller) plant across energy networks.  
Importantly, the scale of these new energy technologies means that they are 
relatively affordable to people and communities, opening up ownership to a 
diversity of actors. This in turn has profound implications for the distribution of 
capital, with implications for both system and societal objectives. First, it 
opens up the potential for growth in renewables by enabling an entirely new 
set of investors to release financial capital (previously destined for pension 
funds or other savings schemes, for example) and participate in the 
development of energy infrastructures. Importantly, the development of new 
business models employing a variety of funding platforms means that 
individuals can invest at a variety of levels in projects across the country 
(through online platforms such as Abundance Generation and Trillion Fund, 
whose £5 minimum investment seeks to enshrine the concept of ‘democratic 
investment’) as well as in their communities and own households. The 
shareholders of the energy system are thus becoming more numerous, more 
dispersed, and more diverse than had been made possible under a wholly 
centralised system. Additionally, such shareholders are also becoming 
stakeholders insofar as they represent an increasingly powerful segment of 
civil society with interest and influence in shaping energy markets, and thus 
the energy system more generally. 
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It would be naïve to suggest that it has been RE technologies alone that are 
democratising the energy system, though they can be considered central to 
the process. Ownership of energy production technologies offers the potential 
to extract value in terms of both reducing the need to buy energy from 
suppliers, and becoming a supplier oneself. However, the emergence of 
complimentary technological innovations are both playing a part in the 
democratisation process and allowing additional value to be extracted by 
prosumers. These include material innovations such as domestic energy 
efficiency products and technologies, which reduce the overall need for 
energy; ICT, which enables ‘smart’ systems of domestic and grid optimisation; 
and affordable storage solutions, which also help to manage local demand 
and supply. Domestic energy aside, electric vehicles offer further 
opportunities to reduce petroleum consumption and offers potential for 
integration into electricity networks. As such an ecosystem of technologies 
develops, so too does the network economies they enable, which further 
reinforces the nascent system.  
Social innovations though are also playing a key role in democratisation: 
crowdfunding and similar business models, many supported by ICT and social 
media, is becoming a standard model of raising equity for citizen-scale energy 
projects (including community energy projects, but also commercial 
enterprises funded in whole or in part by individuals). Social innovation in 
terms of collective action in ‘traditional’ community energy networks both 
orient themselves toward, and benefit from information diffusion. Taken 
together, technological and social innovations are profoundly changing the 
rules of the game in terms of distributing value across energy networks and 
among society.  
9.1.2 From economies of scale to network economies 
If the centralisation of electricity production at the start of the 20th century was 
driven by economies of scale, decentralisation can be understood as being 
driven by network economies. Economies of scale are of course relevant to 
network economies, although they stem from the size of the network rather 
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than the size of individual infrastructures or the enterprises that own and 
operate them. Furthermore, since value is created and distributed among all 
network members, rather than concentrated in a small number of 
profit/maximising firms, the drive towards network economies is on the part of 
individuals and communities (Kelly, 1998, Rifkin, 2011). Incrementally 
increasing deployment and integration then can be expected to result in 
increasing distribution of value among an increasing number of stakeholders. 
As well as being beneficial from a wealth-distribution perspective, the creation 
of value throughout increasingly large networks is also of value from a 
system, and policy-perspective. For example, the problems of intermittency 
and need for redundancy that may be caused by RE deployment at a small 
scale may be helped in part by further increases in deployment, particularly 
when multiple, diverse and geographically distributed technologies are 
employed in association with the integration of efficiency and demand 
management and demand response measures (Mitchell, 2015b, Mitchell, 
2015a, Jansen, 2015). More generally, the slow but steady replacement of 
fossil-fuel based technologies with RE technologies offers a step change in 
system efficiency in terms of the reduction in conversion losses from the 
former (Mathiesen et al., 2015). 
While emerging technologies are slowly but inexorably changing the game, 
the UK has been slow to capitalise on the opportunities network economies 
afford. Rather than supporting those technologies that facilitate this type of 
change, energy policy under the Tory government has recently taken a 
deliberative shift back to the recentralisation of technology assets, for 
example by continuing backing for a nuclear renaissance, a move that is 
manifestly undemocratic. 
Despite disregard for the opportunities of network economies in this country, 
other Governments are actively seeking to understand and shape these 
developments to meet policy objectives. For example, in setting out in its 
Reforming the Energy Vision (New York State PSC, 2014), the New York 
State Public Service Commission communicate to ensure that energy system 
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transformation is customer-centred by encouraging both deeper penetration of 
renewable sources, and promoting markets through which energy 
management such as efficiency demand response measures can be 
facilitated. In doing so, the State is demonstrating rare leadership in holding 
consumers as central to energy system transformation, both intrinsically and 
as a necessary element of achieving energy policy objectives. 
9.1.3 Path dependency and lock-in to democratisation 
Since the democratisation of energy system describes the devolution of power 
(and wealth) from centralised incumbents, it is worth reflecting on how the 
emergence of distributed power might evolve. To what extent, for example, 
can the democratisation of energy be expected to continue in terms of both 
the depth and breadth of emancipation? 
At the most basic level, the processes behind democratisation lend 
themselves to a degree of path dependency in that they would act to reinforce 
the process by positive feedback. In the same way that network economies 
helped to lock in fossil fuel based generation, the development of distributed 
generation and complimentary network infrastructure will be instrumental in 
locking in distributed technologies. For example, the economics of installing 
domestic renewables are likely to improve once prosumers can take 
advantage of storage and electric vehicle innovations. Of course, under a 
distributed, democratised system, these returns do not accrue to only a few 
actors, they benefit a network of individuals and communities, who are 
becoming increasingly keen to participate as benefits become realised.  
As pointed out above, increased participation as a network of prosumers 
contributes to network effects arising from the mutual interconnectedness of 
different technologies and networks. So, as centralised fossil fuel generation 
both necessitated and was reinforced by centralised radial networks, the 
move to more decentralised technologies is necessitating more distributed, 
responsive networks, which then paves the way for more complete 
deployment and integration of RE, opportunities for energy efficiency 
251 
 
 
improvements, as well as creates demand for symbiotic innovations such as 
storage and electric vehicles. 
Furthermore, network effects extend to actors and institutions, for example by 
increased within-industry cooperation around more distributed system, 
including the development of technological, institutional and financing 
standards. For example, established RE sectors such as wind has developed 
to favour established technology forms, such as the ‘Danish concept’ turbine; 
regional, domestic and international industrial networks and lobbies have 
grown to support burgeoning RE sectors; and small-scale loans and crowd-
funding have become established as accepted and effective forms of 
financing for domestic and community-scale projects seeking to own their own 
physical energy assets. In turn, specific skills and knowledge around RE 
ownership helps to consolidate learning and spread expectations, illustrated 
for example in the increasing expectation that commercial projects should 
offer either community benefits or joint ownership to local populations.  
In sum, and to reiterate, just as fossil fuel technologies resulted in the lock-in 
to centralised technologies and concentrations of wealth and agency, a new, 
relatively distributed landscape of technologies and actors can also be 
expected to self-perpetuate and become locked-in. It should be emphasised 
that just as carbon lock-in was a consequence of the need to manage 
standards and concentrate capital for large-scale fossil-fuel generation, trends 
towards increased decentralisation is less a consequence of strategic design 
than of the resultant combination of small-scale energy technologies suiting 
contemporary societal needs. 
9.2 The transformational nature of small-scale energy 
The emergence of new technologies, actors and values combined with the 
path dependent tendencies of democratisation suggests that small-scale 
energy has the potential to be transformational in terms of creating structural 
change in the energy system. Indeed, in light of the inadequacies of the 
established energy system (as discussed in Chapter 2), this thesis argues that 
it is becoming apparent that it is only small-scale energy that can overcome 
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energy system inertia. This section briefly highlights the conceptual difference 
between transition and transformation before discussing how key elements of 
small-scale energy can be considered as contributing to transformational 
change. 
Sociotechnical transitions, as discussed in chapter 7 are conceptually 
divergent from the concept of transformations, and in order to appreciate the 
full impact of small-scale energy the distinction is important. The 
sociotechnical transition literature has primarily developed around the desire 
to understand and steer technological innovation pathways through 
environments controlled by incumbent interests, towards a known end of 
innovation breakthrough. Societal transformation studies, on the other hand, 
typically comprise technological as well as social innovations, driven by 
“incommensurable, tacit and embodied knowledges, involving more diverse, 
emergent and unruly political re-alignments that challenge incumbent 
structures pursuing contending (even unknown) ends” (Stirling, 2014a)52.  
As such, both transitions, and transformations recognise the role of society, 
although while agency in the former is limited to niche-regime contestation, in 
the latter it is more often associated with how subaltern interests within civil 
society, as manifested in social movements direct change (Seyfang and 
Smith, 2007, Stirling, 2014a). That said, while actors may be value-led, the 
concept of transformation itself is purely descriptive, simply defining the 
                                            
 
52 It should be noted that the use of transition, rather than transformation, as a key 
concept throughout this thesis is borne out of the employment of the sociotechnical 
transition literature (specifically the MLP) rather than any intentional emphasis on 
technological innovation. In any case, while the terms are not interchangeable, the 
use of one often implies the other, i.e. transformational change of some kind may 
require sociotechnological transformation, and vice versa (Stirling, 2014). 
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processes agreed to be required to move to a structurally distinct energy 
system (Mersmann et al., 2014).  
9.2.1 Realignment with societal needs 
Path dependency can be used to explain how society has been locked into a 
suboptimal pathway characterised by technologies, institutions and 
behaviours that cost more, financially, environmentally and socially, than 
alternatives. In order to escape lock in, we as society first need to be aware of 
the relative unsuitability of large-scale technologies, and secondly, have an 
alternative pathway to turn to (Unruh, 2002). On both counts small-scale 
energy is realigning system characteristics with societal needs. 
Our understanding of what society needs in relation to energy has changed 
somewhat over the last few decades, such that the inadequacies of the 
current energy system in addressing these needs has become apparent. 
Energy policy has previously focused solely on making sure supply met 
consumer demand and that costs were kept reasonable. Now, however, there 
are expectations by householders and society not only that energy is (and 
remains to be) affordable, but also that demand should be uninterrupted. 
Furthermore, society more generally should expect the processes through 
which energy is obtained are safe, and do are not damaging either to humans 
or the wider environment.  
In the absence however of critical reflection of these issues, either by 
policymakers or the media (with whom self-interest, rather than societal 
interest tends to prevail), it is left to society itself to come to their own 
conclusions, and thus create a “countervailing critical mass or social 
consensus for policy action” (Unruh, 2002). This thesis suggests that it is 
community energy pioneers - including both formal CE groups and the wider 
group of actors employing small-scale energy approaches – that form the 
vanguard of this critical mass. 
First, the CE movement in particular has largely been driven by grassroots 
subaltern interests, which are by their nature dissenting towards assumptions 
around the ‘correct’ way to structure an energy system, and emphasising 
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dramatically different sets of values. For example, many CE groups cite the 
relocalisation of energy value as a central driver, and actively oppose the 
exertion of power by incumbents. In doing so, CE and citizen-oriented energy 
more widely has in many ways has raised questions around the inevitability of 
a specific variant of capitalism (i.e. that which concentrates value and wealth) 
whilst highlighting the existence of an alternative. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the fallibility of capitalism as we know it is 
being demonstrated more widely. In particular, the advent of ICT and the 
consequence of increasing abundance and availability of information and the 
rise of collaborative consumption is giving rise to embryonic innovations that 
challenge the assumptions of modern day capitalism, i.e. the efficacy of 
markets or the importance of property rights (Mason, 2015). Additionally, just 
as the institutions of capitalism are socially constructed, new modes of 
‘postcapitalism’ can be formulated to reflect conscious and collective 
deliberation about its failings and around alternatives. 
Community energy might certainly be considered an embryonic innovation in 
some regards, for example in the blurring of social with market-based values 
and the blending of private with public and community-based goods and 
services. The strong foundation of social capital (networks, trust and 
reciprocity, as highlighted in Chapter 7) means that community energy is by 
definition collaborative, and as such it actively promotes the sharing of 
information and expertise, rather than marketization of such resources. Of 
course, it should be pointed out that as with other embryos, such new modes 
of capitalism have been facilitated by enabling technologies, which includes 
ICT, but also small-scale technologies. 
9.2.2 Increasing levels of engagement  
While the established energy system has come to be one that is disengaging 
of society, the emergence of both CE and citizen-oriented energy is 
demonstrating that a) people and communities want to be more engaged and 
b) will need to be more engaged in order to meet our energy challenges. 
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First, the uptake of domestic renewables alone (and solar PV in particular) is 
testament to the fact that people are far more engaged i.e. that people are 
willing to become more than just consumers of energy, than forecasts had 
suggested. The growth in both community energy and the entrance of local 
authorities into the niche space is evidence of significant willingness to 
engage in collective energy efforts, and while this comprises engagement by 
civil society citizens as ‘prosumers’, it includes other forms of both active and 
passive engagement such as investment, participation in CE groups, and 
support for local RE schemes. At a broader level, increases in supplier 
switching rates over recent years has been driven by the arrival of new 
entrants, and marks a potential shift in consumers’ attitudes with respect to 
how energy is perceived as a good. 
As distributed energy networks expand, so too do the opportunities for citizen 
engagement. This will be relevant in terms of ongoing decentralisation of 
energy in and near populations (including electricity generation, but also 
renewable heat and electric transport), but particularly in terms of the 
increasing focus on integration of such technologies into networks. For 
example, the ability of smart grids to facilitate more flexible, responsive 
networks is based on assumptions about the propensity of consumers to 
engage with energy in different ways than they have previously. 
One particular benefit of increased citizen engagement may be increased 
opportunities around addressing energy efficiency (Hall and Roelich, 2015). 
The deepening of RE and the emergence of smart infrastructure both create 
channels through which citizens are linked more explicitly to the energy 
system, and manifested through new relationships with energy providers and 
other actors (e.g. within district heating networks). Such new and changed 
relationships, backed up by new business models, offer novel opportunities 
for more holistic energy services, such as ensuring homes are well insulated 
before renewable heat technologies are installed, for instance. The 
emergence of real-time information and feedback enabled by smart meters 
(which offer a degree of passive engagement) may also encourage uptake of 
energy efficiency measures (Darby, 2006). 
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All of this goes some way to refuting the assumption that energy policy 
objectives can be carried through without people noticing. Rather, by giving 
people a stake in the energy system, we can evidently give people a reason 
to care about its future. 
9.2.3 Challenging institutional and cognitive norms 
One important consequence of increasing the proportion of small-scale 
energy is that it is challenging institutional and cognitive norms of the energy 
system. Institutional and cognitive norms encompass the rules by which 
individuals, businesses, and governance institutions abide, for example 
attitudes, values, and worldviews, shaping how energy is governed (Geels 
and Deuten, 2006, Verbong and Geels, 2007, Kuzemko, 2014). Small-scale 
energy brings with it a new set of rules and assumptions about how the 
energy system could be governed. 
It has been argued that energy has undergone a process of non-deliberative 
depoliticisation whereby the creation of institutions has narrowed debate 
around energy issues by assuming norms around how energy should be 
governed (Kuzemko, 2014). This places value on specific forms of expertise 
and information (i.e. technical and economic) particularly as this is held as 
more credible than others (i.e. social and behavioural) (Hay and Wincott, 
1998, Adler and Haas, 1992). This supports dominant framing of energy as a 
supply issue, and the maintenance of dominant centralised supply-focused 
technologies. Such norms around accepted principles and assumptions 
contributes to lock-in by presenting decisions as agreed or non-negotiable, 
and as such renders decisions them untouchable to debate and deliberation 
by outside actors (Kuzemko, 2014). 
While it is fair to say that the UK energy system is still very much centred on 
both technocratic and non-deliberative forms of governance, development of 
knowledges around energy systems is slowly challenging this as a system 
norm. Most important of these is the acknowledgement of system-wide 
approach to addressing the energy challenges, and related to this, the 
increasing contribution of social sciences to understanding and enabling 
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energy system change. The increasing contribution of social science (relative 
to technical disciplines) in energy research has coevolved alongside the 
growing role for people and communities in shaping the energy system, and 
marks a shift in demand for more appropriate forms of knowledge (Sovacool, 
2014, Stirling, 2014b). As the role of individuals and communities in the 
energy system intensifies, a deeper understanding of the social and 
behavioural dimensions of energy will be needed in order to engage these 
actors. 
9.2.4 Overcoming presumed normativity  
The deepening of the relationship between society and energy assets and 
issues suggests that energy governance is slowly but inexorably becoming 
more plural and polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2014, Goldthau, 2014). 
Marking a significant departure from centralised control, polycentrism is 
considered more likely to address issues relating to equity, inclusivity, 
information, accountability, organisational multiplicity and adaptability, all of 
which are predisposed to more effective energy and climate governance 
(Ostrom, 2007, Ostrom, 2014). The emerging polycentrism in energy 
governance, involving households, communities, business communities, local 
authorities and central government also less prone to regulatory capture, are 
more legitimate and participative than has ever been the case under 
centralised governance, and the momentum towards more polycentrism 
seems likely to continue. 
For incumbents, the emergence of polycentrism poses a challenge to their 
agency and ultimately to their existence. Energy system incumbents value 
inertia as a check against instability: the security and familiarity inherent in 
incremental change (i.e. slight tweaking, but continuation of support for 
centralised technology policies) is much preferable to radical changes, which 
may involve more risk, but also usually different actors. It is thus that RE and 
energy efficiency technologies are unfavourably framed by incumbents as 
unreliable, inefficient, and immature, and new value propositions framed as 
illegitimate. 
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For businesses, though, sunk assets and cognitive norms is also symptomatic 
of complacency, which contributes to the tendency for established companies 
to consistently ‘miss the wave’ of disruptive innovations, the new attributes 
they introduce, and the new markets they create and then dominate (Bower 
and Christensen, 1996). The reluctance of the Big Six to invest more heavily 
in renewable infrastructure is in part due to the assumption (by policymakers 
as well as themselves) that centralised, thermal plant will always have a role 
to play in the UK energy system because of the perceived necessity for 
reliable base load. The expansion and integration of RE technologies however 
is challenging this assumption (Holliday, 2015). Institutional and cognitive 
norms provide further barriers to thinking outside the box. 
More fundamentally, the mere state of incumbency (i.e. being in power, and 
being among the majority) may encourage in incumbents a state of ‘presumed 
normativity’, meaning that worldviews, values and methods are assumed to 
be the ‘correct’ ones (Stirling, 2015). Incumbent trajectories are thus held as 
“paradigmatic of progress”, and are deemed as necessary and inevitable as 
they are positive (Ibid). Such Panglossian judgements have been recently 
vindicated by the election of a majority Conservative government, thereby 
providing a mandate both for severe increases in austerity measures 
alongside massive reductions in support for sustainable energy.  
However, in light of ongoing polycentrism, presumed normativity is unlikely to 
be politically sustainable. There is a huge disconnect between the move to 
devolved power at the local government / city scale, and the command-and-
control style of governance favoured by the Cameron/Osborne partnership, 
but it is clear which is the more legitimate. 
9.3 Managing the unmanageable? 
It is clear then that small-scale energy offers potential for transformational 
change in the energy system. It is thus worth reflecting on the role of 
policymakers as well as other actors in affecting such change.  
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9.3.1 A fallacy of control? 
Taking domestic renewables as an example, the small-scale FiT can be 
understood as having a democratising effect, and while this was a key driver 
for proponents of the policy, subsequent policy design was more aligned with 
deployment objectives.  
Government intervention in the UK (particularly creation of the FiT) was a 
central factor to the development of small-scale energy over the last few 
years. The underestimation of deployment rates under the FiT however is 
striking, and suggests limits to the degree of control government policy has on 
the development of the sector. Installed capacity of solar PV in 2014 was 
around 10 times that thought plausible under the highest rate of annual 
deployment (DECC, 2011c, DECC, 2015b). The cost of installing large-scale 
solar in 2013 was less than the lowest projected estimate in 2011 for 2015. 
Wind capacity also exceeded the highest expected deployment rates, though 
to a lesser degree than with solar, and lower associated cost reductions. Such 
underestimations of both deployment rates and cost reductions are in part 
explained by assumptions by DECC that sector growth in the UK would mirror 
that already taken place in Germany (Grubb, 2014). 
In terms too of social innovation, while community approaches to addressing 
energy challenges were mentioned in early DECC White Papers, the 
emphasis was on energy saving rather than also the potential for generation, 
and while growth of the sector has been relatively modest, the interest in 
citizen, community and Local Authority-led forms of energy production could 
not have been predicted at the outset of the FiT. Nor could the impact of 
diversification of ownership be predicted, such as how pioneering work of CE 
practitioners is paving the way for a suite of new business models across 
different actors. As with technological innovation, the globalisation of 
information facilitates the transfer of social learning from such exemplars 
around potential benefits, as well as new ways of doing things. Moreover, 
social innovation is overwhelmingly driven by grassroots social interests, 
which is by definition beyond the control of policy, not least because the 
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drivers and benefits of social innovation are social – rather than monetary - in 
nature.  
To suggest that the UK government has driven transformational change would 
be to fall foul of the fallacy of control, whereby greater roles are assigned to 
intention - and thus to the traits of political actors - than to serendipity. It is not 
that policymakers have been impotent in influencing change, but only that it 
can be difficult to ascertain the influence of government in shaping change. 
This of course has implications in limiting expectations about what we think 
government could do to enact change, not least because the transformational 
changes underway in the energy system (more affordable technologies, 
diverse ownership etc.) are acting to further dilute top-down agency.  
9.3.2 Management or murmuration? 
The fallacy of top-down control is especially evident when considered 
opposite the dispersed and unpredictable dynamics of individuals. Driven by 
autonomous agency and underpinned by social collectivity around specific 
values, virtues and visions, transformational movements such as those within 
small scale energy are by definition resilient to the imposition and reframing of 
values from above. For example, while incumbent interests might favour the 
professionalization and standardised ‘scaling up’ of community energy, the 
value of community energy and transformative movements in a wider sense is 
in the alternative, social, even antagonistic questioning of what is valuable, 
and how to get there, rather than conformation to the norms of incumbent 
interests. 
It is thus by these definitional qualities of autonomous agency and social 
collectivity that Stirling relates the dynamics of transformations to 
‘murmurations’, steered relationally by the spontaneous realignment of myriad 
subjective orientations (Stirling, 2015). Such a term seeks to convey the 
dynamism and agility of the underlying bases of transformative movements, 
through radical and rapid realignment through “emergent latent coordination 
between autonomous subjects” (Ibid). The ability of grassroots movements 
such as community energy to shape-shift to continually align with societal 
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interests is only possible because they are driven, and expressions of, 
societal interests.  
This also explains the inappropriateness of the containment and management 
of such movements, particularly as embracing their organic, unruly and 
unpredictable nature is perhaps the only way to permit progressive 
innovations to mature. 
9.3.3 Lessons from international exemplars 
What is there to be learnt then from the international exemplars discussed in 
Chapter 3? The chapter summarised a range of circumstances from both 
Denmark and Germany that could be used to explain strong community 
energy sectors. In particular path dependency in these cases can be used to 
explain how current energy system features have evolved from historic 
circumstances 53 . For example, traditions of cooperative movements and 
regional and plural governance arrangements paved the way for distributed 
ownership and control of RE and related grid assets, which in turn explain a 
strong societal ownership of both the challenges and solutions of the energy 
systems. Also, reliance on wind power for agriculture in Denmark supported 
the development of knowledge, expertise, and supply chains around wind for 
domestic electricity generation, which was reinforced as Denmark became the 
global leader in wind technology.  
Such path dependency towards small-scale distributed energy systems can 
also be attributed to the move away from large-scale energy as an alternative. 
For example, strong support for locally derived renewable energy was 
                                            
 
53 It should be acknowledged that lessons from past experiences are often (if not 
always) affected by the narrative fallacy, which arise inevitably from our eagerness to 
make sense of the world, and the ease at which specific salient events can be seized 
as causal narrative elements (Taleb, 2007; Kahneman, 2011).  
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complimented by strong opposition for nuclear power as a sustainable option 
in both countries, making nuclear moratoria attractive propositions for both. In 
sum, historic circumstances has made meant that it has perhaps been easier, 
politically and technically for these countries to follow a path towards more 
decentralised energy systems than the UK. Moreover, path dependency in 
these countries is reinforcing rather than resistant of local energy: political 
choice is constrained by societal pressure to maintain local control and 
ownership over energy assets, rather than gain it in the first place, as in the 
UK. 
However, as this chapter has shown, the context within which energy systems 
can be understood is changing, in terms of the necessities of climate change 
mitigation, the availability of new technologies and the evolution of societal 
preferences, such that new pathways are presenting themselves to 
policymakers. It is possible to presume that since the UK has not been 
endowed with the same attributes as Denmark or Germany, it is less able, or 
even unable to make any progress towards a sustainable energy system. 
However, this stance would be defeatist. Having a different historic path to 
Germany and Denmark does not mean that the UK has missed the boat, but it 
does mean that RE and citizen oriented energy finds it more challenging to 
demonstrate value to policymakers, both in economic and political terms. 
However, the technological and societal transformation underway, this thesis 
argues, means that there is increasing pressure to catch up with pioneering 
countries. 
Indeed, such transformative changes present real opportunities to become as 
much of a leader in some emerging fields as Denmark and Germany have 
become in both supporting RE industries and diverse ownership thereof. To 
maximise the benefits offered by energy system transformation, the UK must 
both acknowledge their existence, and develop a coherent strategy to develop 
opportunities before it is too late. The rest of this section summarises five 
ways through which lessons learnt from Denmark and Germany’s experiences 
could help to secure such opportunities.  
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First, in the same way that Denmark sought domination of wind power supply 
chains, there is an emergent opportunity to lead the way internationally in 
terms of expertise and innovation around smart grid solutions. By reframing 
the challenges posed by increasing RE deployment as an opportunity, the UK 
is in an extremely good position to pioneer novel smart grid applications, data 
and system management and novel business models (Strbac et al., 2016), all 
of which will become increasingly valued in a world with increasingly 
distributed energy systems. 
Secondly, history shows us that while the context of energy systems is 
continually evolving (not least in terms of technological development, global 
climate policy and societal preferences), some countries (e.g. Germany and 
Denmark) are evidently more deft than others (e.g. the UK) in responding to 
change. In making future decisions then, the UK must recognise the ever-
changing context of the energy system means that building flexibility into the 
energy system is a must. The ability to flex in response to new conditions will 
avoid lock in to unsustainable pathways, minimise the sunk costs associated 
with supporting out-dated policies, infrastructures and institutions, and regain 
direction should perverse outcomes to policies present themselves (Schuppe, 
2015b). Flexible, reflexive and adaptable governance arrangements then are 
a must, and the UK can learn much from the kind of inclusive (and therefore 
stable) policymaking environment exhibited in Denmark (Lockwood, 2015). 
Third, the counterpoint to flexibility however is having an overarching vision, 
and therein lies another key lesson from the cases explored in Chapter 3. 
Both Denmark and Germany, while admittedly playing to path dependent 
strengths, have both demonstrated the importance of vision and determination 
in setting long-term objectives and designing policy around these objectives. 
Amid the bleakness of energy policy under the conservative government, 
some glints of sense have emerged in the form of the establishment of the 
National Infrastructure Commission, which has been charged with providing 
oversight in terms of the best direction for the UK energy system (National 
Infrastructure Commission, 2016a). Such a development has the potential to 
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provide the Government with a much-needed, impartial but trusted steer on 
the infrastructural needs of the future energy system. 
Fourth, the UK should acknowledge both the need and the desire for energy 
system infrastructures to be integrated sensitively within communities. The 
strong supportive constituency behind the governance of energy in Germany 
demonstrates the importance of legitimacy in making energy decisions 
(Lockwood, 2014). In the same vein, the UK can do much better in capitalising 
on strong public support for renewable energy options relative to large-scale 
fossil-fuel options (DECC, 2016) rather than pursuing the development of the 
latter, such as shale gas. 
And lastly, integrating RE has been helped in part by interconnectedness of 
Denmark and Germany’s grids with its neighbours. While this is clearly more 
challenging for the UK as an island nation, the forthcoming interconnection 
programme (National Infrastructure Commission, 2016b) is testament to the 
UK’s ability to identify and react to opportunities of an emerging global energy 
system. 
9.3.4 Key policy lessons 
Several key lessons can be drawn from this. First, the UK needs to create a 
vision of an energy future that aligns energy policy objectives with ongoing 
transformation within the energy system. This would necessarily require policy 
to more meaningfully engage with individuals, households, and society more 
generally in terms of shaping the future energy system around the needs of 
people, rather than business interests. Importantly, this would necessitate an 
urgent rethinking of current policy, which favours revisiting both centralised, 
but undemocratic forms of energy such as nuclear, and repurposing fossil fuel 
exploitation for unconventional gas. Continuing with either proposition would 
represent a backward step away from a sustainable energy future. As a check 
against this, all energy policy decisions should be appraised on their ability to 
engage society proactively, rather than exist as a side effect. 
Second, energy policy should as far as possible nurture those parts of the 
energy system that offer potential. This includes supporting the development 
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of a diversity of renewables in general, but with a focus on augmenting the 
democratising impact of such technologies in particular. Community energy is 
a necessary component of energy policy strategy, though it should certainly 
not be considered sufficient in terms of engaging the whole of society. Rather, 
diversity within community energy should be supported, particularly because 
space to innovate in response to changing circumstances and adapt to local 
contexts is vital if we are to maximise the potential benefits of the 
democratisation of energy. For example, local energy markets represent 
significant progress in terms of introducing justice, equity and participation, as 
well as more conventional forms of value into local populations, and their 
development should be supported. There is a clear role for, and precedent of, 
devolved administrations such as Local Authorities and cities to provide more 
progressive leadership in supporting citizen-oriented and community energy: 
such bodies can employ latent resources (including physical, financial, 
human, and organisational capital) in ways that most CE groups cannot, 
whilst maintaining a position of proximity and trust with local communities. 
Lastly, in the absence of preferential treatment of community energy, or of 
citizen-oriented engagement more generally, better-resourced commercial 
actors will always outcompete them. Commercial and social enterprises offer 
entirely different value propositions, such that policy decisions to level the 
playing field must take into account differences in resource availability, but 
also the ability to deliver value. For wholly private projects, projects may be 
developed quickly, but they will be disengaged from local populations and 
offer relatively little value to society as revenues will be internalised. For 
projects wholly or partly owned by social enterprises, deployment may take 
considerably longer, but will offer considerably higher value to local 
communities. This raises questions around whether policy should be 
embracing commercial, rather than social needs, and indeed what this means 
for the legitimacy of policy actors. 
On the face of it, citizen-oriented energy might at one point resemble an 
unstoppable force challenging the immovable object of centralised energy 
system incumbents. On closer inspection however, the paradox falls down: as 
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the proliferation and interconnection of emergent social and technological 
innovations continues, ‘community energy’ is revealed as an increasingly 
broad set of actors, values and business models, some of which will struggle 
and perish, some of which will learn, adapt and thrive, but all of which are 
valuable. System incumbents are similarly diverse in their ability to adapt and 
respond to prevailing pressures and opportunities. Additionally, learning 
around technological and social innovation from other countries undergoing 
transformation means that the UK energy system is continually exposed to 
pressures from outside. It is in this wider context that citizen-oriented energy 
as a transformational movement appears unstoppable. 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter progresses from a sociotechnical transition-perspective of 
community energy to considering the transformational potential of the 
movement. In summary, the chapter discusses how new technologies and 
new actors are changing the rules of the energy system from one which relies 
on economies of scale to one in which network economies are more 
important. This implies a shift of assets, wealth and thus value from a small 
number of private actors to a large, distributed and diverse network of actors 
including citizens from civil society, but also encompassing businesses and 
local authorities. 
Further, it was suggested that community energy is inherently aligned with 
transformational processes in terms of responding to societal needs, 
engaging new actors, challenging institutional and cognitive norms, and 
overcoming presumptions around the ‘right’ way to govern the energy system. 
This raises questions about the relative roles and responsibilities in shaping 
energy system transformation. 
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10 Conclusions 
This thesis set out to explore the value of community energy in the UK. In light 
of the multiple challenges of climate change and concerns around energy 
insecurity, cost and quality, analyses of approaches have hitherto ignored the 
overarching issue of scale, that is, whether small-scale energy technologies 
and dispersed ownership offer particular benefits to addressing these 
challenges. The expansion of both formal and informal community energy in 
the UK is characterised by a dramatically different set of technologies, 
ownership arrangements and governance structures than is conventional, and 
thus provides an entry point for understanding the role of small-scale energy. 
A review of the literature identified three overarching themes that provided the 
rationale for the perspectives taken in this thesis. Firstly, incumbency and 
innovation in energy systems are often studied as isolated phenomena, which 
neglects the complex dynamic between the two. Secondly, that technical and 
economic perspectives typically shape our academic and political 
understanding of energy issues is fundamentally ignorant of the importance of 
social dimensions. And lastly, the general tendency of studies around 
community energy to focus on either specific experiences or sector-wide 
evolution masks the importance of the scaling up of expectations and 
experiences from projects on-the-ground towards insights around system 
evolution and transformational change. 
To address these emergent themes, the original research question, What is 
the value of community energy in the UK?, was established. From that broad, 
overarching question, three more specific lines of inquiry were identified. 
These were: 
a) What impact can community and citizen-oriented energy have on local 
energy systems? 
b) How do social dimensions of community energy relate to its value? 
c) In what ways does the community energy movement, and citizen-
oriented energy more widely impact upon the wider UK energy 
system? 
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While this thesis took ‘community energy’ to mean formalised groups and 
adopted DECC’s definition of “collective action to purchase, manage and 
generate energy” (DECC, 2014b), the foundations and embeddedness of 
such groups within civil society called for broader consideration of the role of 
individuals and communities to encompass citizen-oriented energy. 
Community energy provided the primary focus for this research, but this is 
considered within the context of citizen-oriented energy activities more 
broadly, which considers the role of individuals as consumers, prosumers, 
activists, investors and voters (Figure 4.1). 
10.1 Summary of results and discussion 
The findings of this thesis can be distilled down to eight key points, which 
capture the essence of the main arguments. These are as follows: 
1. Today’s energy system is considerably different in terms of both 
the ‘rules of the game’, and the game itself. We no longer expect 
the energy system to just provide us with energy; it also needs to be 
clean, secure and sustainable. Technological and social innovations 
have created new means through which objectives can be met. 
2. Overcoming inertia within the energy system can be considered a 
key challenge. Ignoring inertia and focusing only on the energy 
‘trilemma’ risks making only marginal adjustments to the system, rather 
than the structural change that is required. 
3. Only small-scale energy can overcome inertia. Large-scale 
infrastructure and ownership models are fundamentally inconsistent 
with change, particularly as they represent considerable-sized sunk 
assets controlled by a small number of stakeholders. 
4. There is a trend towards more small-scale energy. The 
development of renewable energy technologies in particular is 
rescaling energy technologies towards scales more appropriate with 
the demand requirements of consumers. 
5. Social capital has become an increasingly important resource for 
the energy system. As the energy system involves an increasing 
269 
 
 
number of stakeholders from civil society, the importance of networks, 
trust and reciprocity is increasing. 
6. Community energy has been influential in spawning a broad 
range of business models. The principles and approaches developed 
by learning in the community energy sector are being used by other 
actors, such as local authorities, beyond the community energy niche 
space. 
7. The development of small-scale technologies in particular is 
having the effect of democratising UK energy system. This 
represents a significant shift from concentrated value and power within 
the established energy system to greater distribution of value and 
power in the emergent system. 
8. There is a key role for policy in engaging society in the energy 
system. Policies can be more or less democratic in the ways that they 
engage and distribute value differently. Given the direction of energy 
system change, policymakers should consider the strategic importance 
of democratisation. 
10.2 Summary of chapters 
This section provides a brief summary of the empirical and discussion 
chapters of the thesis. 
10.2.1 Establishing a baseline for community energy impacts 
The literature review highlighted the paucity of robust, objective evidence 
around the impact of community energy. This is in part related to the inherent 
subjectivities around deciding what to measure, as well as how to measure it. 
Moreover, approaches taken by community energy practitioners are often ad-
hoc, and focus on absolute project successes rather than relating to robust 
baseline measurements. The overall premise of this chapter was that the local 
focus of community energy means that the impact of a group’s activities are 
heavily influenced by the specific local context regarding the resources, 
opportunities and constraints present in each locality.  
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In developing an understanding of Wadebridge’s energy system, Chapter five 
establishes the context upon which change can be understood. This 
presented the findings from a large-scale household energy survey. The 
relatively broad geographical focus of WREN means that relatively large local 
variations exist in terms of the local housing stock, access to the gas network, 
and socioeconomic and demographic spread compared to smaller community 
energy groups. Such variety as suggests that the case study, Wadebridge 
might be considered a microcosm of larger geographical areas, where 
multiple challenges relevant to energy policy present themselves (such as fuel 
poverty and opportunities and appetite for increased deployment of 
renewables), although trade-offs between goals are perhaps inevitable. 
Similarly, the local energy economy is characterised by considerable 
variations in domestic energy consumption profiles and expenditures across 
the study area, in large part due uneven connectivity to the gas network. 
The household energy survey also showed that local public support for the 
need to both reduce overall energy consumption and increase investment in 
renewables, with a preference for smaller scale technologies in the form of 
rooftop PV (although local wind and larger scale solar were also held 
favourably). In terms of governance, the population supported community-
scale decision-making, although it was acknowledged that local issues had to 
be balanced with strategic oversight. Trust and participation emerged as key 
themes here: there were some limits to their willingness to become more 
involved personally (at least without knowing more), and while some 
individuals questioned the authority of WREN in shaping Wadebridge’s 
energy future, it is suggested that these perceptions will be shaped by 
attention to process as projects progress, i.e. by creating, nurturing and 
delivering upon expectations. The large membership of WREN suggests at 
least tacit support approval of the ethos and activities WREN represent, both 
locally and further afield. 
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10.2.2 Measuring success 
Employing WREN as a case study, Chapter six set out to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the impacts of WREN’s programme of 
activities, and in doing so directly addressed the first research question. In 
summary, the chapter highlighted a broad range of impacts resulting from 
WREN’s activities. Particular progress has been made in the last few years 
around developing local renewable energy capacity, particularly in the 
deployment of small-scale PV and renewable heat. In both instances, WREN 
has demonstrated that community groups can act as important centres of 
expertise, providing initial information about technologies and government 
support schemes, assisting with project appraisal, and as a signposting 
service to trusted local installers. A valuable element of community energy 
groups such as WREN is as trusted local intermediaries in the delivery of both 
information as well as support for domestic renewable deployment. 
In addition to support for small-scale renewables, WREN had acted as a key 
point of contact for larger schemes. For example, support of local larger-scale 
wind and solar installations ensures provides channels for public engagement 
for privately-owned installations. This helps to foster local legitimacy for such 
schemes while providing democratic means through which monetary 
community benefits can be distributed. Furthermore, WREN has been 
involved in a wide range of activities, including acting as intermediaries for 
government demand reduction schemes, providing education and training for 
schools and businesses, and negotiating preferential prices through the bulk-
buying of energy-related products. 
The impact of WREN on the local energy system has been exceptionally 
broad, and demonstrates the ability of community energy groups to operate 
holistically in facilitating a wide range of energy-related goods and services. 
Proposals to develop local electricity supply will likely build on significant 
networks of local support, and can be expected to take local benefits to the 
next level. 
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On a more fundamental level, the chapter highlighted the importance of 
multidimensional, distributional and temporal considerations when assessing 
impact in community energy, and in doing so contributes to ongoing 
discussions around standardising assessment methodologies.  
10.2.3 Social capital and community energy 
The literature review highlighted the potential for community energy to engage 
with society in way that has not been possible under a regime dominated by 
centralised technologies and governance frameworks. As an investigation of 
the interplay between WREN’s evolution and social capital, Chapter seven 
addresses the second research question: How do social dimensions of 
community energy relate to its value?  
In summary, the chapter suggested that human capital, along with three types 
of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking have all played significant roles 
in WREN’s evolution. For WREN, who like the majority of community energy 
groups was formed by individuals, human capital is a critical component in 
terms of the development a local vision, and the existence of requisite 
knowledge, experience and determination needed to develop that vision. 
Bonding capital is then developed through the coalescing of other likeminded 
individuals to gather around such nuclei, and the collective negotiation of 
common objectives and values. Legitimacy within the community is 
dependent on the availability and deployment of bridging capital, which for 
WREN has been achieved by broadening the appeal of the programme, by, 
for example making energy relevant to wider needs and aspirations of the 
community. Lastly, linking capital, as the relationship with those outside of the 
network holding power and influence has in WREN’s case has been deployed 
to great effect, such as through representation within DECC’s Community 
Energy Contact Group. In order for community energy to move from visions, 
to practice, to becoming agents of the energy system, the availability and use 
of all forms of social capital is thus considered of utmost importance. 
In a broader sense, with regard to ongoing academic bias towards technical 
and economic perspectives on energy pathways, this chapter sought to 
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readdress the balance towards the social dimensions. The social dimension of 
community energy is shown to have local impacts in terms of facilitating the 
growth of populations’ capabilities, and sector-wide impacts through the 
employment of linking capital towards progressive ends. 
10.2.4 The growth and diversification of community energy  
Chapter 8 moves on from analysis of a single project to consider the impacts 
of the wider community energy sector, as well as of ‘community energy’ more 
broadly. First, it offered a critique into the importance of expectations, 
networks and learning as three elements considered in the transition literature 
as critical to the development of niche innovations. 
Second, recognising that CE does not develop in a vacuum, it then discusses 
how ongoing forces in the broader context of the energy system, for example 
the democratising effect of alternative energy technologies, the widening 
societal consensus around climate change, and the strengthening role of 
individualistic tendencies in society.  
While the CE sector has clearly developed in itself, there is also evidence to 
suggest that other actors beyond the traditional CE niche are adapting to the 
opportunities small-scale energy affords, particularly as a response to 
pioneering approaches taken by CE actors. This is being manifested in the 
growing diversity of business models being adopted by both businesses and 
other regime actors, such as local authorities. 
10.2.5 The transformational effect of democratisation 
The literature review suggests that overcoming inertia can be considered a 
key challenge alongside the energy trilemma. Chapter nine thus focuses on 
the role of small-scale energy in affecting system transformation, rather than 
just sociotechnical transition. In addressing the contribution of community 
energy to such transformational shifts this chapter completes the response to 
the third research question: ‘In what ways does community energy impact 
upon the wider UK energy system?’ 
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Specifically, the chapter picks apart how emergent technologies are 
democratising the energy system, and how this, and other factors are 
contributing to transformational change in the energy system. Democratisation 
of energy the energy system implies a shift of assets, wealth and thus value 
from a small number of private actors to a large, distributed and diverse 
network of actors including civil society, but also encompassing businesses 
and local authorities. 
As Chapter 2 discussed, the ‘rules of the game’ have changed in terms of 
what we require the energy system to do, i.e. address climate mitigation and 
offer energy security, rather than just provide consumers with unending 
supplies of energy. By offering the prospect for devolved power and wealth, 
energy system democratisation contributes to these changing rules by 
creating a new set of values around engaging with the energy system, whilst 
providing the means through which more meaningful engagement can occur. 
The close alignment of small-scale energy with societal needs, the greater 
need to engage with individuals, and the emergence of a new set of 
institutional and cognitive norms are identified as key elements of enabling 
transformative change. As such, small-scale energy is considered vital to 
overcoming inertia. This however raises questions about the role of 
policymakers in determining the ‘right’ way to govern the energy system, as 
well as put in place the policies to enable this.  
10.3 Contributions, limitations and future avenues for research 
This final section reflects on the contribution of the thesis to audiences in 
practice, academia and policy, on the limitations of the research, and on the 
potential contribution of future avenues of research in addressing these, and 
other opportunities for knowledge creation. 
10.3.1 Contribution of knowledge  
As a thesis focusing on the value of community energy, this research 
contributes to the growing body of evidence around community energy. In so 
far as is possible, this research seeks a more rounded understanding of 
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community energy impacts, which is currently reliant on more anecdotal and 
ad-hoc accounts of the sector. Furthermore, the methodologies employed in 
this thesis to understand the multi-dimensional aspects of community energy 
will be of value to ongoing attempts to standardise appraisal of efforts within 
community energy. 
Related to this is the contribution this thesis makes to the philosophy of 
understanding impact in community energy. While it is natural for practitioners 
and policymakers alike to wish for standardised appraisal methods, the 
creation of such a tool would risk being ignorant of the diversity of contexts, 
resources, drivers and approaches characteristic of the community energy 
sector. From a policy perspective, such considerations are important if 
community energy is to be seen as anything more than another economic 
sector. 
This thesis has engaged with literatures on innovations and governance, and 
is of particular value in bringing together understanding of incumbency and 
inertia with that of innovation and dynamism. To this end, the MLP in 
particular offered a key framework of analysis, and this research contributes 
to ongoing developments in our understanding of this interface. 
Of value for the MLP literature is the mapping of real-world observations on to 
the theoretical heuristics the MLP offers, particularly concerning micro-
dynamics of social interactions, public perceptions, and micropolitics of 
community energy. While the MLP is considered valuable as an academic 
tool, such observations enriches and brings life to assumptions of agency in 
theoretical frameworks and operationalizes such abstractions for the 
understanding of a more diverse set of audiences, for example in civil society 
and policy. 
This thesis also seeks to further understandings of community energy for 
policymakers (at both central and local government levels), through an 
objective description of the evolution of the sector within the context of 
broader landscape-level processes. Highlighting the social value of the 
movement seeks to encourage a reassessment of the frameworks through 
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which energy decisions are made. While the subjectivities of sustainable 
energy progress remain open to debate, this thesis seeks to highlight that 
transformational processes are underway, and there are potential gains to be 
made by capitalising on the opportunities transformation brings. 
10.3.2 Limitations and future research avenues 
As with all pieces of research, several limitations can be identified that may 
constrain the contribution of this research to policy, practice or academia. 
Firstly, a conscious decision was made to employ a case study approach to 
provide an in-depth account of a single community energy project. As Chapter 
four showed, there are potential limitations to this approach in terms of the 
extent to which such observations can be considered representative of the 
wider movement. As chapter four discusses, representativeness was not 
considered vital in this case, largely because community energy is so context 
specific. However, it is conceded that in-depth analysis of other groups would 
further increase the richness in understanding that case-studies can bring. 
Analysis of similar groups, carrying out similar projects in comparable 
contexts might be useful in highlighting how subtle differences in available 
resources influence project outcome, for example. Observations of other 
groups would be similarly valuable in terms of building insights around the 
delivery of different projects, such as securing community ownership of local 
infrastructures.  
In the same vein, observing the effect of geographical context on the success 
of community energy initiatives would be valuable in building an 
understanding of the resource requirements of disparate groups. Such work 
would also be important in bringing to light the issue of path dependency in 
community energy, that is the risk that it is those communities already 
relatively rich in resources (including social capital) that are best placed to 
identify and address local energy issues, meaning that other communities, 
which may be in greater need of assistance, may be left behind. This would 
have clear implications for policy in terms of identifying how best to prioritise 
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support for community energy, and would contribute to the emergent literature 
on the geography of energy transition. 
Another limitation potentially arises from the focus on success, rather than 
failure. In part this stems from our natural attraction to success and the 
tendency to attach causal meanings or overly simple narratives to such 
success. Furthermore, successful groups are of course easier to find, and are 
perhaps more willing to success than past groups would be to give a post-
mortem on failed groups. This however means that our understanding of the 
community energy movement is biased towards lessons gleaned from 
successful groups, whereas unsuccessful groups may well provide as much, 
or greater insight into the determinants of success. For example, failure to 
survive as an entity may stem from any one of a number of factors, whose 
avoidance might be ignored by focusing only on narratives of success 
As with many projects of this kind, another limitation of this thesis is the 
conflict between a desire to understand change, and the limited time in which 
to do so. It was carried out during a period of remarkable flux. The four-year 
period of research was marked by both dramatic and incremental changes in 
the subject area, including the rapid reduction of the cost of solar installations, 
continuous change in energy policy with both direct (e.g. publication of the 
government’s first Community Energy Strategy) and indirect (e.g. removal of 
subsidies for onshore wind) consequences for community energy, and huge 
expansion of the community energy sector. It can, however profess to offer no 
more than a relative snapshot, and predictions of how the UK energy system 
will proceed are as speculative as any other. However, as a snapshot this 
thesis does provide a starting point from which longitudinal observations can 
be made, in terms of what is happening in Wadebridge, as well as how the 
wider sector is evolving. 
10.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis addresses the research question: What is the value of community 
energy in the UK? It is argued that the value for energy system stakeholders 
is multi-scalar (i.e. experienced at local, regional and national scales), 
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multidimensional (i.e. takes account of economic, social and environmental 
impacts) and temporal (i.e experienced over different timescales, from the 
immediate, to the generational). Furthermore, community energy initiatives 
are closely aligned and overlap with the increasing role of individuals (rather 
than collectives) as users, prosumers, investors and decision-makers in the 
energy system within which they reside. By bringing together evidence from 
local as well as sectoral-level impacts this thesis provides a holistic, rounded 
perspective of the impact of community energy over the last four years and 
the value of that impact for society. 
Community energy can have significant impacts locally, particularly relating to 
stimulating local investment in renewable energy technologies, retaining the 
revenues associated with such investment, and an associated reduction in 
energy costs. For individuals and communities, such economic benefits are 
not trivial particularly as they represent the desire and the ability to retain 
value locally. Chapter 7 also demonstrated that community energy has the 
ability to affect social organisation relating to addressing energy objectives by 
stimulating the creation of networks around common interests relating both to 
energy issues, and self-determination more generally. 
In terms of wider impact, the UK community energy sector has developed 
considerably over the last four years and is demonstrating widespread 
impacts to local energy systems as well as broader synergistic shifts relating 
to the momentum of the movement as a whole. The diversity inherent in the 
movement is particularly valuable in terms of the opportunity to respond to 
local needs. Furthermore, the diverse learning within community energy 
projects is encouraging new actors, such as local authorities to experiment 
with similar approaches.  
Outside of the immediate community energy space, efforts to better reduce, 
manage and produce energy by individuals has coevolved with the CE 
movement. Such is the momentum of both community and citizen-led energy 
efforts that a tipping point is surely approaching, representing a long-term shift 
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in the scale and distribution of technologies, economics and actors within the 
energy system. 
While community energy encompasses a multitude of drivers and values, the 
democratising potential of technological and social innovations within 
community energy is seductive as it represents a step change in rebalancing 
power towards individuals and communities. It is argued that although policy 
has been relatively negligent of small-scale energy, there is considerable 
momentum behind drives towards more societal engagement in the energy 
system, increasing the need for policy to support this. This suggests an urgent 
need for policymakers and other incumbents to reflect on the realities of the 
emergent energy system, and embrace, rather than resist, small-scale 
energy. 
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12 Appendices 
Appendix 1 Wadebridge Home Energy Survey 
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 Wadebridge Home Energy Survey 
 
 You may be aware of the work the Wadebridge Renewable Energy Network (WREN) is doing to 
tackle the challenges of rising energy costs and help attract low carbon development to the area.  
 
 WREN is a not-for-profit cooperative, Membership costs £1, and runs on a one-member-one-vote 
basis. WREN's goal is to generate 30% of Wadebridge's electricity from renewable sources by 
2015, and 100% by 2020, in a way that maximises local benefits through community ownership 
and local energy supply arrangements, and generates income to be re-invested in the community. 
WREN also aims to help reduce heating bills by making local homes more energy efficient. 
Together, it is hoped that these efforts will bring local economic benefits, such as employment, to 
Wadebridge.  
 
 This survey is being carried out by PFA Research Ltd on behalf of the University of Exeter and 
WREN to help us learn what householders in your local area think about energy issues, and to 
understand how the area uses energy and how this might change in the future. We are looking for 
your opinions, and there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 Please rest assured that your confidentiality is maintained to the highest possible standards. This 
survey is undertaken following the Data Protection Act (1998) and the Market Research Society 
Code of Conduct. In short, your personal details and any other information you provide will not be 
sold or passed on to any third party and, following the survey, we will only make contact with you 
on your request.  
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 Completed questionnaires can either be posted using the enclosed freepost envelope, or handed 
into the WREN Energy Shop on the Platt in Wadebridge. Alternatively, you could fill out the 
questionnaire online at  
http://www.pfa-research.com/e-surveys/wren/wren1.htm. If you have any questions, please call 
into the Energy Shop or contact Iain Soutar, Peter Lanyon Building, Tremough Campus, University 
of Exeter, TR10 9EZ, or by email at i.soutar@exeter.ac.uk. 
 
 Many thanks for taking the time to give us your views.  
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 Your Home 
 
Q1 How many people live at this property? Adults        
    
   Children (Under 16 years of age)   
     
 
Q2 Is your home... 
 Owned q  Rented q        
 
Q3 Approximately how old is the property?   Years 
    
  
Q4 Is your property…? 
 Detached  q  Bungalow  q  Flat q  
 Semi-Detached  q  Terraced  q  Other:   
 
Q5 Do you work from home?  
 No, this is purely a residential 
property 
q  Yes, work from home 
sometimes 
q 
 Yes, work from home all the time  q  Yes, the home is the business 
(i.e. B&B) 
q 
       
Q6 How many people in your household are members of WREN?     
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 Energy in your home 
 
Q7 How do you heat your home? (Please tick all that apply for each column) 
  Water heating  Room heating 
 Mains gas q  q 
 Electricity q  q 
 LPG tank q  q 
 LPG bottle q  q 
 Wood q  q 
 Oil q  q 
 Coal or smokeless fuel q  q 
 Other - Please specify q  q 
 
Q8 If other for water heating, please 
specify:  
 
Q9 If other for room heating, please 
specify:  
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Q10 
Approximately how much energy 
does your household use per 
month OR quarter? 
 
 
M
on
th
ly
 
Q
ua
rte
rly
 
N
ot
 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
D
on
’t 
kn
ow
 
Electricity - Usage in kWh units     
   OR... Electricity - Cost in £      
 
   Gas or LPG - Usage in kWh 
units 
    
   OR... Gas or LPG - Cost in £      
 
   Oil - Litres      
   OR... Oil - Cost in £      
 
   Wood or solid fuels - Cost in £      
      
 
Q11 Since moving into your current property, which of the following have you carried out? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
  Installed double glazing q  Installed a more efficient boiler q  
  Installed loft insulation q  Carried out cavity wall insulation q  
  
Installed solar PV  q 
 Installed ground/Air source heat 
pump  
q 
 
  Installed a woodburner  q     
        
311 
         «ID_Marker» 
 
 
Q12 What were you three main reasons for making 
the changes in Q11?    
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
Q13 Did you access any funding for you energy related home improvements?  
 Yes q No q  
 
Q14 Is your electricity or gas supplied by any of the following suppliers?  
  British Gas q  EDF   q  
  Eon q  Npower   q  
  Scottish Power  q  Scottish and Southern (SSE)  q  
  Good Energy q  Ecotricity  q  
  GreenEnergy q  None of these  q  
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Q15 Would you be interested in any of the following? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
  Investing in local renewable energy generation q  
  Hosting 'free' PC and biomass heating from the WREN Energy Company q  
  Receiving subsidised home insulation q  
  Receiving advice on renewable technologies q  
  Finding out about car-sharing in Wadebridge q  
  Local energy supply arrangements  q  
  Monitoring your own home energy use q  
  Receiving advice on reducing your energy use q  
 
Q16 Would you like WREN to contact you regarding any of the points in Q15?  
 Yes q  No q        
  
 
 Energy in Britain 
 
Q17 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements relating to electricity 
production and consumption in Britain?  
  Strongly 
Agree 
 Agree  Disagree  Strongly 
disagree 
 No opinion 
 It is important that Britain 
invests more in renewable 
energy  
q  q  q  q  q 
 We need to reduce the amount 
of energy we use in this country 
q  q  q  q  q 
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 It is best that Local Government 
decides how our energy is 
produced 
q  q  q  q  q 
 It is best that National 
Government decides how our 
energy is produced  
q  q  q  q  q 
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 Energy in your Community 
 
Q18 To what extent do you agree with the following statements relating to electricity production 
and consumption in Wadebridge?  
  Strongly 
agree 
 Agree  Disagree  Strongly 
disagree 
 No opinion 
 It is important that the energy I 
use is produced locally in the 
community 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Decisions regarding local 
energy issues should be left to 
the local community 
q  q  q  q  q 
 I would personally like to be 
more involved in deciding how 
our local energy is produced 
q  q  q  q  q 
 It is better that renewable 
energy technologies (e.g. wind 
turbines, solar farms etc.) are 
owned by the community rather 
than by an individual or a 
private company 
q  q  q  q  q 
 I would rather renewable 
energy technologies were not 
situated in or around 
Wadebridge 
q  q  q  q  q 
 I am confused by the variety of 
options for energy in 
Wadebridge 
q  q  q  q  q 
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 Energy in your Community 
 
Q19 How supportive would you be of the following sources for producing Wadebridge's 
electricity?  
  Very 
supportive 
 Fairly 
supportive 
 Not very 
supportive 
Not at all 
supportive 
No opinion 
 Coal/gas power stations in 
Cornwall 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Nuclear power stations in 
Cornwall 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Wind farms in the Wadebridge 
area 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Individual wind turbines in the 
Wadebridge area 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Solar PV panels on local 
buildings 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Solar 'farms' in the Wadebridge 
area 
q  q  q  q  q 
 Nuclear power stations, but not 
in Cornwall 
q  q  q  q  q 
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 Thank You 
 
Q20 Our research is continuing, would you be interested in discussing any of the issues raised 
in this survey further?  
 Yes q No q 
 
Q21 Please leave your contact details here if you said ‘Yes’ to question 16 and/or question 20:   
 Title:  
 
 
 First name:  
 
 
 Surname:  
 
 
 
 Address 1:  
 
 
 Address 2:  
 
 
 Town:  
 
 
 Postcode:  
 
 
 
 Email:  
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Q22 Are there any additional comments you would like to make?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for completing the survey. Please return the questionnaire to PFA Research 
Ltd using the included freepost envelope or hand it into the WREN Energy Shop on the Platt in 
Wadebridge by 
17 July 2013 
Should you be unable to locate the freepost envelope please address the return to  
Freepost RSXH-GRAB-JRJR 
PFA Research Ltd 
Tremough Innovation Centre 
Tremough Campus 
Penryn, Cornwall, TR10 9TA 
